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Preface
As silicon technology evolves, chip multi-processor (CMP) and system-on-chip (SoC) de-
signs are dramatically changing from limited, robust and homogeneous logic blocks to
integrating billions of fragile transistors into complex and heterogeneous cores/IPs. This
increased integration has compelled architects to design resource-heavy, complex and
power-hungry on-chip interconnects, moving towards network-on-chip (NoC) structures.
In addition, the waning reliability of silicon poses a great threat to these communication
structures as they could potentially be a single point of failure. Further, the heterogene-
ity and fast time-to-market of upcoming devices makes it nearly impossible to thoroughly
verify NoC architectures and optimize them for power at design-time. Failure of NoC ar-
chitectures to meet correctness, reliability and power-budget requirements has detrimental
effects on the runtime operation of NoC-based CMPs and SoCs. Therefore, highly efficient
runtime detection and reconfiguration mechanisms are becoming a key requisite to unlock
the full potential of future CMPs and SoCs. Such mechanisms can overcome both func-
tional bugs that escaped design-time verification and device failures due to an unreliable
silicon substrate. Similarly, these runtime reconfiguration solutions can also be leveraged
to optimize the communication paths dynamically; particularly, to minimize power dissi-
pation and prevent overheating of the NoC structures.
The solutions proposed in this thesis address the challenges to NoCs’ runtime health by
employing a reactive approach, i.e., error detection followed by recovery. As a result, this
thesis is able to address a wide range of unforeseen problems; particularly the ones aris-
ing from design errors, reliability threats, and excessive power dissipation. Further, the
proposed solutions adopt an integrated approach, addressing both detection and recovery
from errors at runtime. To attain quick and minimalistic error isolation, an application’s ex-
ecution is divided into fixed-time monitoring windows, or epochs, during which distributed
checkers at each NoC router monitor the traffic activity to detect anomalous behavior. If a
failure is detected, a reconfiguration procedure is triggered at epoch boundaries to circum-
vent the detected failures. The reconfiguration procedure is implemented with lightweight
and distributed hardware, and it utilizes broadcasts to synchronize the operation of all NoC
v
nodes.
This thesis ensures the design correctness of NoCs at a low cost by observing that as-
pects that are verified at design-time do not require further checking at runtime. Therefore,
it is sufficient to monitor only a subset of the NoC’s functionality, along with a lightweight
recovery support, to ensure complete design correctness. On the reliability front, this thesis
leverages a novel fault model to diagnose and repair transistor failures at a fine granularity.
In addition, the end-to-end diagnosis and repair procedures are cohesively designed to offer
a graceful performance degradation with an increasing number of faults, losing less than a
third of the processing power when compared to other state-of-the-art solutions. Finally, to
prevent overheating, this thesis proposes a runtime-adaptable and power-tunable NoC de-
sign that dynamically power-gates the NoCs’ components based on application’s activity.
As a result, the leakage power is slashed by up to 37% with less than 2% degradation in the
application’s performance. All the proposed solutions incur an area and power overhead
within 5% of the baseline NoC, and are widely applicable as they require minimal changes
to the underlying design. By offering correct, reliable and power-aware NoC operation
in the face of adverse silicon trends, this thesis enables functional NoC implementations in
future silicon generations that would otherwise have not been possible.
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Abstract
As silicon technology evolves, chip multi-processor (CMP) and system-on-chip (SoC) de-
signs are dramatically changing from limited, robust and homogeneous logic blocks to
integrating billions of fragile transistors into complex and heterogeneous cores/IPs. This
increased integration demands greater on-chip communication bandwidth, which, in turn,
has compelled architects to design resource-heavy, complex and power-hungry on-chip in-
terconnects, moving towards network-on-chip (NoC) structures. In addition, the waning
reliability of silicon poses a great threat to these communication structures as they could
potentially be a single point of failure. Further, the heterogeneity and fast time-to-market
of upcoming computers makes it nearly impossible to thoroughly verify NoC architectures
and optimize them for power at design-time. Failure of NoC architectures to meet cor-
rectness, reliability and power-budget requirements has detrimental effects on the runtime
operation of NoC-based CMPs and SoCs. Therefore, runtime detection and reconfiguration
mechanisms are becoming a key requisite to unlock the full potential of future CMPs and
SoCs. Runtime mechanisms can overcome both functional bugs that escaped design-time
verification and device failures due to an unreliable silicon substrate. Similarly, runtime
reconfiguration solutions can also be leveraged to optimize the communication paths dy-
namically; particularly, to minimize power dissipation and prevent overheating of the NoC
structures.
The solutions proposed in this thesis address these challenges to NoCs’ runtime health
by employing a reactive approach, i.e., error detection followed by recovery. A reactive
approach is a natural choice as it can address a wide range of unforeseen problems; partic-
ularly those arising during runtime operation. Further, the solutions proposed in this thesis
provide integrated detection and recovery from errors. To attain temporal error isolation,
an application’s execution is partitioned into fixed-time monitoring windows, or epochs,
during which distributed checkers, at each NoC router, monitor the traffic activity to de-
tect anomalous behavior. If a failure is detected, a reconfiguration procedure is triggered
at epoch boundaries to circumvent it. The reconfiguration procedure is implemented with
lightweight and distributed hardware, and it utilizes broadcasts to synchronize the oper-
xiii
ations of all network nodes. The solutions are designed to be passive, lightweight and
independent of the baseline design. For all solutions, the design complexity is kept at a min-
imum and the area overhead is within 5% with respect to a baseline NoC. In a nutshell, this
thesis provides low-cost NoC-specific solutions that enable: correct behavior by avoiding
functional bugs, reliable execution by circumventing faults and power-aware operation by
averting overheating. The solution targetting functional correctness ensures correct NoC
operation under all execution scenarios; the reliable NoC degrades >3× more gracefully
than other state-of-the-art solutions, while the power-aware NoC design is able to reduce
leakage power by up to 37% with less than 2% performance loss. The work presented in
the thesis will enable designers to aggressively push scalability and time-to-market limits
with respect to NoC design.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Digital computers, lead by advancements in microelectronics technology over the past few
decades, have become pervasive in modern society. These advancements, for the most part,
can be summarized by Moore’s law, which states that the number of transistors integrable
on a single chip doubles every 18 months [108]. Today, most people, as well as corpora-
tions and institutions, are relying on computers to handle their daily tasks more than ever
before. Computers are the driving force behind phones we use to communicate with each
other; they run banking and stock market systems for business and commerce. Even auto-
mobiles and airplanes are dependent on computer systems for enhanced efficiency, safety
and user-experience.
The penetration of computing systems in human society has been driven by the con-
stant efforts of computer architects to design innovative architectures that fully utilize the
additional transistors made available by Moore’s law. To this end, computer architects have
traditionally prioritized constraints such as performance, energy efficiency and cost for the
commercial success of their products. On a broad scale, the computing industry has seen
three major design paradigms. Up until the early 2000s, the focus was on adding complex
features to microprocessor architectures to boost single thread performance. However, the
resulting processors exhibited unmanageable power dissipation density due to their many
complex performance-oriented components working in tandem to execute the same task
[62, 3].
To continue benefiting from technology scaling, the trend since early 2000s has been
towards a growing number of simpler, mostly homogeneous power-efficient cores on-chip.
The idea is to utilize the greater number of cores to better exploit thread-level parallelism.
As a result of the increase in the number of on-chip entities that operate collaboratively,
there has been a significant rise in inter-core communication demands. This trend has
caused a paradigm shift from computation-centric to communication-centric designs. Re-
cently, due to the faster growth in component count in comparison to the reduction in
per-transistor power, multi-cores have also hit the power wall. Homogeneous application-
1
oblivious multi-core architectures, no matter how power-efficient, cannot be scaled further
without operating portions of the multi-core system at throttled frequencies, or even com-
pletely switching some components off [37].
Moving forward, industry experts envision the use of additional silicon area available
to deploy a wide variety of heterogeneous application-specific components as a way to
overcome power constraints. This shift has led the transition of homogeneous CMPs to
heterogeneous collections of IPs that resemble systems-on-chip (SoCs) in many aspects.
Therefore, in addition to providing low-latency communication between the many compo-
nents, an efficient on-chip interconnect should also adapt to the vastly varying applications
that run on these diverse architectures. As a result, the complexity of the on-chip commu-
nication substrate has exacerbated.
Naturally, the transition from computation-centric to communication-centric design has
rapidly sidelined traditional interconnects, such as simple buses, due to their limited band-
width and poor scalability. Networks-on-chip (NoCs), characterized by highly concurrent
communication and better scalability, have emerged as the de facto choice for on-chip
interconnects. With efficient communication at the center of current and upcoming com-
puter designs, NoCs have grown in importance and have attracted increasing attention from
computer architects. However, similar to the processor designs of the past, the focus till
now has been on increasing communication performance, occasionally focusing on energy
efficiency. The ever increasing need for faster and more capable NoCs, along with the as-
tronomical increase in the number and variety of cores/IPs they bind together, has caused
an enormous growth in the complexity of NoC architectures and of the communication
subsystem as a whole.
Technology experts predict future computers to be complex machines composed of
several billions of minuscule and fragile transistors. At future technology nodes, they ex-
pect frequent errors throughout the lifetime of a system [115, 15] due to failing silicon
devices. Even for existing silicon, large scale studies have shown error rates that are orders
of magnitude higher than previously assumed [86]. As a result, CMP and SoC designs are
transitioning from limited, robust and homogeneous logic blocks to complex systems inte-
grating a vast sea of fragile transistors into heterogeneous cores/IPs. This waning reliability
of silicon poses a challenge for on-chip communication reliability, since the communica-
tion hardware is typically not a redundant resource. Faulty communication can cause loss
of valuable data, corruption of program’s output, or even crash of the entire software appli-
cation. NoC designs can make a successful transition to future fragile silicon generations
only if they are equipped with capable and pervasive robustness mechanisms that protect
them from failing. Providing these mechanisms is precisely the goal of this dissertation.
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As the variety and quantity of heterogeneous components comprising future multi-
cores/SoCs grows, the interconnect design methodology must also evolve. Current NoCs
without any runtime reconfiguration support often fail to adapt to dynamic application en-
vironments. This can be particularly harmful from the perspective of power dissipation.
Modern NoCs consume a significant portion of the on-chip power budget (as much as 30%
of the entire chip power [103, 130]). If power is not accurately monitored and limited, it can
lead to overheating emergencies. Power emergencies in turn can cause unnecessary throt-
tling of other components on-chip, and consequently lead to performance loss. Increased
power dissipation also translates to higher temperatures on chip, and it can considerably
accelerate the transistor breakdown phenomenon [59]. Therefore, monitoring and limiting
power consumption by an NoC, while still maintaining good performance, is of paramount
importance to NoCs’ runtime health.
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Figure 1.1 Overview of the NoC challenges tackled by the dissertation. This thesis develops
the design methodologies to enhance the runtime health of NoCs of the future. It particularly focuses
on: i) guaranteeing correctness under unmanageable design complexity, ii) providing dependable
communication with unreliable silicon substrate, and iii) enabling adaptable interconnect designs to
tackle excessive power dissipation.
In view of the challenges to NoC design that were described above, the current archi-
tectures and design methodologies that focus only on performance are no longer adequate.
In addition, as the sole medium for on-chip communication when deployed, the NoC also
becomes a single point of failure. Therefore, ensuring healthy NoC operation is of great
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importance. Figure 1.1 provides a graphical overview of the thesis. Specifically, this disser-
tation identifies three new barriers that limit advancements of future computer systems from
the perspective of NoC design: i) escalating design complexity, ii) waning reliability of sili-
con devices, and iii) excessive power dissipation. Overcoming these limitations is essential
to tap the full potential of future semiconductor technologies. The dissertation provides
novel solutions to overcome these barriers by developing NoC-specific design methodolo-
gies to equip the communication substrate with the capability to bypass these threats. In
addition, the thesis describes runtime mechanisms to promptly detect and pinpoint issues
while the system is in operation. These mechanisms allow the system to quickly react to a
failure at runtime and adapt to bypass the components affected.
1.1 Network-on-Chip Basics
Continuous technology scaling has enabled computer architects to design larger and more
complex CMPs and SoCs for improved performance. As a result, the corresponding in-
crease in communication demands has led to an industry-wide shift towards scalable and
efficient interconnects, typically a network-on-chip (NoC). NoCs leverage communication
concurrency and resource sharing to provide a distributed and scalable solution. An NoC
is a collection of routers connected together via links (channels) and organized in a cer-
tain topology. In NoCs, data is transmitted between communicating entities in units called
packets, which are often further divided into smaller blocks called flits. Packets are injected
into the network via a dedicated network interface (NI) that forms the interface between a
core and a network router. Once packets are injected into the network, its routers provide
packets with temporary buffering as they are routed to their respective destinations accord-
ing to some routing protocol. The left side of Figure 1.2 shows an NoC with its routers
organized in the popular mesh (grid) topology.
The right side of Figure 1.2 shows the micro-architecture of a simple NoC router. Pack-
ets received at the router are temporarily buffered at the input ports, while the routing logic
determines the output port that leads to the correct destination. Once the correct output
port is determined, packets request access to the crossbar that connects all input ports to
all output ports. An arbiter is responsible for handling requests and grants to the cross-
bar. Once the packets traverse the crossbar, they are transferred to the input buffers of the
downstream router via inter-router channels. The protocol governing the flow of packets or
flits through the routers and channels is termed as the flow control.
Figure 1.3 depicts the micro-architecture of a more complex virtual channel (VC)
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Figure 1.2 Network-on-chip basics. The left side of the figure shows a high-level diagram of an
NoC organized in a mesh topology. The right side of the figure depicts the micro-architecture of a
simple NoC router.
router. A VC router decouples the dependency between channels and input buffers, al-
lowing multiple interleaved packet flows through the same channel. The primary idea is to
deploy multiple buffers and VC control units at each input port, and allocate a buffer and
a VC control unit to each packet flow before the packet enters the router’s pipeline. A VC
allocation (VA) unit is responsible for managing the buffering resources for these indepen-
dent packet flows. Similarly, a switch allocation (SA) unit manages requests and grants to
the crossbar in a VC router.
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Figure 1.3 A typical virtual channel router. Virtual channels decouple the dependency between
channels and input buffers to allow multiple interleaved packet flows through the same channel.
1.2 NoC Verification Bottleneck
The shift towards communication-centric designs has placed increasing demands on the
interconnection fabrics, which, in turn, have become progressively large, distributed and
complex. Therefore, a greater number of interactions must be verified at design time. This
steep increase of the verification space can be perceived in the vast verification effort that
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is invested in current microprocessor designs: up to 70% of human and monetary resources
dedicated to microprocessor designs are channeled towards verification [58].
Failures that are caught early in the design process through pre-silicon verification tech-
niques do not significantly impact the time-to-market. Therefore, the computer industry
relies heavily on pre-silicon verification techniques to filter out most bugs. Pre-silicon
validation efforts involve a combination of simulation-based verification techniques and
formal methods. Simulation-based verification, though helpful in catching many easy-to-
find bugs, is incomplete, as it cannot exhaustively test the countless different execution
scenarios within an NoC. In contrast, formal methods, such as model checking, are com-
plete but only effective in verifying small portions of the design, and cannot scale to verify
end-to-end system-level correctness.
Despite massive industry efforts in verification, escaped functional bugs that manifest
at runtime are a reality. Failures in the field have the most critical impact, which, in the
absence of any runtime detection and recovery scheme, often lead to product recalls. In
addition to costing huge amounts of money, recalls also adversely affect the competitive-
ness of the company’s product. For example, the Pentium FDIV bug, which caused a
divide-by-zero condition, costed Intel $475 million in recalls [77]. Figure 1.4 shows a
study of the number of escaped bugs for various generations of Intel processors as reported
in processor errata documents [60], [61]. It can be seen that there has been a steady in-
crease in the number of bugs detected per month with each design generation, especially as
the designs moved to dual-core (Core 2 Duo) and multi-core (Core i7) architectures. The
growing complexity of inter-core communication is the leading cause for this rise, with
10%-13% of the reported design errors related to the communication system of dual and
multi-cores. The growth in the bug-rate is expected to continue as the CMPs transition to-
wards more complex NoC-based interconnects, with a lot of hard-to-find bugs contributed
by the communication infrastructure.
Recently, the research community has started to explore runtime verification solutions
where the system’s activity is monitored at runtime and checked for correctness. Runtime
verification can greatly reduce the impact of escaped design bugs. The associated cost,
however, includes silicon area for runtime monitoring and recovery, dedicated design ef-
fort and a performance impact due to continuous monitoring activities. Therefore, naı¨vely
safeguarding against all possible failures scenarios at runtime is prohibitively expensive.
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Figure 1.4 Bugs discovered after deployment for a number of Intel processors. The rate of es-
caped bugs increased drastically with the transition from uni-core to multi-core architectures. Thus,
it can be speculated that a significant fraction of the bugs relate to the interconnect sub-system.
1.3 NoC Reliability Challenge
In today’s landscape of extreme technology scaling, silicon transistors are highly suscep-
tible to a wide variety of reliability threats. Specific sources of hardware failures include:
particle strikes on silicon components, device degradation over time, and voltage and
temperature fluctuations. Failures may manifest as one-time upset to device operation
(transient or soft faults) or as a permanent hardware failure (permanent or hard faults).
Transient failures do not permanently damage the device functionality and typically can
be overcome by re-execution of the erroneous computations. However, without proper de-
tection, transient errors can silently corrupt data produced by digital systems. In addition,
naı¨vely re-executing the entire application is often not possible, especially for mission-
critical and real-time systems. The problem is further exacerbated by the increasing rate
of these single-event upsets (SEUs), making the re-execution of entire applications an im-
practical solution.
Permanent failures, unlike transient faults, are persistent changes to the behavior of sil-
icon devices. Permanent failures in the field are typically introduced by transistor wear-out
phenomena: electromigration [47], negative-bias temperature instability [8], and time-
dependent dielectric breakdown [117]. Commonly, permanent faults are overcome by
disabling the malfunctioning component and leveraging redundancy in the design to con-
tinue execution. Naturally, the smaller the disabled circuit portion, the more graceful is the
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performance degradation with each fault manifestation. A gracefully degrading solution,
therefore, requires a fine-resolution fault detection and diagnosis, followed by reconfigura-
tion around the faulty component.
Both transient and permanent faults can lead to undesirable consequences. Both fault
types can cause silent corruptions to program’s output or can lead to expensive service dis-
ruptions [107]. In addition, permanent failures can lead to complete loss of functionality
due to their recurring nature [73], often forcing product recalls. As an example, the recent
Intel Cougar-Point chipset was recalled due to a wear-out problem in the SATA controller:
a recall that industry experts estimated to cost approximately $1 Billion [113].
In the context of NoC sub-systems, all components of the NoC are susceptible to soft-
errors: from buffers and logic in the routers [34] to the on-chip links that are additionally
affected by cross-talk and coupling noise effects. Further, as wear-out phenomena are
accelerated by increased activity and higher temperatures, the heavily utilized on-chip net-
works become vulnerable to permanent faults. To make things worse, the network-on-chip
is often the sole medium for on-chip communication, and may become a single-point of
system failure, leading to critical loss of data and failure of software applications or of the
entire system. Therefore, effective techniques ensuring reliable operation of NoCs in face
of hardware failures are a critical requirement for overall system reliability.
1.4 Power-agnostic NoC Designs
In the past decade, designers have relied on multi-core designs to provide increased per-
formance scaling at reduced power budgets. Unfortunately, adding more cores on a chip
is no longer sufficient to provide meaningful performance improvements within reasonable
power budgets [37]. Researchers have termed this phenomenon dark-silicon as it is no
longer possible to run all components in a system at full throttle, and a significant portion
of the chip must be completely switched off to avoid overheating.
Performance improvements in the dark-silicon era can be achieved by designing
application-specific hardware components that accelerate certain types of computations.
However, as the variety and quantity of heterogeneous components that make it into future
computers increase, the interconnect that binds them together must also evolve to accom-
modate this shift in the design paradigm. In addition to the varying bandwidth requirements
of heterogeneous components, the interconnect must also adapt to the needs of different ap-
plications that stress different portions of the network. The growing heterogeneity, the short
time-to-market and the need for NoC designs to be generic enough to run a variety of appli-
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cations, have rendered design-time optimizations difficult and ineffective. This often leads
to over-provisioned NoC architectures that are designed to handle the most adverse com-
munication patterns at all times. This shift in the design paradigm requires the development
and deployment of novel interconnect architectures that can adapt to a wide range of com-
munication demands at runtime, and avoid the alternative of over-provisioning hardware
resources.
Particularly problematic is the trend of growing power-dissipation in NoC devices de-
signed for worst-case traffic patterns, which today can consume up to 30% of the entire
chip’s power-budget. The problem is further exacerbated by leakage effects, causing power
dissipation even during periods of low activity. For NoCs at 22nm, leakage can be a ma-
jority contributor to the total interconnect power [120], and the share of leakage power is
expected to grow in future generations. The result is excessive power dissipation, even
when an NoC is not under heavy use. However, heterogeneous workloads stressing only
a portion of the design create opportunities for isolation of the lightly-used portions of
the system and corresponding NoC region. The isolated components can be switched to a
low-power mode using power-gating [57]. Such a solution requires application behavior
monitoring and prediction, followed by runtime reconfiguration of components to optimize
the NoC resources for the executing workload. By updating the reconfiguration trigger
criterion, it is also possible to provide a variety of power and performance trade-offs, de-
pending on the available on-chip power budget.
1.5 Threats to NoCs’ Runtime Health
This dissertation aims at circumventing threats to NoCs’ runtime health. In other words,
we aim to detect and overcome spurious NoC behaviors that manifest at runtime and cannot
be adequately addressed at design-time. Ensuring correct NoC operation in the presence
of runtime malfunctions is challenging because: i) the faulty behavior can manifest unpre-
dictably at any time or in any component, making prediction and prevention non viable
options, ii) the continuous monitoring required to detect malfunctions results in substantial
resource and performance overhead, and iii) complete recovery to a correct state after error
manifestation is difficult without employing high redundancy in the design. Developing an
effective solution without sacrificing performance or dedicating heavy silicon resources re-
quires careful study of the characteristics of each type of failure. The characteristics of each
failure’s manifestation in silicon components is referred to as a fault model. In addition to
an accurate fault model, ensuring runtime health also requires a thorough understanding
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of the component under threat, i.e., the NoC in our case. Note that NoCs are particularly
critical because they are the only communication medium between interacting units in a
chip and, therefore, a malfunctioning interconnect can potentially render the entire chip
unusable.
In this dissertation we propose solutions to overcome three classes of failures that af-
fect NoCs’ runtime health. Specifically, we deem the following threats to NoCs’ runtime
health as major roadblocks to their evolution: i) design errors due to the increasing com-
plexity of on-chip communication infrastructures, ii) transistor failures due to the waning
reliability of transistors in the fragile silicon era, and iii) power dissipation beyond the
cooling capacity of chips due to increasing transistor density. We believe that overcoming
the issues above is the key to unlocking the full potential of communication-centric com-
putation in future generations of computer systems. In the remainder of this section we
discuss the characteristics of each failure class when they manifest in NoCs. We leverage
these characteristics to design low-cost and high-coverage runtime solutions.
Design errors. As the name suggests, these are errors that are introduced accidentally into
the hardware design, often due to its complexity and the challenges associated with a large
and distributed development effort. Design errors cause the hardware not to conform to the
specification and can have impacts ranging from minor delays in product launch to recall
of the malfunctioning hardware. We particularly target design errors that have escaped all
verification efforts before launch. Note that the computer industry spends massive effort in
ensuring that released products are bug-free. Therefore, bugs that slip through the verifica-
tion effort are typically associated with rare runtime occurrences. Even though these bugs
rarely manifest, they can affect any NoC component in an unpredictable manner.
Design bugs can be overcome by re-execution of the application from a correct state,
while operating the hardware in a barebone but guaranteed-to-be-correct mode. How-
ever, any hardware complexity introduced to protect the NoC against design errors has
the potential of adding further complexity to the design. Taking these observations into
consideration, our runtime verification solutions incorporate the following features:
• they are optimized for error coverage, rather than speed of recovery as design errors
manifest rarely but in an unpredictable manner.
• they involve a lightweight recovery phase that operates the NoC in a guaranteed-to-
be-correct mode till the error is circumvented.
• they add only simple and easily verifiable hardware logic to the NoC, simultaneously
ensuring that the recovery operation does not interfere with the baseline micro-
architecture.
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Transistor failures manifest either as temporary corruptions of transistor output values or
as permanently malfunctioning transistors. The former, called soft-errors, are similar in
their manifestations to design errors. Soft-errors occur rarely and unpredictably, and they
can be overcome by re-executing from an uncorrupted state. The latter, referred to as per-
manent faults, permanently damage transistor outputs. Therefore, the affected components
are unusable for the rest of the chip lifetime. To continue operation, diagnosis of such per-
manent malfunctions is required, followed by a hardware reconfiguration step to disable
the failed components. Similar to other failures, permanent faults also occur rarely but
unpredictably. Permanent faults can also render the entire chip unusable if not addressed
appropriately. The guiding principle for protection against permanent faults is graceful
performance degradation. In other words, with each new fault, components should be di-
agnosed and disabled frugally so as to prolong the chip’s lifetime. Naturally, overcoming
permanent faults requires some resource redundancy in the design. Based on these char-
acteristics, our solutions for protection against transistor failures incorporate the following
features:
• soft-error solutions leverage a detection and recovery mechanism similar to our de-
sign error tolerance design.
• they provide fine-grained diagnosis and reconfiguration to frugally bypass perma-
nently faulty components.
• solutions protecting against permanent faults are optimized for diagnosis accuracy
rather than reconfiguration latency.
• they utilize redundancy built into the NoC architecture, rather than adding reliability-
specific hardware.
Excessive power dissipation. Contemporary CMPs and SoCs incorporate a variety of
application-specific components, and they run a variety of workloads exhibiting vastly
different characteristics within and across applications. This trend compels designers to
over-provision resources at design-time. Over-provisioning allows CMP/SoC designs to
appropriately tackle the worst possible execution scenarios at runtime. However, over-
provisioning of resources leads to excessive power dissipation.
NoCs, being a central component in CMPs and SoCs, also suffer from increased power
dissipation due to over-provisioning. In addition, they consume a significant portion of the
on-chip power budget. Note that a majority of NoC power dissipation can be attributed to
transistors leaking power even when not in use. Finally, the available power-budget varies
at runtime depending on the current chip operating conditions. Thus, we propose to develop
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power-conscious NoC design solutions with the following characteristics:
• targeting the reduction of leakage power dissipation.
• performing dynamic optimization at runtime, based on workload characteristics.
• providing application-specific power efficiency, i.e., greater power savings for less
demanding applications.
• enabling flexible and tunable trade-offs between power and performance.
1.6 A Functional, Reliable and Power-aware NoC Archi-
tecture
With the growing relevance of communication-centric microprocessor designs, NoCs have
emerged as the de facto scalable on-chip interconnect. However, focusing on performance
and scalability of NoC designs alone does not completely address the challenges brought
upon by silicon scaling. To this end, this thesis identifies and addresses the roadblocks
arising from three key trends in extreme-integration silicon technology.
The first trend is the growing complexity of interconnect architectures due to the
sheer number of collaborating entities and the never-ending quest for low-latency, high-
bandwidth communication. This dissertation first provides evidence that design-time
verification tools and methodologies are no longer adequate to validate all the complex
interactions in NoC operation, and, as a result, bugs slipping into final silicon are a reality.
It then proposes a verification approach that operates completely at runtime to detect and
recover from errors in the field [2]. We further improve coverage and overhead of the solu-
tion by designing a complementary design- and run- time verification solution [90]. These
solutions rely upon a lightweight and guaranteed-to-be-correct checking mechanism to de-
tect execution anomalies, and they utilize interconnect reconfiguration for error recovery.
The interconnect operates in a degraded and verified mode for the duration of the bug ac-
tivity. Once the recovery is complete, the interconnect switches back to a full performance
mode.
Similar to design errors, reliability failures also manifest non-deterministically at run-
time. Functional bugs are triggered in rare execution scenarios, and they often disappear on
re-execution. Similarly, soft-errors are single-event upsets, and they can be easily protected
against by detecting and re-executing. Therefore, this dissertation proposes a soft-error
protection solution [92] that is similar to our runtime verification approach. Handling
permanent failures, however, is more involved and it requires: i) detection of the faulty
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behavior, ii) diagnosis of the fault site, and iii) reconfiguration around the faulty compo-
nent to prevent it from affecting future operations. To overcome permanent failures, this
dissertation describes solutions that enable all these mechanisms. In our scheme, detec-
tion is facilitated by lightweight execution checkers, while information collected from the
detection procedure is analyzed for accurate diagnosis [48]. We also propose a gracefully
degrading NoC design that leverages a fine-grained fault localization mechanism and a
frugal routing-reconfiguration solution [91]. Finally, we describe a solution to provide first-
response operation while the reconfiguration procedure re-organizes the network around
the fault [71].
The final part of this dissertation describes the design of a runtime-adaptable NoC ar-
chitecture that is capable of addressing excessive NoC power dissipation resulting from
growing heterogeneity, short time-to-market, and application diversity in modern micro-
processors. Our solution [93] ensures healthy runtime operation of NoCs by avoiding
overheating. Further, our NoC design adapts at runtime, eliminating the need for costly
and time-consuming design-time optimizations. To this end, our solution leverages the dis-
tributed runtime monitors that are similar in philosophy to the ones used for functional and
reliable NoC design. It further utilizes the routing and topology reconfiguration method-
ologies developed in the earlier chapters of this dissertation for the purpose of providing
runtime adaptivity.
The solutions proposed in this thesis address challenges to NoCs’ runtime health by
employing a reactive approach, i.e., error detection followed by recovery. In this manner,
our solutions can address a wide range of unforeseen problems; particularly, design errors,
reliability threats, and excessive power dissipation. Further, we adopt an integrated ap-
proach to guarantee NoCs’ runtime health, addressing both detection and recovery from
errors at runtime. A bird’s eye view of the mechanisms proposed in this thesis is shown in
Figure 1.5. Figure 1.5a shows the generic execution flow of the schemes proposed in this
dissertation. We divide applications’ execution into fixed-size time windows, or epochs,
so as to provide temporal error isolation. During an epoch, distributed checkers at each
network router monitor the traffic activity to detect anomalous behavior. If a failure is
detected, a reconfiguration procedure is triggered at epoch boundaries to circumvent the
detected failures. The reconfiguration procedure is implemented with lightweight and dis-
tributed hardware, and it utilizes broadcasts to synchronize the operations of all network
nodes. Figure 1.5b shows the hardware additions at each router required to implement
these capabilities: i) a failure monitor, ii) reconfiguration logic, and iii) a reconfiguration
decision/control unit. The runtime monitoring and reconfiguration capabilities enable our
NoC architecture to efficiently tackle threats to correct runtime operation.
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Figure 1.5 Overview of the solutions proposed in this dissertation. a) The figure shows the
generic execution flow of our runtime mechanisms. Execution is divided into epochs, and the NoC
is continuously monitored for anomalous behavior. A reconfiguration procedure circumvents the
failures detected using synchronized broadcasts. b) The figure shows hardware additions at each
router required to implement monitoring and reconfiguration capabilities. The added hardware is
designed to be lightweight and distributed.
1.7 Dissertation Organization
The main body of this document is organized in three parts, each of which is dedicated
to discuss solutions that provide protection against a specific runtime threat class affect-
ing NoCs. This dissertation dedicates one chapter each to innovative NoC designs that
provide: i) functional correctness in face of design errors arising from growing communi-
cation complexity, ii) resilient operation under both soft- and permanent- faults caused by
the waning reliability of silicon, and iii) power-aware execution to keep NoCs’ power den-
sity under check. The final chapter is dedicated to summarize the work in this dissertation
and conclude the discussion.
Specifically, Chapter 2 discusses two solutions that ensure functional correctness in the
presence of design errors. The first solution, called SafeNoC [2], employs a pure runtime
approach to detection and recovery from an erroneous design state. The second solution,
ForEVeR [90], leverages both design and runtime verification approaches to broaden the de-
sign error detection scope and reduce overheads. Chapter 3 discusses separate solutions for
soft-errors and permanent failures. The soft-error protection scheme [92] exploits similari-
ties between soft-error and design error manifestations, and it is built with minimal changes
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to ForEVeR’s infrastructure. Chapter 3 also details separate solutions for permanent fault
detection, diagnosis, reconfiguration and recovery. The proposed detection and diagno-
sis scheme [48] leverages lightweight monitors to accurately pinpoint faulty components,
while the reconfiguration scheme, uDIREC [91], leverages this fine-grained information to
provide graceful degradation with faults. The recovery scheme, BLINC [71], provides a
quick first-response on fault manifestations and allows uninterrupted operation of the net-
work even during the occurrence of the fault. The work on tackling the power challenges
of NoCs is described in Chapter 4. The proposed scheme leverages the execution informa-
tion collected from distributed monitors to switch off sparingly used components. Finally,
Chapter 5 summarizes and concludes the dissertation.
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Chapter 2
Addressing Functional Bugs
Designing a functionally correct microprocessor is a challenging task due to its sheer com-
plexity and the vast scale of modern designs. With the advent of the communication-centric
design paradigm, much of this design complexity has shifted to on-chip interconnects, i.e.,
typically a network-on-chip (NoC) for large multicore and SoC designs. NoCs are imple-
mented as a network of routers and links, carrying messages to their destinations abiding
to some routing protocol. The routers themselves often include advanced features, such
as pipelining, speculation, prioritization, complex allocation schemes, etc. In addition,
the routers are organized in a wide range of topologies, supported by complex routing al-
gorithms. With these advanced performance features, it is a challenge to ensure correct
functionality under all circumstances for the entire network. Functional bugs, or failure by
a design to meet its specification, are filtered through various stages of verification, includ-
ing techniques like simulation, emulation and formal verification. Even though computer
architects channel significant resources to design-time verification, functional bugs slipping
into the shipped silicon are a reality. Bugs manifesting in the field are the most devastat-
ing, necessitating permanent performance-degrading workarounds, and in extreme cases,
forcing semiconductor companies to recall the affected product. This chapter presents the
solutions to reduce or completely eliminate the cost of NoC functional bugs manifesting
at runtime. We first propose a complete runtime verification approach that overcomes the
majority of design errors in NoCs [2], followed by a hybrid pre-silicon and runtime verifica-
tion approach that improves verification coverage and reduces the overhead of the runtime
protection mechanism [90].
2.1 Inadequacy of Design-Time Verification
Pre-silicon verification efforts are used to ensure correctness using a combination of sim-
ulation, emulation and formal techniques. Simulation- and emulation- based verification
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techniques, though helpful in catching many easy-to-find bugs, are incomplete as they can-
not exhaustively test the countless different execution scenarios within a network. Even
though incomplete, simulation and emulation are still the prime approach for catching the
majority of design bugs early-on during the design phase. Design-time detection and cor-
rection provides three advantages. First, bugs caught at this stage can be fixed simply by
modifying the design and cause only minor delays in schedule. Second, simple designs or
small components of a complex design can be exhaustively tested to guarantee functional
correctness. Finally, for complex designs, well designed test cases stress the most common
usage scenarios to circumvent the majority of simple bugs. On the other hand, formal meth-
ods, such as model checking, are complete but only effective in verifying small portions
of the design [43, 18]. Formal methods also suffer from state-space explosion problem
for bigger designs. Therefore, formal methods typically do not scale to verify end-to-end
system-level correctness properties.
Recently, the research community has started to explore runtime verification solutions
where the system’s activity is monitored at runtime after product deployment. Runtime
verification can reduce the cost of design bugs that escape design-time verification by de-
tecting their occurrence and preventing the corruption of network/processor state, loss of
data and/or failure of the entire system. However, runtime verification solutions require
dedicated monitoring and recovery hardware, which entails additional design and verifica-
tion effort. Therefore, a naı¨ve runtime verification solution results in substantial design,
area and runtime overhead. To keep these overheads low and still be effective, a runtime
verification solution should have the following properties:
• have no performance overhead during normal operation,
• cover a wide variety of failure scenarios,
• incur only a small area and power overhead, and
• entail minimal design and verification effort.
Runtime verification solutions have so far primarily focused on microprocessor designs
[10, 83, 128]. In this chapter, we leverage runtime verification techniques to overcome
functional bugs in NoCs, while trying to enable all the desirable properties stated above.
Our designs are based on the observation that all frequently-occurring bugs are typically
caught during pre-silicon verification: the bugs that slip through most often manifest very
rarely. This observation allows our runtime verification methodologies to operate with low
overhead detection and recovery hardware, yet they are capable of overcoming a wide va-
riety of errors. We also strive for solution’s designs that entail only minimalistic design
modifications that are easily verifiable and mostly decoupled from the NoC hardware, and
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incur no performance overhead in the absence of errors.
To evaluate the effectiveness of pre-silicon techniques for NoC verification, we per-
formed an experimental study on a simple 2x2 mesh NoC design, with 5-port wormhole
routers [28]. Since we are aiming for complete NoC correctness, simulation-based verifi-
cation cannot be considered a suitable solution as it cannot exhaustively traverse an NoC’s
state space comprising tens of thousand of state elements. Therefore, we focused on for-
mal verification techniques, and wrote properties as System Verilog Assertions (SVA) [1]
describing high-level network behavior. We then tried to formally prove those properties
using Synopsys Magellan [122]. However, the model checking-based formal verification
engine was unable to complete the task due to the state explosion problem. Therefore, we
restricted ourselves to properties that can be verified within a single router (component-
level verification) to avoid state explosion. However, formal verification failed even in
these scenarios if properties were not specified carefully. In general, it was hard to verify
liveness properties and bounded properties with a large time bound.
In subsequent efforts, we were successful in verifying router-level specifications by
breaking them down into simple sub-properties. An example of a property, “router does
not drop any flits”, is illustrated in Figure 2.1. For this particular example, we also decou-
pled the liveness requirement (“flit leaves eventually”), with the property we targeted to
verify (“router does not drop any flits”). This analysis led to three important guidelines:
i) verifying properties at component-granularity is tractable, in contrast to monolithic end-
to-end verification, ii) broad-scope properties can be tackled by breaking them into simple
sub-properties, and iii) formal verification is inadequate in proving liveness or large time-
bound properties: the bugs that cannot be exposed in the process are good candidates for
runtime detection and recovery. We used the observations above in developing the hybrid
design- and run- time verification solution described in Section 2.3.
2.1.1 Overview of this Chapter
To counter the shortcomings of design-time verification, we propose novel runtime vali-
dation schemes tailored to NoC-centric multi-cores and SoCs. This chapter first presents
SafeNoC in Section 2.2, a solution that provides end-to-end protection against NoC design-
failures at runtime. SafeNoC leverages the observation that bugs that escape into the final
silicon are rarely triggered, and a potentially slow software-based recovery mechanism has
little overall performance impact. The chapter then introduces ForEVeR in Section 2.3,
which guarantees complete NoC correctness, while keeping the area and reconfiguration
overhead at minimum. ForEVeR leverages the observation that components that can be
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Figure 2.1 Formal verification guidelines. State explosion avoided by: i) verifying routers indi-
vidually, ii) breaking specification into simple sub-properties and iii) checking liveness requirements
at runtime.
fully verified during design-time do not need protection at runtime. Particularly, ForEVeR
uses formal verification to guarantee correctness in small components, such as routers,
while relying on a runtime detection and recovery mechanism to overcome network-level
errors. The hallmark of both these techniques is that they apply minimal modifications
to the baseline NoC, mostly conducting the verification activities in a decoupled fashion.
Both solutions are independent of the topology organization, the router architecture and the
routing scheme of the baseline NoC.
2.2 Runtime Verification with SafeNoC
SafeNoC is a end-to-end runtime detection and recovery mechanism to guarantee the func-
tional correctness of the communication fabric in CMPs and SoCs. To this end, SafeNoC
augments the existing interconnect with a simple and lightweight checker network that is
guaranteed to deliver messages correctly. For each data message sent over the primary
NoC, a look-ahead signature is transmitted over the checker network and is used to detect
errors in the corresponding data message. Specifically, if a message is delivered without the
corresponding signature present at the destination, SafeNoC triggers a recovery event. On
error detection, all the flits in-flight in the NoC at the time of detection are reliably transmit-
ted through the checker network to all the destination cores. There, a novel software-based
recovery algorithm reconstructs the original packets from the erroneous flits, leveraging the
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available signatures for the same. SafeNoC, thus ensures that all data reaches the intended
destinations. Figure 2.2 shows a baseline CMP interconnect overlaid with the checker net-
work. Both the checker router and the NoC router connect to the network interface to which
two signature calculation units are also added. A generic 64-bit, 4-stage pipeline, 2-VC,
8-flit buffer per VC, wormhole router with inbuilt ECC functionalities is assumed as the
baseline.
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Figure 2.2 High-level overview of SafeNoC. SafeNoC augments the original interconnect with
a lightweight checker network. For every data packet sent on the primary network, a look-ahead
signature is routed through the checker network. Any mismatch between the received packet’s
computed signature and its look-ahead signature flags an error and triggers recovery.
SafeNoC is not limited to any particular interconnect topology or router architecture,
and it can overcome a wide variety of functional bugs affecting the NoC. In addition,
SafeNoC exhibits no overhead in the absence of errors, incurring a penalty of few millisec-
onds in the worst-case bug manifestation. Unlike traditional end-to-end ‘retransmission-
based’ detection and recovery techniques for NoCs [85] that require large buffers for
retransmission of clean data copies, SafeNoC requires small storage of compact signatures.
SafeNoC leverages the infrequent nature of bug manifestations for trading-off recovery la-
tency for a low hardware overhead design. SafeNoC’s silicon footprint is a considerable
improvement over the retransmission-based recovery scheme, as we will discuss in Section
2.5. Moreover, SafeNoC’s hardware additions are simple and mostly decoupled from the
existing interconnect hardware, and they are formally verified to be functionally correct.
The SafeNoC solution has separate error detection and error recovery phases. In the
error detection phase, whenever a packet is to be sent over the primary network, a signature
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of that packet is computed and sent through the checker network. The signature serves as a
look-ahead packet and a unique identifier of the corresponding main packet, and it is used
as a basis for detecting errors in the main interconnect. When a destination receives a data
packet, it recomputes its signature and compares it against previously received look-ahead
signatures. If a match is not found within a certain timeout period, an error is flagged and
recovery is initiated. During the recovery phase, in-flight flits and packets are recovered
from the network and reliably transmitted through the checker network to all destinations.
Any destination that has a mismatched signature runs a software-based reconstruction al-
gorithm, in which it uses the recovered flits to reconstruct the original data packets, so that
they match their corresponding signatures.
2.2.1 Error Detection
SafeNoC’s checker network incurs minimal area overhead, is formally verifiable and it de-
livers look-ahead signatures before actual data packets arrive through the primary network.
A checker network that does not deliver signatures before their corresponding data packets
would only introduce a performance penalty but would not affect correctness. SafeNoC’s
optimized checker network minimizes such cases by deploying a simple, single-cycle la-
tency, packet-switched router, organized in a ring topology [67]. The details of the checker
network design are presented in Section 2.4.
SafeNoC’s bug model assumes that data within a packet’s flits is protected by built-in
ECC, and functional errors can either manifest by affecting entire packets, such as a dead-
lock, or by affecting individual flits within a packet, such as misrouting or re-ordering of
flits. Within this bug model, for a signature to uniquely identify a packet, its value must de-
pend on the flits’ data values, as well as their order within the packet. As a result, every flit
in the data packet must be augmented with a flit ID. The 64-bit data of each flit is rotated by
a fixed amount that depends on the flit’s position. The resulting values are XORed together
into a 64-bit intermediate value. The intermediate value is divided into 4 parts that are then
XORed to give the final 16-bit signature. This signature computation provides low aliasing
probability (3.05× 10−5), and it can be implemented with low area overhead. Each des-
tination router maintains a timeout counter for every look-ahead packet it receives. If the
signature from the newly received packet matches any of the look-ahead signatures, then
this packet is considered to have been delivered correctly. In case of a signature time-out,
an error is flagged and recovery is initiated.
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2.2.2 Error Recovery
The recovery phase consists of four steps in the following order: network drain, packet
recovery, flit recovery and packet reconstruction. First the network drain phase is initiated,
during which the network is forced to drain its in-flight packets for a preset amount of time,
as shown in Figure 2.3a. The draining stage only leaves problematic packets and flits stuck
within the network. The network then enters the packet recovery phase, which involves
recovery of these problematic packets and flits. All primary routers remain active during
this phase, except they do not service new packets. Only one primary router tries to recover
packets at any time. To this end, a token is circulated through the checker network to de-
termine the recovering router. When a router receives the token, it checks its input buffers
to determine if there is a complete packet, in which case it is retrieved and sent over the
checker network, as shown in Figure 2.3b.
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Figure 2.3 SafeNoC recovery process. Recovery proceeds in four steps. The last step is executed
in software, while the others are implemented in hardware.
The next step, flit recovery, recovers stray flits from the network. A flit is considered
stray if it is stuck in a router buffer or if it is delivered to the wrong destination. All stray
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flits are candidates for the reconstruction process. Figure 2.3c illustrates this phase: a FIFO
checker at every input buffer of each router tracks valid stray flits. Using a token-based
protocol, each router, in turn, sends the stray flits over the checker network to all desti-
nations in the NoC. During the last phase, packet reconstruction, the processor cores run
a software algorithm to reconstruct the original packets using the stray flits (Figure 2.3d).
Candidate flits are organized in separate groups, one for each flit ID, and an index is main-
tained for each group to indicate which flits have already been considered. For each flit
ID, a candidate is added to the set of current candidates. The current candidates are then
assembled into a new packet and its signature is computed. If the signature matches any of
the remaining look-ahead signatures, the packet is delivered to the application and all its
flits are removed from the candidate groups.
2.2.3 Experimental Evaluation
We modeled SafeNoC both in Verilog HDL and with a cycle-accurate C++ simulator. Using
Synopsys Magellan [122], we formally verified the Verilog model of the hardware involved
in recovery. The impact of recovery on performance was evaluated using the C++ simula-
tor modeling a variety of functional bugs in the baseline system. The model was simulated
with two different types of workloads: directed random traffic (16 flits per packet), as well
as application benchmarks from the PARSEC suite [14]. The SimpleScalar [19] simulation
infrastructure was leveraged to estimate the reconstruction algorithm’s execution time. The
network drain time was set to 2,000 cycles and the packet delivery timeout to 4,000 cycles.
Bug name Bug description
dup flit a flit is duplicated within a packet
misrte 1flit a flit is misrouted to a random destination
misrte 3flit 3 flits of a packet are misrouted to a random destination
misrte 1pkt a packet is misrouted to a random destination
misrte 2pkt 2 packets are misrouted to random destinations
misrte flit pkt a packet is misrouted, another packet’s flits are misrouted
dup pkt a packet is duplicated
dup misrte pkt a packet is duplicated and one copy is misrouted
reorder flit flits within packet are reordered
deadlock some packets are deadlocked in the network
livelock some packets are in a livelock cycle in the network
Table 2.1 Functional bugs injected in SafeNoC.
We injected 11 different bugs reported in Table 2.1 into the NoC infrastructure and
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evaluated the detection and recovery time. One bug was injected per execution, and each
simulation was repeated for all traffic patterns. The simulations were further repeated for
10 different bug trigger times and for 10 different random seeds for statistical confidence.
With SafeNoC, all workloads complete, delivering all packets correctly to their destina-
tions. Figure 2.4aa reports the recovery time required by each benchmark, averaged over
all random seeds, activation points and bugs, for a total of 11,000 runs.
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Figure 2.4 SafeNoC recovery time. Execution cycles for the first 3 steps of recovery (bars-left
axis, network drain repeated twice) and for packet reconstruction (line-right axis).
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On average, SafeNoC spends approximately 11,000 cycles in the first four steps of re-
covery. The drain time is a preset design parameter, at 4,000 cycles. The packet recovery
and flit recovery steps require on average 1,600 and 5,300 cycles, respectively. In addition,
SafeNoC incurs an average of 3.4M execution cycles to reconstruct erroneous packets.
Therefore, the performance overhead of SafeNoC is dominated by the reconstruction algo-
rithm. In Figure 2.4b, we also analyze SafeNoC’s recovery time by bug. The reconstruction
time varies widely depending on the severity of the bug and the number of flits and packets
it affects. For example, bug misrte 2pkt affects 32 flits in 2 different packets. Therefore,
the reconstruction algorithm must consider two candidate flits for each position within the
packet, requiring up to 38M execution cycles to complete. The packet recovery time is
constant for almost all bugs, at 1,473 cycles, required for the token to traverse all routers,
with the exception of deadlock and livelock, where entire packets are retrieved from the
primary network.
2.3 Complementary Design and Runtime Verification with
ForEVeR
ForEVeR’s approach is based on the insight that although formal methods do not scale to
the complexity of an entire NoC, yet they can ensure component-level correctness, which,
in turn, could greatly reduce the need for runtime bug detection and recovery. During sys-
tem development, ForEVeR recommends a methodology for providing complete formal
verification of the individual NoC routers. In addition, ForEVeR provides hardware addi-
tions to equip the NoC for monitoring and correcting the network execution at runtime. In
the case that even individual network routers are too complex to be amenable to formal
verification, ForEVeR proposes an additional runtime solution targeting specifically only
those aspects of the routers’ functionality that could not be verified during system devel-
opment. The ForEVeR (Formally Enhanced Verification at Runtime for NoCs) solution
is independent of topology, router architecture and routing scheme. ForEVeR can detect
and recover from a wide variety of functional errors in the interconnect, and it can ensure
forward progress in the execution with no data corruptions. ForEVeR comes at a small area
cost of 4.8% for an 8x8 mesh interconnect, while incurring a minimal performance impact
only when an error manifests.
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2.3.1 Methodology
As reported in [16], the functional correctness of an NoC can be organized along four high-
level requirements. Three of them can be satisfied by guaranteeing their validity locally at
each network router: no packet drop, requires that no packet is lost while traversing the
network; no data corruption states that packets’ payloads should not become corrupted
while traveling from source to destination; finally, no packet create requires that no new
packet is generated within the network (packets can only be injected from network’s source
nodes). If each individual router satisfies these properties, then they hold for the NoC sys-
tem as a whole, since network links are simple wires and cannot embed functional bugs that
corrupt, create or drop packets. ForEVeR leverages formal verification to ensure these three
properties and maintain packet integrity. Finally, the last requirement (bounded delivery),
specifies that each packet is delivered to its intended destination within a finite amount of
time and it ensures that there is forward progress in the transmission. This last requirement
cannot be validated locally, since it affects the entire network. The runtime component of
ForEVeR detects the violations of this property, and also provides a mechanism for error
recovery.
To this end, Figure 2.5 shows a high-level overview of the hardware additions re-
quired by ForEVeR, and, in particular, it highlights the components required to enable
bounded delivery. Partially verified routers are connected together to form an NoC that is
completed by detection and recovery logic. Runtime checkers and recovery logic are used
at the router-level to protect complex router components against design flaws (if they can-
not be formally verified at design time). In addition, the primary NoC is augmented with
a lightweight checker network that is used to transmit advanced notifications to the moni-
tors at the destination nodes. During recovery, the checker network is also used to reliably
deliver in-flight data packets to their respective destinations. Note that each component of
the router can be classified into i) verified at design-time, ii) monitored at runtime, or iii)
providing advanced performance features to be disabled during recovery.
ForEVeR’s checker network is similar in design to SafeNoC’s checker network, and so
is the philosophy of operating it concurrently for error detection and recovery. However,
the checker network in ForEVeR is smaller as the notifications it carries do not contain any
packet signatures. In addition, ForEVeR eliminates the need of the majority of SafeNoC’s
structures: i) signature buffers at destinations, ii) signature-packet comparators at desti-
nations, and iii) a software-based reconfiguration. ForEVeR also greatly simplifies the
recovery operation, requiring just a single packet recovery phase. Finally, ForEVeR pro-
tects against a wider variety of bugs, guaranteeing no dropped or corrupted flits, which is
not the case with SafeNoC. In summary, ForEVeR leverages complementary verification
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for a more holistic solution at cheaper cost.
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Figure 2.5 High-level overview of ForEVeR. A combination of router-level verification and run-
time monitoring, and network-level detection and recovery ensures correct NoC operation.
2.3.2 Router Correctness
A correctly functioning router should ensure that each packet’s integrity is maintained
while it transfers within the router. This can be achieved by guaranteeing that routers
do not drop any individual packet’s flits and flit ordering from head to tail is preserved
during the transmission in a wormhole fashion. The methodology to achieve router correct-
ness is presented via an example of a fairly complex and generic 3-stage pipelined router
that is input-queued and that uses virtual channel (VC) flow control, look-ahead routing
and switch speculation. This verification methodology can however be generalized to any
network and router architecture, as discussed in Section 2.3.5. The datapath components
consist of input buffers, channels and crossbar, and are controlled by input VC control
(IVC), route computation unit (RC), VC allocator (VA), switch allocator (SA), output VC
control (OVC) and flow control manager. The datapath components are fairly simple and
can be completely verified at design-time, while verification of the control components
presents a greater challenge. First, we attempt a full formal verification of the routers, and
in case some aspects of the router cannot be proven correct, we leverage a runtime solution
to monitor and correct any functional bug in those components.
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Router-level Formal Verification
The verification process can be efficiently partitioned into three sub-goals: i) ensuring
that no flit is dropped (no packet drop), ii) showing that no flit is created or duplicated
(no packet create), and iii) ensuring that packets maintain integrity as they travel through
the router (no data corruption). For the first sub-goal, it must be verified that all valid flits
received at input channels are written into valid buffer entries, that the buffers operate in a
FIFO manner, and that each flit after gaining access to the output channel moves from in-
put buffer to the output channel in a fixed number of clock cycles (depending on the router
pipeline depth). To accomplish the second sub-goal, we verify that flits are not duplicated
as they travel through the various stages of router pipeline (IVC, crossbar and OVC). We
also verify that these stages do not create flits out of thin air. The third sub-goal encom-
passes the behavior of entire packets, rather than individual flits, ensuring that all body flits
belonging to any particular packet should follow that packet’s head flit in a wormhole order,
as the packet traverses through the router’s datapath. We pursued the formal verification
of the baseline router design, using the structure described above and Synopsys Magellan
[122], a commercial formal verification tool. Table 2.2 summarizes the sub-goals, how
many properties were proven for each of them and how much computation time they re-
quired. Properties were described as System Verilog Assertions and verification executed
on an Intel Xeon running at 2.27 GHz and equipped with 4GB of memory.
Correctness goal Property to be verified #SVA time(s)
no packet drop * valid flit written to buffer 4 90
(router datapath and control) * buffer operates as FIFO 20 660
* transferred from IP to OP channel 17 170
no packet create * no flit/packet duplication at IVC 4 30
(control components) * no flit/packet duplication at crossbar 1 10
* no flit/packet duplication at OVC 2 10
no data corruption * wormhole preserved (leaving IVC) 25 1,800
(complex component interaction) * wormhole preserved (leaving crossbar) 5 350
* wormhole preserved (leaving OVC) 5 200
Table 2.2 Organization of router’s formal verification with ForEVeR.
Router-level Runtime Verification
ForEVeR provides runtime checkers to protect router components that could not be fully
verified at design-time. Such components, typically, control the interaction between multi-
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ple router activities [43]: VC allocator, switch allocator and buffer management. Note that
the route control unit does not need additional protection because its activity is monitored
as part of the network-level solution. If any router-level checker detects the occurrence of
a bug, the router is reconfigured to a barebone mode of operation that can be completely
formally verified. Recovery is performed by transferring the packets in this degraded mode
of operation, which is guaranteed to be correct. After router-level recovery, a network-
level recovery step is also performed. Below we describe ForEVeR’s runtime router-level
monitors for error detection in detail.
1. VC and switch allocator. A design error in the VC allocator may give rise to various
erroneous conditions. However, some of these conditions are tolerable as they either do
not violate router correctness rules, or they are detected and recovered by the network-level
correctness scheme. Assignment of an unreserved but erroneous output VC to an input
VC is an example of such an error as, in the worst case, it may only lead to misrouting or
deadlock, which can be detected and recovered by our network-level correctness scheme.
Starvation is another example that needs no detection or remedy at the router-level. Crit-
ical errors, i.e., errors that threaten data integrity, arise when an unreserved output VC is
assigned to two input VCs, or an already reserved output VC is assigned to a requesting
input VC. This situation will lead to flit mixing and/or packet/flit loss. Similar to the VC al-
locator situation, a design flaw in a switch allocator may or may not have an adverse affect
on ForEVeR’s operation. To monitor VCs and switch allocators at runtime, we propose the
use of an Allocation Checker (AC) unit, a simplified version of a unit proposed in [94] for
soft-error protection. The AC unit is purely combinational and it performs all comparisons
within one clock cycle. It simultaneously analyzes the state of VC and switch allocators for
duplicate and/or invalid assignments. If an error is flagged, all VC and switch allocations
from the previous clock cycle are invalidated. Flits in flight in the crossbar are discarded
at the output. To avoid dropping flits during the invalidation/discard operation, an extra flit
storage slot per input port is reserved for use during such emergencies. To implement this
runtime monitor, VA, SA and crossbar units are modified to accept invalidation commands
from the AC.
2. Buffer management. A design error in buffer management can lead to either buffer
underflow or overflow. Input buffers can be easily modified to detect and refuse communi-
cation during an underflow, thus not loosing or corrupting any data. On the other hand, a
hardware checker is used to detect buffer overflow errors. Additionally, each input port is
equipped with two emergency flit storage slots. Upon receiving a flit when the correspond-
ing buffer is full, the communicating routers switch to a NACK-free variant of ACK-NACK
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flow control, that guarantees freedom from buffer overflows using a simple scheme. The
emergency slots are reserved for flits in flight during this event. During this NACK-free
flow control operation, a flit awaiting acknowledgement is re-transmitted every two cy-
cles (round trip latency of the links). This scheme, though detrimental for performance,
is extremely simple and can be implemented with little modification to the baseline buffer
management scheme. In addition, the router operates in this simple and verified mode only
during recovery, switching back to its high performance mode after recovery is complete.
Note that, to safeguard against all errors, at most two emergency slots per input port are
required and this storage can be implemented as a simple shift register. In addition, the cost
of this extra storage is amortized across multiple VC buffers in a single input port.
2.3.3 Network Correctness
At the network level, it must be guaranteed that all packets are delivered to their intended
destination within a bounded amount of time. Specifically, the network-level solution must
detect and recover from design errors that inhibit forward progress in the network (dead-
lock, livelock and starvation) or cause misrouting of packets. To achieve this, ForEVeR
augments the NoC design with a checker network similar in architecture to the checker
network of the SafeNoC solution 2.2. Similar to SafeNoC, ForEVeR operates its checker
network concurrently with the original NoC, providing a reliable fabric to transfer notifica-
tions and packets to be recovered. During normal operation, each packet transmitted on the
primary network generates a corresponding notification over the checker network, directed
to the same destination.
Network-level Error Detection
All design errors preventing forward progress result in packet(s) trapped within the net-
work. Therefore, the detection mechanism should be capable of detecting such scenarios.
Any unaccounted packet at destination will lead to a counter with an always positive value,
and hence the detection mechanism will flag an error. Figure 2.6 illustrates the hardware
implementation and execution flow of the detection scheme. The detection operation is
organized into ‘check epochs’ or time intervals of fixed length. The detection algorithm
increases the counter at the local destination node for each notification received and de-
creases it for each packet received. In addition it stores in a separate register, reset at the
beginning of each check epoch, whether a zero has been observed. Recovery is initiated if
one or more network nodes have not yet observed a zero at the end of a check epoch. The
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implementation requires a counter connected to both the primary and the checker network,
a timer to track epochs and a zero-observed storage bit. Finally, note that design errors
leading to misrouting of packets can be detected by analyzing the routing information in
the header flit at the destination nodes.
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Figure 2.6 ForEVeR network-level (runtime) detection scheme. The counter at destination NI
is incremented (decremented) upon notification (data packet) arrival, and recovery is triggered if
zero is not observed during a check epoch.
Network-level Error Recovery
When an error is reported either by the router-level runtime monitors or by the network-
level detection scheme, the NoC enters a recovery phase, consisting of a network drain step
followed by a packet recovery step. The recovery phase is depicted graphically in Figure
2.7. During network drain, the network is allowed to operate normally to drain its in-flight
packets, while no new packets are injected. At the end of this phase, which runs for a fixed
time length, recovery terminates if all destinations have received all their outstanding pack-
ets. This situation indicates that recovery was triggered by a false positive detection, which
can be caused due to inaccuracies in ForEVeR’s detection scheme. The subsequent phase,
i.e., packet recovery, recovers all remaining outstanding packets. To this end, a token is cir-
culated through all routers in the NoC via the checker network, and NoC routers can only
operate when they hold this token. In addition, all routers are prevented from servicing new
packets. When a router receives the token, it examines all its VC buffers sequentially to find
packet headers. If a header is found, the corresponding packet is extracted and transmitted
over the checker network. The token circulates through all routers retrieving packets from
one router at a time. Retrieving all packets may require repeating the token loop through
all routers, as certain packets may still remain in their respective buffers.
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Figure 2.7 ForEVeR network-level (runtime) recovery scheme. All packet injections are sus-
pended during the network drain phase, while remaining packets are recovered via the checker
network during the packet recovery phase.
2.3.4 Experimental Evaluation
ForEVeR’s experimental setup is similar to SafeNoC: Verilog implementation is used for
formal verification and area estimates, while C++ simulator [28] is used to evaluate For-
EVeR’s operation. We injected 9 different design bugs into the C++ implementation of
ForEVeR, described in Table 2.3. Bugs 1-6 are errors that inhibit forward progress, bugs
7-8 are misrouting errors, whereas bug 9 is an error that affects router operation while it
is servicing a packet. One distinct bug is triggered during each execution of simulation
traces, while varying the trigger time (5 trigger points, 10,000 cycles apart), the location
of bug injection (10 random locations) and packet size (4, 6 and 8 flits). ForEVeR was
able to detect all design errors with no false positives or negatives and correctly recover
from them, executing all workloads to completion and delivering all packets correctly to
their destinations. Each recovery entailed an execution overhead, due to network drain and
packet recovery. During network drain, the primary NoC was allowed to drain for a fixed
period of 500 cycles, a parametric value that we set by simulating the draining of a con-
gested network. Table 2.3 reports the additional average packet recovery time incurred for
each bug, averaged over all benchmarks, packet sizes, activation times and locations.
Note that routing errors are caught at incorrect destinations, while errors affecting router
operation are uncovered immediately by the distributed hardware monitors. On average,
ForEVeR spends approximately 2,633 cycles in packet recovery for each bug occurrence.
This value is primarily affected by the number of packets that must be recovered; thus bugs
affecting a large portion of the network, such as an entire port (VA port strv), take more
time to recover than bugs that influence smaller portions, such as only one VC (VA vc strv).
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Similarly, deadlock errors that may affect many packets, require the largest recovery time.
We observed the worst case recovery time of 30K cycles across all our simulation runs, in-
cluding all packet sizes and both uniform and application traffic. A key aspect of ForEVeR
design is that it incurs no overhead during normal operation, spending time in recovery
only on bug manifestation. Therefore, it can afford a longer recovery time as design bugs
manifest infrequently.
Bug name Bug description recovery time
deadlock some packets deadlocked in the network 4,821 cycles
livelock some packets in a livelock cycle 3,084 cycles
VA vc strv input VC never granted an output VC 2,827 cycles
VA port strv no input VC in a port granted output VC 3,055 cycles
SW vc strv one input VC never granted switch access 2,123 cycles
SW port strv no input VC in a port granted switch access 2,490 cycles
misroute1 one packet routed to a random destination 1,724 cycles
misroute2 two packets routed to random destinations 1,810 cycles
router bug hardware monitors in routers detect a bug 1,764 cycles
average 2,633 cycles
Table 2.3 Functional bugs injected in ForEVeR and average packet recovery time.
Bugs that typically escape into production hardware are extremely rare corner-case situ-
ations buried deep in the design state space that were not uncovered by extensive pre-silicon
and post-silicon validation efforts. Hence, it is safe to assume that these bugs are extremely
infrequent as they have escaped months of verification efforts. Therefore, even though
more than 100 bugs were discovered in the latest Intel chips (Figure 1.4) after production,
released bug patches (mostly software-based) do not lead to significant slow down in over-
all performance. In perspective, ForEVeR’s recovery penalty of 2.6K cycles on average
is insignificant even for a unrealistic bug rate of one error every 5 minutes. For a 1 GHz
NoC, exhibiting an error rate of one error every 5 minutes, this translates to a negligible
performance penalty, less than one hundred millionth (10−8).
To closely study the relationship between recovery time and number of flits recovered
via the checker network, we injected a varying number of packets in the NoC and prevented
them from ejection at the network interfaces. The network-level detection scheme flags an
error after the second epoch due to un-accounted primary network packets at destinations,
thus triggering a network recovery. Concurrently, we noted the time required to drain all
stuck packets through the checker network. Figure 2.8 plots our results for varying packet
sizes, reporting packet recovery time vs. number of extracted flits. As seen from the figure,
packet recovery time varies almost linearly with the number of stuck flits, requiring less
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Figure 2.8 ForEVeR’s packet recovery time. ForEVeR’s recovery overhead increases almost
linearly with the number of flits stuck in the primary NoC that must be transmitted reliably through
the checker network. Worst case packet recovery time of 45K cycles is observed in this limit study.
than 45K cycles, even in the worst case. Note that in this artificial scenario, we are inten-
tionally jamming the main network with many more flits than usual network occupancy at
any instant. Thus, this serves as a limit study, and, in practice, ForEVeR’s packet recovery
time is limited by 30K cycles, as seen by our results on recovery from design bugs.
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Figure 2.9 False positive rate vs. check epoch size, for various packet sizes. The false positive
rate drops rapidly with larger check epochs and decreasing network load.
False Positives
False positives occur when an unnecessary recovery is triggered in absence of a bug occur-
rence, and they are due to inaccuracies in the runtime monitors. Note that, a false positive
in the detection mechanism does not affects the network’s correctness but only its perfor-
mance. The false positive rate of the detection scheme depends on the duration of the check
epoch, relative to traffic conditions. Note that false positives are triggered when the desti-
nation counter is non-zero for an entire check epoch; hence a heavily loaded network will
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trigger more false recoveries as unaccounted notifications accumulate at destinations while
their corresponding packets are being delayed due to congestion in the network. Intuitively,
a longer check epoch will reduce the false positive rate by allowing more time for packets
to reach their destinations. Figure 2.9 shows the decrease in false positive rate with increas-
ing check epoch size. The false positive rate drops to a negligible value beyond a certain
check epoch size (E pochmin), whose value depends on network load. Additionally, a heav-
ily loaded network exhibits a higher false positive rate than a moderately loaded network,
and hence a heavily loaded network requires a larger E pochmin to practically eliminate all
false positives. Extensive simulations indicate that E pochmin rises to intolerable values only
when the network is operated at loads well past its saturation. However, NoC workloads
are characterized by the self-throttling nature of the applications, which prevents them from
operating past saturation loads [87].
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low network load and 4-flit packets. False negatives decrease with increasing primary network
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False Negatives
False negatives might cause an error to go undetected for a few epochs. But, since no loss
of flits/packets is guaranteed, the data would eventually be delivered in an uncorrupted state
to the correct destinations upon error detection. To avoid false negatives in the detection
scheme altogether, the checker network is constrained to deliver notifications before the
corresponding data packets arrive via the primary network. In ForEVeR’s evaluation sys-
tem, the checker network almost always delivers notifications ahead of data packets, except
for very low latency situations, where primary network packets take shorter routes through
the primary NoC, while notifications travel longer routes in the ring-based checker network.
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To counter these cases, the updating of the monitor counters can be delayed by an amount
determined by the maximum latency difference between primary and checker network at
zero load (we call this value counter update delay). We ran low latency simulations using
uniform traffic with a small packet size (4 flits) and a check epoch of 300 cycles. With this
setup the primary network is only lightly loaded, and hence it has a greater chance of cre-
ating false negatives. Figure 2.10 plots the maximum number of false negatives observed
over 10 different seeds for different counter update delay values. Note that the rate of false
negatives falls quickly and are completely eliminated at a delay of 20 cycles or greater.
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Figure 2.11 E pochmin and latency with increasing network load for uniform traffic. E pochmin
is within tolerable limits for all but deeply saturated networks.
Optimal Epoch Length
To calibrate the check epoch, we ran rigorous simulations using both uniform random traffic
and PARSEC benchmarks. After operating ForEVeR normally for a preset length of time, a
random primary network packet is dropped to emulate the impact of an error in the primary
network; the false positive and negative rate for a range of check epochs is then calculated.
Figure 2.11 plots E pochmin (necessary to minimize the false positive rate) and the average
network latency as network load is varied, under uniform network traffic. E pochmin ex-
hibits a slow increase with rising injection rate up to network saturation, and a steep rise
afterwards. From the plot, a worst case E pochmin of 7K cycles is sufficient to eliminate
all false positives when the network is in deep saturation, operating at an average latency
of about 4 times the zero-load latency. With similar experiments on PARSEC benchmark
traces, we observed that the check epoch of length 600 cycles is sufficient to eliminate all
false positives.
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Verification of ForEVeR’s Recovery
All components involved in the detection and recovery processes must be formally veri-
fied to guarantee correct functionality. Detection leverages the checker network and the
counting logic in the network interfaces. In addition to the interface between primary and
checker routers for packet draining, the recovery operation also uses the checker network.
To verify the correctness of the checker network, we need to show that it delivers all
packets to their intended destination in a bounded amount of time, as discussed in Section
2.3.1. We partition this goal into four properties: injection, guaranteeing correct injection
of packets into the network; progress, ensuring packets advance towards their intended
destinations; ejection, proving timely ejection of packets; and data integrity, ensuring that
data remains uncorrupted throughout.
As discussed earlier, during recovery, the NoC routers operate in a barebone mode with
all complex hardware units disabled, thus making the verification task much less challeng-
ing. To ensure correct recovery, we have to verify that routers fairly take turns in retrieving
valid packets from their respective buffers. To this end, we check the following aspects:
i) fairness and exclusivity during extraction (fairness) to guarantee that routers take turns
in transmitting packets on the checker network. ii) We also verify that complete packets
are extracted (complete packet), emptying the buffer completely (buffer empty). We also
check that iii) only valid packets are recovered (valid packet). Table 2.4 reports the time
required to prove these verification goals using our setup.
checker network correctness recovery operation correctness
verified property time(sec) verified property time(sec)
injection 8 fairness 15
progress 156 complete packet 10
ejection 86 buffer empty 46
data integrity 10 valid packet 29
Table 2.4 Formal verification of ForEVeR’s network-level detection and recovery.
Area Results
A central goal in designing ForEVeR is to keep silicon area at a minimum. The amount of
hardware required to implement router-level correctness varies with the designer’s ability to
verify different router components as formally verified functionalities need no protection at
runtime. Thus, we present the area overhead for network-level and router-level correctness
separately. Table 2.5b reports additions for network-level correctness, indicating a 4.8%
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area overhead over a primary network router. The overhead is due to recovery support at
each router, contributing 1.7%, and network interface additions and checker router, which,
combined, are responsible for the remaining 3.1%.
Table 2.5a reports the overhead for ForEVeR’s router-level hardware monitors and
reconfiguration hardware, accounting for 9.2% additional area over the baseline router. Re-
covery support for router-level correctness costs 7.8%, whereas the monitoring hardware
results in 1.4% overhead. In our framework, we were able to formally verify the baseline
router completely, and hence we only incurred the network-level area cost (4.8%).
(a) router-level correctness (b) network-level correctness (per router)
design area (µm2) % design area (µm2) %
baseline router 77,723 100.00 recovery support 1,300 1.67
recovery support 6,071 7.81 NI additions 1,550 1.99
monitoring 1,053 1.35 checker router 845 1.09
overhead 7,124 9.16 overhead 3,695 4.75
Table 2.5 ForEVeR area overhead.
ForEVeR leverages formally verified components within the router to recover from
design errors to keep the overhead low when compared to purely runtime verification tech-
niques [85, 2]. Without these verified components there would be a need for substantial
extra hardware. Specifically, in case of an error, a full runtime solution would require stor-
age to duplicate all the in-flight data and retransmit that using the same unreliable network
or transfer that over a secondary network that is guaranteed to be correct. We present the
comparison against runtime schemes in Section 2.5.
2.3.5 Generalization
Generalization to other NoC Designs
Both the detection and recovery schemes of ForEVeR can be generalized to any NoC
design/architecture. ForEVeR is agnostic to NoC topology and the routing algorithm em-
ployed, as long as the checker network, used both during detection and recovery, can adapt
to consistently deliver notifications ahead of time. To this end, checker network’s perfor-
mance can be tuned to the needs of the baseline network by various mechanisms, such as
increasing bandwidth or bundling notifications together before transmission. For the base-
line design, a low bandwidth checker network sufficed to deliver notifications as required.
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Generalization to other Router Designs
ForEVeR can be generalized to all mainstream router designs, as they have similar under-
lying structure, where control components manage the flow of data through the data-path
components. ForEVeR’s hardware monitors for router-level detection provide protection
to router components that handle complex interactions such as flow control and resource
allocators. Although the baseline router implementation is completely formally verified in
our experiments, we designed these generalized hardware monitors (flow control checkers
and allocation comparators) to be able to extend ForEVeR’s detection scheme to more com-
plex router designs that may be outside the scope of formal verification. As for ForEVeR’s
recovery scheme, only guaranteed basic router functionality is required to safely salvage
packets from the routers. To ensure this, basic router components (input ports, buffers,
arbiters, crossbar) required for bare-bone functionality are formally verified. These com-
ponents are common to all router architectures, while many of the other router features
that are design specific tend to be performance oriented: these type of features are disabled
during recovery.
2.4 Checker Network Design
This section discusses the design principles behind the design of the checker network for
ForEVeR. The same design principles apply to the checker network design for SafeNoC,
and hence it is not discussed separately. A suitable checker network should have three main
properties: i) it should be formally verifiable; ii) it should provide low latency transmis-
sion; iii) and finally, it should incur a low area overhead. A formally verifiable network
should present a simple router and network architecture, and a simple routing algorithm.
In contrast, a naı¨ve solution to consistently deliver notifications before their counterpart
data packets arrive through the primary network, may require complex router and network
designs that are area-intensive and difficult to verify. Fortunately, exploiting the nature of
traffic flowing through the checker network (i.e., notifications), we are able to design a
network satisfying both these conflicting requirements. Note that these properties are not
a strict requirement for the correctness of our solution. However, not meeting them leads
to additional costs in area, development time and performance. For instance, a checker
network that does not deliver notifications before their corresponding data packets, may
result in an error going undetected over multiple epochs. In such a scenario, error detection
latency is affected, but NoC correctness is still guaranteed. The checker network, therefore,
is tailored to the characteristics of the primary network so to minimize the occurrence of
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such cases.
The checker network is used exclusively to transmit notifications to their destinations.
The notifications contain no data, only including destination address (6-bits for a 64-node
NoC) and a valid bit. Having to transmit only packets of uniform and small sizes presents
many advantages that can be leveraged to design a simple and efficient NoC architecture.
First, packet-switched routers, without large buffers or many wires between routers, can
be utilized. This eliminates the need of complex switching techniques for buffer and/or
wire cost amortization, including circuit switching, store-and-forward, virtual-cut through,
wormhole and virtual channel switching, which all require a substantial amount of con-
trol and book-keeping hardware for proper functioning. Additionally, such a simple router
design can be implemented to have single-cycle latency, as we discuss later in this sec-
tion. Second, the small fixed-size packets require no packetization hardware at the network
interfaces (NIs) and fully utilize the available bandwidth on packet switched networks
(no bandwidth fragmentation). Finally, since the notifications are not stored at destina-
tions, multiple notification can be ejected simultaneously, without requiring any additional
buffering.
Based on these observations, our checker network should be packet-switched, with
channel/buffer allocation and traffic transmission performed at packet granularity. To fur-
ther simplify the design, we chose a ring topology for the checker network, leveraging
a simple, single-cycle latency, packet-switched buffer-less router, based on the solution
proposed in [67]. All the nodes in the network are connected in a bidirectional ring. A
predetermined allocation ensures that there is no contention for network resources in rout-
ing a packet from source to destination; therefore, pipeline registers at the router inputs are
sufficient to ensure loss-less transmission. To this end, once a packet is injected into the
network, it has priority over other packets that are trying to enter the network, and thus the
packet is guaranteed to make progress toward the destination. For each packet, a decision
is made to inject it in one ring or the one in the opposite direction based on minimal rout-
ing distance. Each packet, once in the network, keeps moving forward through the same
ring until it is ejected at its destination. Two packets traveling on separate rings may try to
eject at the same node in the same cycle, causing contention for the ejection port. This is
resolved by providing a separate ejection port for both ring directions at each node. The
valid bit from ejection ports connects to the detection counter, while the destination ID
is discarded at ejection. The checker router architecture is shown in Figure 2.12, and the
checker network normal operation is shown in Figure 2.15a.
Ring topologies suffer from higher hop-counts when compared to common topologies
like meshes, but in our system this is mitigated by three factors: i) the checker routers can
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Figure 2.12 Checker network architecture for ForEVeR and SafeNoC. The checker router is
packet switched with a single cycle latency. Packets are guaranteed to move forward once inside
the checker network. To this end, packets that are waiting injection are given a lower priority as
compared to the packets already inside the checker network. Finally, there is no contention at the
ejection port.
be traversed in a single-cycle, ii) there is no contention within the checker network, and iii)
in contrast to notifications, the main network transfers large data packets (e.g., cache lines)
that are typically divided up into long wormholes. As a result, the checker network design
presented above consistently delivers notifications before their counterpart data packets ar-
rive via the primary network. In exceptional situations, when notifications lag data packets,
our scheme may produce a false negative detection result. In general, however, our scheme
has a certain amount of tolerance to having a few notifications lagging behind and this rarely
leads to false negatives. When it does, false negatives only increase the detection latency
and do not affect the correctness of our scheme as we guarantee no loss of flits/packets, and
the data would eventually be delivered in an uncorrupted state to the correct destinations
upon error detection.
We ran experiments by injecting uniform traffic with varying packet sizes into the pri-
mary network and simultaneously injecting one notification into the checker network for
each primary network packet. At the destination, the notifications were matched with corre-
sponding data packets, and the following statistics were logged: i) which network delivered
the packet or notification first (main or checker), and ii) the time difference between cor-
responding deliveries. Figure 2.13 shows the fraction of packets delivered first by each
network for varying injection rates. If the main network uses short packets (Figure 2.13a),
the majority of the notifications are delivered before the corresponding main network pack-
ets. However, there is a non-negligible fraction of packets (10-35%) for which the main
network delivers first. Also, note that due to better congestion management in the ring,
a larger fraction of notifications are delivered first when the main network is subjected to
heavy traffic. Moreover, when the main network packets are larger (16 flits, Figure 2.13b),
41
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
0.01 0.03 0.05 0.07 0.09 0.11%
 p
a
ck
e
ts
 d
e
li
v
e
re
d
 f
ir
st
injection rate (packets/node/cycle)
checker_network
main_network
data packet size: 4 flits
traffic: uniform
(a) Small packet size (4 flits).
95%
96%
97%
98%
99%
100%
0.004 0.008 0.012 0.016 0.02 0.024%
 p
a
ck
e
ts
 d
e
li
v
e
re
d
 f
ir
st
injection rate (packets/node/cycle)
main_network
checker_network
data packet size: 16 flits
traffic: uniform
(b) Large packet size (16 flits).
Figure 2.13 Fraction of checker notifications delivered first. The checker network delivers
almost all notifications before their counterpart primary network packets. The effect is more pro-
nounced at higher injection rates and for larger main network packets.
the checker network is comparatively less loaded, and hence more than 99% of the notifi-
cations make it to their destination before the main network packets at any injection rate
above 0.008 packets per node per cycle. In summary, the majority of the notifications are
delivered ahead of their corresponding network packets under all conditions, with an ad-
ditional marked improvement on notifications being delivered first when packets are large
and the network is under heavy traffic load.
Figure 2.14 plots the distribution of notification-main packet deliveries for a range of
delivery-time differences. A positive time difference indicates that the notifications arrived
first. For small main network packets (4 flits, Figure 2.14a), most notifications are deliv-
ered 0-50 cycles ahead of the main network packets. Few main network packets (11%
of total) are delivered before their corresponding notifications, and a negligible number of
main network packets (<0.5%) are delivered more than 25 cycles before their notifications.
Our detection scheme is tolerant to a few main network packets delivered early, when the
notifications follow shortly after (<25 cycles later). ForEVeR employs a technique based
on delayed counter update to eliminate false negatives. As can be noted from Figure 2.14b,
the complete distribution is positive for networks with large packets, with only a negligible
number of main network packets (<0.2%) delivered ahead of their notifications.
Recovery operation: As mentioned earlier, during recovery, each main network flit is
transmitted in multiple segments through the checker network. The network interfaces
house the dis-assembling/re-assembling logic to support recovery. The checker network
recovery operation and logic is greatly simplified because only one router is transmitting
packets to a single destination at a time. To this end, the checker network’s channels include
additional dedicated wires for head and tail indicators that are used during recovery oper-
ation. The checker packet with head indicator carries the destination address and reserves
an exclusive path between the source and the destination. All intermediate valid packets
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Figure 2.14 Distribution of notification-main packet pairs over a range of delivery-time dif-
ferences at heavy injection. The checker network delivers almost all notifications before their
corresponding network packets.
traversing the ring network are ejected at the same destination until a packet is received
with a tail indicator. Moreover, all transmissions on the checker network during recovery
occur in the same (clockwise) direction to avoid wormhole overlap of two packets. In con-
trast to normal operation, the address field is not discarded on ejection, as it contains data
in body/tail checker packets. In our evaluation system of 64 nodes, the checker network
channel is 8 bits wide, with 6 bits for address and 1 bit each for head and tail indicators.
Thus, each 64-bit primary network flit is partitioned into 12 checker networks packets (1
head, 11 body/tail) when transferred on the checker network. We expect design errors to
manifest infrequently, and thus this serial transmission scheme, while slow, it should not
significantly affect overall system’s performance. The operation of the checker network
during recovery is illustrated in Figure 2.15b.
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Figure 2.15 ForEVeR’s checker network operation. (a) Normal operation: notifications are
transmitted in both ring directions and multiple source-destination pairs are active simultaneously.
(b) recovery operation: only the clockwise ring is used to transmit disassembled main network
flits, that are then reassembled at the destination’s NI. Additionally, only one source can be sending
packets to one destination at any time.
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2.5 Comparison of Runtime Protection Solutions
Table 2.6 outlines the qualitative comparison of SafeNoc and ForEVeR with other pure-
runtime schemes. The comparison is with the following runtime solutions: i) ACK-
Retransmission [85], which maintains a fresh copy of injected data until it receives a
positive acknowledgement from the destination, and ii) Park-06 [94], which utilizes var-
ious micro-architectural modifications to overcome soft-errors both in router datapath and
control-logic. We compare the four schemes on four aspects: protection against design
errors, area overhead, and power overhead. Soft-error resilience is also considered for
comparison because soft-error manifestations are similar to design error manifestations,
and certain runtime-verification schemes can also be leveraged for soft-error protection.
We discuss this aspect in detail in the next chapter. Only ForEVeR can guarantee complete
correctness, while others fail to overcome either forward progress bugs or drop/duplicate
packets or both. ACK-Retransmission, for instance, cannot recover from bugs like dead-
lock and livelock, and even for other bugs it uses the same untrusted network to retransmit
data upon error detection, possibly incurring the error again and again. Therefore, the
delivery of the retransmitted data in ACK-retransmitted cannot be guaranteed.
type of design errors protected area overhead
solution forward duplicate/ storage link
progress drop pkt buffers wires
ForEVeR yes yes none low
SafeNoC yes no high moderate
ACK-Ret no yes very high none
Park-06 no no very high none
performance overhead SEU protection
solution normal recovery data control
operation operation path path
ForEVeR no impact short yes yes
SafeNoC no impact intractable no no
ACK-Ret high impact short yes yes
Park-06 low impact low impact yes yes
Table 2.6 Comparison of runtime verification solutions.
ForEVeR does not need to buffer main network packets to support its detection and
recovery operation. However, storage of notification packets at injection ports is required
in our checker network architecture. The notifications only store the destination address
(6-bits), and hence are considerably small as compared to main network packets. In our
simulations, the worst-case storage required at checker network injection port was 11 no-
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tifications when operated beyond saturation. As on-chip networks do no operate beyond
saturation [87], this adds up to only 9 bytes of storage for the worst case, almost the same
as one main network flit of 64 bits. Thus, the amount of notification storage required is
insignificant.
In contrast, SafeNoC utilizes buffers at destination nodes to store checksums and pack-
ets waiting for their counterparts, while ACK-Retransmission maintains large source node
buffers for all in-flight packets. Finally, Park-06 [94], requires additional buffering at each
router FIFO to overcome deadlocks caused by soft errors, such that the total buffer size
is large enough to accommodate the remaining flits of a packet allocated to the FIFO
and still have one empty slot. Naturally, the storage requirement grows with larger pack-
ets. Moreover, this additional buffering is required at each VC for each input port. We
ran stress tests on the NoC using uniform traffic to calculate the maximum buffering re-
quired over time for the SafeNoC and ACK-Retransmission solution. For SafeNoC, we
observed the maximum number of outstanding checksums and data packets at any time,
and for ACK-Retransmission we noted the maximum number of data packets in-flight.
Buffer requirements for Park-06 can be calculated using the analytical equations provided
in [94]. Figure 2.16 shows the results of our study and plots the worst case buffering
required at each node. Note that ForEVeR requires no additional buffers, while all oth-
ers require substantial buffer space for proper operation. The buffer requirements for
ACK-Retransmission and Park-06 grow substantially for large packet sizes, while SafeNoC
requires buffering for∼40 flits/node independent of packet size. Note that provisioning for
buffers to store 50-100 flits at each node can be prohibitively expensive for a constrained
NoC environment. For instance, for data packets of 16 flits, the buffers in SafeNoC, ACK-
Retransmission and Park-06 alone result in 12.5%, 37% and 26% area overhead over our
baseline NoC, respectively. ForEVeR, however, does use some additional wires on a sepa-
rate checker network, but since the transmitted notifications contain no data, we can design
an area-efficient checker network, as we will discuss in Section 2.4. In contrast, SafeNoC
uses a similar checker network to transfer larger (16-32 bit) checksum packets, while the
ACK-Retransmission and Park-06 solutions do not use a separate checker network to over-
come errors.
On the performance front, neither ForEVeR nor SafeNoC has any impact during nor-
mal error-free NoC operation, whereas ACK-Retransmission and Park-06 create additional
traffic due to end-to-end and switch-to-switch acknowledgements, respectively. During re-
covery, all techniques other than SafeNoC can quickly recover from anomalous behavior.
SafeNoC runs a packet reconstruction algorithm in software that, in the worst case, can be
exponential in the number of flits to be recovered and reassembled.
45
Although protection against soft-errors is not the focus of this chapter, we briefly com-
pare the solutions on this aspect due to the similarities between soft-error and design error
manifestations. ACK-Retransmission and Park-06 can provide the best protection against
soft-errors, while SafeNoC has no mechanism to overcome soft-errors. In contrast, as we
will demonstrate in Chapter 3, ForEVeR with a few modifications can be leveraged to over-
come soft-errors affecting both the datapath and control path of NoC routers. In summary,
the low area and performance overhead, combined with the ability to protect against both
design and soft-errors, makes ForEVeR the most complete runtime solution.
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2.6 Related Work
NoC simulator distributions [28, 38], and RTL simulation and emulation platforms [54]
are widely used for performance and functional verification. However, both simulation and
emulation techniques are inherently incomplete, since they cannot check all possible ex-
ecution scenarios. In contrast, formal techniques can provide the guarantees of complete
correctness; however, they either cannot be automated, as in theorem proving, or they are
limited by the state explosion problem, as in model checking. This has led designers to
use formal verification exclusively for small portions of NoC designs [64] or to verify the
abstracted model of the implementation [23, 16, 55]. Other works [16, 126] utilize theo-
rem proving to guarantee NoC correctness and are also able to verify liveness properties
like deadlock-freedom [125]. However, these abstracted NoC models, often do not model
advance features like virtual channels, flow control techniques, etc. Moreover, properties
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proven over the abstracted NoC model cannot guarantee correctness of the actual micro-
architectural implementation. In contrast, SafeNoC and ForEVeR guarantee the correctness
of all the executions of the NoC implementation, and they also enable designers to deploy
aggressively-designed NoCs that are not exhaustively verified at design-time.
To address the limitations of design-time verification, runtime solutions have been re-
cently proposed to ensure the correct transfer of data packets through the interconnect.
Several of these works target deadlock, a prominent issue in adaptive routing. Tradition-
ally, the deadlock problem in NoCs is overcome by deadlock avoidance [116, 29, 74], or
through detection [79, 75] and recovery [9]. Other works tackle a wider, still incomplete,
set of NoC errors through end-to-end detection and recovery techniques, and are surveyed
in [85]. The most common among these is the acknowledgement-based retransmission
(ACK-Retransmission) technique, where error detection codes are transmitted along with
data packets, to check for data corruption at the receiver. An acknowledgement is sent back
after each successful transfer. In case of failure, the sender times out and re-transmits the
locally-stored packet copy. Apart from large storage buffers and performance degradation
due to the additional acknowledgement packets, this approach is incapable of overcoming
deadlock, livelock and starvation errors. Moreover, since it uses the same untrusted net-
work for re-transmission, ultimately it cannot guarantee packet delivery. In contrast, both
SafeNoC and ForEVeR safeguard against a wide range of functional bugs, including, i) bug
manifestations that cause data corruption, such as, duplicated or misrouted packets, and
ii) bug manifestations that stall the forward progress of the network, such as, deadlock,
livelock, and starvation. In addition, both SafeNoC and ForEVeR are end-to-end solutions
leveraging hardware units mostly decoupled from the primary NoC and requiring minimal
changes to the primary NoC.
We are not aware of any runtime solutions that deal with design errors in NoCs. How-
ever, there has been few such works for processors, [10, 83, 128]. In general, these solutions
add checker hardware to verify the operation of untrusted components. Our solutions are
similar to such solutions, in the sense that they use a simple and functionally correct checker
network to verify the operation of the complex primary network.
Our solutions rely on augmenting the original network with a small and lightweight one
that operates concurrently. The idea of using multiple overlaid networks has been proposed
for various purposes. [11] and [131] use multiple networks for performance enhancement.
Others, such as TILE64 [13], use separate dedicated networks, each supporting a distinct
functionality of the NoC. Mostly, these networks share the same topology and are compa-
rable to each other in complexity. To the best of our knowledge, ours is the first attempt
to overlay a network with another low-cost and error-free one to ensure the functional
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correctness of the original interconnect.
Very few research works have proposed complementary use of formal and runtime tech-
niques. Among them, [12] leveraged hardware checkers in model checking to avoid state
explosion by validating abstractions at runtime. However, [12], unlike ForEVeR, cannot
be directly applied to ensure NoC correctness. Another work proposed property checking
at both design time and runtime [124]. However, as recovery from design errors in not
supported, this is not a complete correctness solution.
Finally, ForEVeR’s detection mechanism relies on the use of router-level runtime mon-
itors, when formal methods fail to ensure router correctness. Runtime checkers has been
proposed for various purposes, like soft-error induced anomaly detection in NoCs [98, 94]
or post-silicon debug and in-field diagnosis [17]. In contrast, ForEVeR leverages special-
ized hardware monitors coupled with recovery support, specifically for NoC correctness.
2.7 Summary
In this chapter, we first presented SafeNoC, a runtime end-to-end error detection and recov-
ery technique to guarantee the functional correctness of on-chip interconnects. SafeNoC
augments the interconnect with a lightweight and simple checker network, and it detects
functional errors by comparing the signature of every received data packet with its look-
ahead signature that was delivered through the checker network. In case of mismatches, our
novel recovery approach collects blocked packets and stray flits from the primary network
and distributes them over the checker network to all processor cores, where our recon-
struction algorithm reassembles them. SafeNoC can detect and recover from a broad range
of functional design errors, while incurring a small performance impact, requiring only
between 11K and 39M execution cycles to recover from an error.
This chapter then describes ForEVeR, a solution that improves the error coverage and
reduces the area overhead compared to SafeNoC. ForEVeR complements the use of for-
mal methods and runtime verification to ensure complete functional correctness in NoCs.
Formal verification is used to verify simple router functionality, augmented with a network-
level runtime detection and recovery scheme to provide NoC correctness guarantees. For-
EVeR augments the NoC with a simple checker network used to communicate notifications
of future packet deliveries to corresponding destinations. A runtime detection mechanism
counts expected packets, triggering recovery upon unusual behavior of the counter values.
Following error detection, all in-flight packets in the primary NoC are safely drained to
their intended destinations via the checker network. ForEVeR’s detection scheme is highly
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accurate and can detect all types of design errors. The complete scheme incurs only 4.9%
area cost for an 8x8 mesh NoC, requiring only up to 30K cycles to recover from errors.
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Chapter 3
Addressing Reliability Threats
Reliability has emerged as a first-class design constraint for CMPs and SoCs with the
shrinking of silicon feature size. Traditionally, memory elements have been the most vul-
nerable to transistor failures [109]. However, recent industrial-level studies have shown
that transistor failures in logic components are far more prevalent than previously assumed
[89, 86]. Protection of memory elements has been well researched; therefore, special at-
tention is required for failures affecting logic components: both datapath and control logic.
This chapter focuses on reliability schemes that protect the NoC against failures in both
datapath and control logic.
NoCs occupy a significant portion of the on-chip real estate [56, 130] and observe
high activity, making them susceptible to both transient and permanent faults. We tackle
transient faults by observing that their manifestation is similar to instances of design er-
rors: detection and re-execution is enough to overcome such errors. Therefore, in Section
3.2, we present an extension of ForEVeR that, with only a few modifications, can also
overcome transient failures. In case of permanent transistor failures, however, a complete
solution should entail detection and diagnosis of the fault site, followed by reconfigura-
tion around the malfunctioning components. This chapter proposes solutions to tackle each
aspect of protection against permanent faults. We first describe a low-overhead passive
on-line detection and diagnosis scheme in Section 3.3, followed by a unified diagnosis and
reconfiguration scheme for frugal bypass of NoC faults in Section 3.4. We conclude by
presenting a novel NoC testing approach that ensures uninterrupted availability in the pres-
ence of faults by leveraging a quick and minimal-impact reconfiguration solution called
BLINC (Section 3.5).
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3.1 Detection, Diagnosis and Reconfiguration for Reliable
NoC design
There are many different sources of errors in modern digital devices, and thus in NoCs:
crosstalk, radiation-induced soft-errors, degradation-induced timing errors, etc. Often these
effects result in temporary faulty behavior of the system, known as soft or transient errors.
In addition, there are permanent faults resulting from manufacturing defects, infant mortal-
ity, or hardware aging. While manufacturing and burn-in tests may screen most permanent
failures caused by the first two phenomena, permanent wear-out faults cannot be detected
before shipment. Moreover, Borkar [15] predicts a 20% transistor failure rate in future
CMPs due to variability effects, with an additional 10% over the lifetime of the chip due
to aging. This waning reliability of silicon makes the problem even worse. As the sole
medium for on-chip communication, NoCs are particularly susceptible to become a single
point of failure.
Recent studies [34, 86] have confirmed the alarming rate of transient errors affecting
both logic and memory components. As NoCs occupy a significant portion of the on-
chip real estate [56, 130], their susceptibility to soft-errors is notable and, additionally,
they suffer from single event upsets (SEUs) due to crosstalk and coupling noise in link
wires. Soft-error tolerance solutions typically involve monitoring hardware to detect the
occurrence of malfunctions, while relying on re-execution from an uncorrupted state for
error recovery. For example, [26] employs N-modular redundancy (NMR) to detect and/or
recover from soft-errors. The silicon overhead makes NMR impractical for commodity sys-
tems; hence soft-error recovery is often based on temporal redundancy, that is, re-execution.
Still, naı¨vely executing duplicates for all computation and communication is not a feasible
solution. Hence, designers leverage lightweight monitoring hardware to catch the major-
ity of soft-errors, triggering a re-execution-based recovery procedure only upon an error
detection.
In the last chapter, we proposed an NoC design that can overcome design errors. We
further noticed that design errors that slip into the final silicon are rare corner-case exe-
cution scenarios. Even though a design error is a permanent disagreement between the
hardware and its specification, it is unlikely that re-execution of the same application will
lead to the manifestation of the same design error again. The reasons are as follows: first,
corner-case bugs are triggered only during intricate interactions between components, and
it is unlikely that execution scenarios are recreated precisely in large computer systems.
Second, the execution trace depends on the operating environment, which is also hard to
recreate. Finally, on detection of an error, we change the system to a configuration that
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is simple and verified-to-be-correct. Therefore, design errors, similar to soft-errors, are
typically one-off events. In this project, we exploit the similarities between soft-error and
design error manifestations: i) both are relatively infrequent; therefore, a slow recovery is
acceptable, and ii) re-execution from an uncorrupted state is a promising recovery solu-
tion for both. By leveraging these properties, we are able to design a lightweight solution,
based on our design error protection solution, that can detect and overcome the majority of
soft-errors and design errors in both control and datapath logic of NoCs.
Permanent faults pose a greater challenge, as simple detection and re-execution is likely
to result in repeated errors. As a result, it is important to accurately diagnose the location of
faulty components and to disable/bypass them for future executions. Reliability solutions,
therefore, try to leverage the redundancy built into the system to enable the system to be op-
erational, even after some of its components have been disabled. The process of disabling
faulty components and replacing them with healthy ones is often termed reconfiguration.
The guiding principle behind all reconfiguration solutions is to achieve graceful degrada-
tion in performance with increasing number of faults. Fortunately, NoCs provide many
concurrent paths between communicating nodes, and thus they inherently benefit from
fairly high redundancy. However, it is essential to diagnose the faults at a fine-granularity
and to disable only small portions of the NoC’s hardware with each fault manifestation.
Therefore, a carefully designed combination of diagnosis and reconfiguration solutions is
vital for NoC reliability: we propose a novel diagnosis solution in Section 3.3, while we
present a frugal routing reconfiguration scheme in Section 3.4.
Even though routing reconfiguration can be leveraged for circumventing permanent
failures, it requires lengthy suspension of network operation for reconfiguration changes to
take effect. In addition, reconfiguration is triggered on a fault detection, by which time the
network could already be in a corrupted state. In other words, routing reconfiguration fails
to provide uninterrupted availability in presence of faults: a property that a digital system
expects from its communication infrastructure. This property is particularly important for
mission critical systems, where a down time of even a few milliseconds can be detrimental.
To this end, we propose BLINC (Section 3.5), a novel reconfiguration solution that pro-
vides a quick and minimal-impact response to faults. We particularly leverage our BLINC
algorithm to develop a transparent reliability solution for NoCs, based on aggressive on-
line testing and failure prevention. In our setup, individual components undergo preventive
testing by being taking offline on a rotating basis via our BLINC algorithm. The compo-
nents are only brought back online if they do not show signs of failure under a strict testing
environment.
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3.1.1 A case for the need for better NoC reliability
In this section, we present a case study to drive the need for better NoC protection against
permanent faults. Due to the continuous scaling of silicon and the saturation of single-
thread performance, CMPs and SoCs with many on-chip processors are a growing market
segment. Further, these large CMPs and SoCs are increasingly relying on NoC intercon-
nects to provide scalable inter-core communication. With the waning reliability of silicon,
permanent wearout faults are affecting silicon components at runtime with a greater prob-
ability. In the context of CMPs and SoCs, cores and the interconnect are the primary logic
blocks; those that require careful safeguarding against permanent faults.
Researchers have recently proposed novel chip multiprocessor (CMP) architectures that
can tolerate up to a few hundred (∼500) processor-logic permanent faults [96, 53] in a
64-node CMP. These reliability schemes do not consider faults in the NoC infrastructure;
however, faults in that sub-system may potentially lead to the isolation of one or multiple
cores, thus greatly reducing the computational power of the system. The loss of many cores
may occur even if the cores themselves are fault-free, simply because they become discon-
nected due to a faulty interconnect. Data from a few industrial CMP designs [130, 56]
reports that roughly 6-15% of the chip area has been dedicated to the interconnect, and
roughly 50% to the processor logic. Assuming such an area partition and a uniform distri-
bution of faults over silicon area [65], 500 permanent faults affecting the 50% area occupied
by processor logic translates to 60-150 permanent faults affecting the NoC logic that occu-
pies 6-15% of the chip area. Therefore, the NoC should be able to gracefully tolerate up
to 60-150 faults to match state-of-the-art processor-oriented reliability schemes. To eval-
uate the capabilities of current fault-tolerance schemes for NoCs, we modeled a 64-node
NoC equipped with state-of-the-art fault-diagnosis [39] and route-reconfiguration schemes
[4, 39]. We then randomly injected a varying number of permanent faults at gate outputs
of the NoC netlist with uniform distribution over silicon area. The gate-level faults were
then mapped to dysfunctional links using the model proposed in [39]. Finally, our model
reported the number of isolated CMP nodes in each fault injection experiment.
Figure 3.1 plots the average number of processing nodes unreachable within such an
NoC with increasing permanent faults. Each data-point on the graph corresponds to the
average of 1,000 different spatially-random fault injection experiments. It is clear from the
figure that existing state-of-the-art solutions deteriorate considerably beyond 30 transistor
faults, dropping many nodes with just a few additional faults (see slope change). If 60
permanent faults were to occur in the silicon area occupied by the NoC, then almost 2/3rd
of the nodes would become isolated, because the network would be partitioned into two or
more distinct regions. Without the deployment of a more gracefully degrading NoC relia-
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bility solution, the CMPs would potentially lose many healthy processing units with only a
few permanent faults affecting the NoC.
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Figure 3.1 Loss of processing capability induced by faults in the NoC for a 64 node mesh network
equipped with [4, 100] schemes.
To address this problem, we propose a novel solution in Section 3.4, called uDI-
REC, which drops over 3× fewer nodes than existing solutions, and thus it minimizes the
network-induced loss of processing capability. Further, it is often the case with uDIREC
that cores (and other on-chip functionalities) are only discarded when the number of faults
is beyond the capacity of the fault-tolerant mechanisms protecting the cores themselves.
uDIREC is beneficial for a variety of multi-core configurations (few or many cores) and
varied fault rates (few to fault-ridden). For example, configurations with few cores degrade
drastically and often become dysfunctional with the loss of one (or few) core(s). uDIREC
extends the lifetime of such configurations by dropping the first (few) node(s) only after a
significantly higher number of faults have manifested.
3.2 Soft-Error Detection and Recovery with ForEVeR++
The ForEVeR architecture described in the previous chapter, with few modifications, can
also detect and recover from transient errors affecting any NoC component type: control,
datapath or links. For the rest of this document, we refer to the soft-error resilient version
of ForEVeR, as ForEVeR++. ForEVeR++ incurs minimal performance penalty up to a flit
error rate of 0.01% in lightly loaded networks. In addition, ForEVeR++ hardware costs
only 6% area over the baseline ForEVeR design.
We make the following observations to provide a cheap soft-error protection solution
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Figure 3.2 Reliable checker network design. ForEVeR++ employs switch-to-switch single error
correction ECC (12-bit codeword, 8-bit data) to protect the checker network data, while it deploys
triple modular redundancy (TMR) to protect the packet-valid bit.
with baseline ForEVeR: first, the router-level monitors designed to detect anomalous be-
havior due to design errors, can also prevent the network from entering an unrecoverable
state upon a soft-error manifestation. Second, ForEVeR++ can provide low-cost soft-error
resilience by utilizing the same recovery hardware as ForEVeR to reliably transmit the soft-
error affected packets. Finally, to protect the recovery hardware (e.g., checker network)
itself against soft-errors, simple ECC and duplication based techniques can be leveraged
without significant overhead. Overall, with these hardware modifications, ForEVeR++ can
provide better soft-error coverage compared to the previous state-of-the-art techniques.
The most common soft-error resiliency techniques augment NoC packets with ECC
information for error checking [85, 35], while relying on costly data retransmission for
error recovery. Retransmission schemes cannot tackle all erroneous scenarios, especially
the ones arising from control logic malfunction, e.g., deadlock. A technique to recover
from soft-errors in both the router’s data-path and control logic was presented in [94]. It
uses switch-to-switch ECC and retransmission for data-path errors, while the router control
logic is protected with hardware checkers. However, this approach leads to a prohibitive
area overhead, especially for networks with large data packets, as shown in Section 2.5.
In contrast, ForEVeR++ does not require backup data storage, can overcome the deadlock
scenarios, and it can recover from the errors in the control logic.
3.2.1 Methodology and Hardware Additions
Since ForEVeR++ intentionally builds on top of the hardware features of ForEVeR (Chap-
ter 2.3), we borrow the terminology from the previous chapter without re-introduction.
Reliability-oriented features in ForEVeR++ are focused on two aspects: i) enhancing the
checker network reliability, and ii) ensuring that the integrity of data is always maintained
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within the main network routers. The second aspect allows ForEVeR++ to eliminate any
backup storage, and instead drain the erroneous packets via the reliable checker network.
ForEVeR++ relies on the end-to-end locality-aware ECC [112] for fixing one-to-few bit
data corruptions in the primary network packets. Link and datapath related errors, typically
only affect single (or few) bit(s), which are corrected by the ECC. Based on the insight that
severe data corruptions are only caused by errors in router control logic, ForEVeR++ can
preserve data integrity by only protecting the router control logic.
Checker network reliability. For ForEVeR++’s reliable operation, the checker network
should always deliver unaltered packets to their correct destinations. To this end, we aug-
ment the checker network with a switch-to-switch single-error-correct (SEC) ECC code.
ForEVeR++ assumes that due to the small channel width of the checker network, in the
worst case, only a single bit can be affected per notification. For the baseline 8-bit wide
checker network, a 12-bit wide codeword is required for SEC capability. Additionally, the
packet-valid bit is protected by triple-modular redundancy (TMR) to prevent from errors in
the ECC output and to avoid transmission of an invalid packet. Thus, the sum total channel
width of the reliable checker network is 15 bits (12 codeword, 3 packet-valid TMR). Figure
3.2 shows the architecture of the reliable checker router.
Error detection. Remember from Section 2.3.2, the router control components are aug-
mented with runtime monitors to prevent an erroneous state due to design errors. These
checkers can also be leveraged to detect anomalies due to soft-errors. Note that ForEVeR++
detects the anomalous behavior before the network goes into an unrecoverable state (for
instance, by dropping a flit) and prevents any data loss/corruption by provisioning small
emergency storage. Finally, in a rare scenario, soft-errors can also lead to forward progress
errors: a situation easily identified by ForEVeR’s network-level detection scheme.
Error recovery. Although the majority of the soft-error bugs can be overcome by restart-
ing the router operation after a soft-error manifestation, we opt for network-wide recovery
(Section 2.3.3) initiation at each error detection. This is because the hardware monitors
cannot diagnose the source of error (design bug or soft-error), and thus our scheme sticks
to a uniform measure in avoiding any unrecoverable state, i.e., trigger a network-wide re-
covery. During recovery, all main network packets are delivered over the reliable checker
network to their final destinations.
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3.2.2 Experimental Evaluation
The performance of soft-error recovery schemes depends on the soft-error rate (SER). The
greater the SER, the larger the performance penalty on network operation. For NoC spe-
cific experiments, average network latency with varying flit error rates is a well accepted
metric to judge the quality of a recovery solution [85]. Flit error rate is defined as the prob-
ability of one or more errors occurring in a flit. Errors in a flit may be caused either by
soft-error-induced malfunction of router control logic, or by data bit-flips in router datap-
ath/links. Assuming equal logic, memory and link SER, we make a simplifying estimate
that the probability of a flit error being caused by control logic malfunction is proportional
to the silicon area percentage dedicated to control components. We conducted an area anal-
ysis of the components of the baseline router and observed that approximately 14% of the
area is dedicated to control components, while the rest is attributed to datapath and links.
Further, datapath corruptions are tackled by ECC with no performance overhead, while
overcoming control logic errors involves freezing the router pipelines and draining packets
over the checker network.
We ran simulations injecting errors in flits with varying probability. The simulator clas-
sified the injected flit errors as control-induced with 14% probability. The remainder were
tagged as performance-neutral datapath-induced errors as they are correctable by the end-
to-end ECC. On the other hand, the control-induced errors trigger a network-wide recovery,
causing a performance hit. Figure 3.3 shows the average network latency with increasing
flit error rate for varying loads of uniform random traffic. Naturally, the average network
latency suffered with the increasing flit error rate. The effect on average network latency
was tolerable (11% worse for 0.1 flits/cycle/node injection rate) up to the flit error rate of
0.01%, beyond which the latency degradation was quick. We also observed that the latency
degradation was more drastic for higher injection rates. This is because more main network
flits are transferred via the reliable checker network upon recovery initiation. Finally, un-
like retransmission schemes based on sending acknowledgement messages during normal
operation [85, 5], ForEVeR++ does not introduce any extra traffic into the main network,
and hence it does not incur a performance hit in the absence of errors. We conclude that
ForEVeR++’s soft-error protection is suitable for networks operating at high load and ex-
pecting a flit error rate of less than 0.001% (worst-case latency degradation of 7%), while
ForEVeR++ can sustain a flit error rate of up to 0.01% for networks operating at low load.
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increases with the injection rate.
3.3 Permanent Fault Detection and Diagnosis
A permanent fault in any datapath component along the path of a transmitted data packet
can manifest as a corrupted packet payload. Datapath components include routers’ external
and internal wires, input FIFOs, crossbars and output buffers. The control components, on
the other hand, manage the flow of packets and flits from input channels to output chan-
nels via the routers’ datapath. If a fault strikes the control hardware of a router, it can
result in dropped, spurious, duplicated, or misrouted flits or complete packets [7]. Hence,
it is vital to protect both datapath and control logic against permanent faults. To this end,
comprehensive diagnosis of NoC permanent faults, both data and control, is required.
We present a low-cost and fine-resolution mechanism to detect and diagnose perma-
nent faults in both the datapath and control logic of the NoC. The proposed solution is
passive, i.e., it does not inject any test traffic into the network. It comprises of an end-
to-end error symptom collection mechanism for locating datapath faults, and a distributed
counting and timeout-based technique to locate defective control components. Figure 3.4
shows a generic NoC architecture, briefly describing our detection and diagnosis scheme.
Faults in router datapath (highlighted grey) are diagnosed using a software-based score-
board (highlighted green-checked), while simple counters and timers (highlighted green)
are deployed to detect failures in router control components (highlighted blue). Our solu-
tion assumes that the network is already equipped with ECC-based forward error correction
[35] to detect and correct data corruptions due to soft-errors. To make up for data possibly
lost between error manifestation and detection, we assume that the system is equipped with
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an orthogonal data recovery scheme, such as the recovery scheme of ForEVeR (Section
3.2). Experimental results show that the proposed method can precisely pinpoint a defec-
tive component, while introducing no performance overhead in the absence of faults and
only leading to 2.7% area overhead.
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Figure 3.4 High-level overview of our detection and diagnosis scheme. Router logic is classi-
fied into datapath (grey) and control (blue) components, with a software scoreboard (green-checked)
used to diagnose datapath faults and counters (green) used to detect control failures.
3.3.1 Diagnosis Resolution
The work in [112] proposed an online diagnosis mechanism that analyzes payload data
errors to locate faulty links, while ECC is used to correct those data errors. However, the
scheme in [112] is limited to the faults in links between routers and does not directly con-
sider faults inside the router logic. Moreover, this method does not address control errors,
such as packet drop/duplication.
Our detection and diagnosis scheme extends the proposal in [112] by localizing fault
manifestations in any router component (links, datapath or control logic) to the finest
resolution possible when observing end-to-end traffic. The extension is based on two in-
novations: i) the deployment of simple counters and timers to diagnose errors affecting
routers’ control logic at fine-granularity, and ii) the perception of routers’ datapath as an
extension of the links connected to it. Elaborating on the latter, since our diagnosis mech-
anism can only observe errors in an end-to-end fashion, it can differentiate between faults
in two components only if there are certain packets that go through one component and
not through the other, and vice-versa. Similarly, when considering route-reconfiguration to
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circumvent permanent faults, the finest granularity at which components can be disabled
is exactly the same. Therefore, faults in the following set of datapath components are not
differentiable from an end-to-end diagnosis and route-reconfiguration perspective:
• output port buffer at the upstream router,
• link between routers,
• input port buffer at the downstream router, and
• crossbar contacts with the output (input) port at the upstream (downstream) router.
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Figure 3.5 A datapath segment includes the crossbar contacts to the output port and the output
port in the upstream router, the link, the input port buffer and the crossbar contacts from it in the
downstream router.
Throughout the rest of this document, we call the combined set of these datapath com-
ponents that are non-differentiable from network ends, as a datapath segment. Figure 3.5
illustrates the concept and constituent components of a single datapath segment. We further
observed that a fault manifestation in any of these constituent components can be modeled
as the failure of a single unidirectional link at an architectural level. We empirically stud-
ied the micro-architecture of wormhole routers to establish that a majority of faults can be
masked by re-routing around a single datapath segment. To this end, we synthesized a 5-
port baseline mesh router, and conceptually divided all router components into two pools:
i) components that only affect one datapath segment’s functionality, and ii) components
that affect the entire router’s functionality. Examples of the former category are crossbars,
output ports, input ports and links, while the latter category includes arbiters, allocators and
routing table. Components that only affect one datapath-segment accounted for 96% of the
router’s silicon area: 96% of the faults will affect only one datapath segment, assuming
an area-uniform fault distribution. We ascertained our observations by randomly inject-
ing stuck-at faults at gate outputs of every such component, and testing the “unaffected”
datapath segments for proper functionality with random test vectors.
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After diagnosing faults at a fine resolution, our scheme subsequently reconfigures by
leveraging the location of the malfunctioning datapath segments or unidirectional links.
Our reconfiguration algorithm, described in Section 3.4, fully utilizes this fine-grained di-
agnosis information to enable graceful degradation with increasing transistor faults. We
also present the design of a unified diagnosis and reconfiguration NoC architecture to en-
able frugal bypass of NoC faults in Section 3.4.
3.3.2 Datapath Faults
We introduce a novel diagnosis method based on a probabilistic scoreboard, similar to the
one proposed in [112]. The scoreboard, implemented in software, maintains the probabil-
ity of routers’ datapath components being faulty. Before determining the probability of a
datapath component being faulty, it is essential to detect the errors in data transmission. To
this end, we add flit-level end-to-end ECC to each packet. Since data errors must be caused
by one of the datapath components on the routing path of the erroneous packet, analyzing
the erroneous packet’s route provides insights into the failure location.
When a data error is detected at the destination, an error symptom packet is sent to
a designated “supervisor node” responsible for scoreboarding and diagnosis. This packet
contains the source and the destination address of the erroneous packet and the bit position
where the error occurred. Based on this information, we use a probabilistic method to cal-
culate the fault probability for each component along the possible paths from the source
to the destination. Our scheme accumulates these probabilities in the scoreboard on each
fault occurrence. After observing sufficient erroneous traffic in the system, the diagnosis
scheme declares the component corresponding to the scoreboard entry with the highest
accumulated fault probability as defective.
Calculation of fault probabilities. The scoreboard is a table of floating point fault prob-
ability entries for each datapath segment of the network. Every time an erroneous packet
symptom is received by the supervisor node, we calculate and accumulate the fault prob-
ability for each datapath component that could be responsible for the failure. Specifically,
all components lying on the path of the erroneous packet are equally likely candidates for
being faulty. Our diagnosis scheme is based on the intuition that in the case of a perma-
nent fault, the scoreboard entry corresponding to the faulty datapath segment will quickly
accumulate a value higher than the healthy datapath segments’ entries. Hence, our scheme
monitors the scoreboard for the highest fault probability value, till the number of erroneous
packets exceeds a preset threshold. After monitoring sufficient number of erroneous trans-
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missions to gain diagnostic confidence, our scheme declares the component corresponding
to the highest fault probability as faulty.
For a deterministic routing algorithm, the routing path is fixed for a given source-
destination pair, and hence error probabilities are updated in equal proportion for all
datapath segments on the path of an erroneous transmission. However, the correspond-
ing calculation is tricky for minimally-adaptive routing algorithms. To this end, we assign
separate usage probabilities to all NoC datapath segments, with respect to each source-
destination pair. These usage probabilities correspond to the fraction of times a particular
datapath segment will be traversed, when a packet is transmitted between a particular
source-destination pair. Therefore, usage probabilities depend on the path selection algo-
rithm employed at each router and can be easily calculated a-priori for static path selection
algorithms. On each erroneous transmission between a particular source-destination pair,
we update the scoreboard entry for each datapath segment by that segment’s usage proba-
bilities corresponding to that source-destination pair.
3.3.3 Control Faults
A fault in a router’s control logic may lead to many different failure scenarios: corruption
of data, complete flits/packets being dropped, or spurious ones generated. In addition, such
faults can also lead to packets being misrouted, potentially resulting in deadlock or live-
lock. Other errors that inhibit forward progress, such as starvation, are also possible due to
faults in the arbitration logic. Hence, our scheme tries to detect various symptoms of con-
trol logic faults and accurately diagnose the faulty datapath segment(s) using the following
techniques:
• Corrupted data: based on the diagnosis mechanism described in Section 3.3.2.
• Dropped or spurious flits: by counting the number of flits per packet received by a
router’s input port.
• Dropped or spurious packets: by keeping a count of packets inside a router.
• Misrouted packet: by detecting packet reception at wrong destination.
• Starvation: using timeouts.
We monitor these symptoms at a per-router or per-datapath-segment basis, and all di-
agnosis information is relayed back to the “supervisor node”. In addition to maintaining a
scoreboard for diagnosing datapath faults, the supervisor node also keeps a “status table”
to reflect the state (working or faulty) of each datapath segment in the NoC. We update
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this table upon receiving the diagnosis information from various nodes. This forms a con-
venient representation for interfacing with the route-reconfiguration algorithms, as will be
discussed later in Section 3.4. As detection of misrouting or starvation errors is straight-
forward, we only discuss detection of dropped/spurious flits/packets in detail.
Dropped or Spurious Flits
In an NoC, packets are typically broken down into fragments called “flits”. The number
of flits per packet can be extracted from the header flit or implied in case of a fixed packet
size. Our scheme uses this information to detect dropped or spurious/duplicated flits by
counting the number of flits sent from each input port (towards the output port), starting
with the header flit and stopping at the tail flit. If this count differs from its expected value,
then either a flit was dropped or created within this input port or the connecting output
port of the upstream router, i.e., within the corresponding datapath segment. To enable
this scheme, only one counter per input port, bounded by the maximum size of any packet
serviced by the network, is required.
Dropped or Spurious Packets
In order to detect a dropped or duplicated/spurious packet, our scheme maintains a packet
counter at each router, incrementing the counter at a packet’s tail flit being received and
decrementing the counter at a packet’s tail flit being sent. This counter value is analyzed to
detect dropped and spurious packets. The diagnosis granularity using this scheme is at the
router-level. However, we also propose an alternate scheme of counting packets per datap-
ath segment. Although, it improves the diagnosis granularity to the datapath-segment-level,
this alternative requires more hardware additions.
Dropped packet. A packet dropped inside a router/datapath-segment means that there are
more packets coming into the router/datapath-segment than going out of it. To this end, we
maintain a packet counter per router/datapath-segment that is incremented on each packet
received and decremented on each packet sent. A dropped packet will result in the counter
never reading a zero value. Therefore, a dropped packet can be detected if the packet
counter does not read a zero value during an entire execution window or “check epoch”.
This scheme avoids false negatives, but may cause false positives when heavy traffic in
the routers leads to continuously occupied routers. We experimentally show that choos-
ing a suitable check epoch size can reduce the false positive rate to an acceptable level.
This scheme is similar to the end-to-end notification counting scheme of ForEVeR that was
63
described in Section 2.3.
Spurious packet. A duplicated/spurious packet error is flagged when the packet counter
reaches a negative value. A negative packet counter value means that more packets have
been sent out of the router/datapath-segment than have entered the router. Note that this
scheme is susceptible to false negatives: even if one or more packets are duplicated within a
router/datapath-segment, the corresponding counter can possibly remain at a non-negative
value if the faulty router/datapath-segment is continuously occupied by other packets for
an extended period of time. However, experiments show that false negatives are extremely
rare for realistic traffic loads, and detection typically occurs within a few cycles.
3.3.4 Experimental Evaluations
We assessed our scheme’s diagnosis accuracy for datapath faults using Monte Carlo sim-
ulations with a simple C++ simulator. However, we used a cycle-accurate NoC simulator
[28] for evaluating our scheme’s accuracy in diagnosing dropped or spurious packets. Our
baseline NoC is an 8x8 XY-routed mesh network with 4-flit packets; routers are a simple 3-
stage pipeline with no virtual channels and 5-entry deep buffers per input port. Our scheme
was analyzed with two different types of workloads: random traffic and application traces
from the PARSEC benchmark suite [14].
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Figure 3.6 Diagnosis accuracy with increasing number of erroneous packets observed by the
supervisor node. Higher diagnosis accuracy is achieved for deterministic routing as compared to
minimal adaptive routing for the same number of erroneous packets observed.
Datapath faults
Intuitively, the location of the faulty component is diagnosable with high confidence if a
sufficiently large number of erroneous packets are observed. Figure 3.6 shows the diag-
nosis accuracy of our method for a selected faulty datapath segment, while varying the
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number of erroneous packets observed. The figure shows results for both XY and minimal-
adaptive routing. Over 98% diagnosis accuracy is achievable after fewer than 15 erroneous
packet observations with XY routing and around 40 erroneous packet observations with
minimal-adaptive routing. The difference can be attributed to the exact knowledge of rout-
ing paths with XY routing, while relying on a probabilistic estimation of routing paths for
minimal-adaptive routing.
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lighter network loads.
Dropped Packet
The scheme proposed for the detection of dropped packets can exhibit false positives. The
false positive rate depends on the duration of the check epoch and traffic conditions. Note
that false positives are triggered when the packet counter is non-zero for an entire check
epoch; a heavily loaded network will see more false positives as packets accumulate at
router buffers. Intuitively, a longer check epoch reduces the false positive rate by allow-
ing more time for packets to clear routers’ buffers. Figure 3.7 shows the decrease in false
positive rate with increasing check epoch size for datapath-segment-level diagnosis. As
seen from the figure, a heavily loaded network exhibits a higher false positive rate than a
moderately loaded network, and hence requires a larger check epoch to limit the false pos-
itives. Finally, false positives drop to a negligible value beyond a certain check epoch size,
referred to as epochmin).
Figure 3.8 plots the epochmin value necessary to eliminate all false positives and the
average network latency, under uniform traffic at various loads. E pochmin exhibits a slow
increase with rising injection rate up to network saturation and a steep rise afterwards. From
the plot, the worst case epochmin of 1K cycles is sufficient to eliminate all false positives
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Figure 3.8 The Figure shows the variation of epochmin and latency with increasing network load
for the dropped-packet detection scheme. An epochmin size of 400 cycles is sufficient to eliminate
all false positives for networks at onset of saturation.
when the network is in deep saturation, operating at an average latency of well over 3 times
the zero-load latency. A similar result was observed for 9 different PARSEC benchmark
traces (1 million instructions each), where a check epoch size of 300 cycles was sufficient
to eliminate all false positives for every benchmark. Our simulations indicate that epochmin
rises to high values only when the network is operated at loads well past saturation. Such a
scenario is unlikely: NoC workloads are characterized by the self-throttling nature, which
prevents them from operating past saturation [87].
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Figure 3.9 Spurious-packet detection scheme under uniform random traffic. The Figure plots
the average of highest detection latency observed during multiple runs. The figure also shows aver-
age network latency during those runs with increasing network load. The detection latency is within
20 cycles before the onset of network saturation.
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Spurious Packet
Our detection scheme for spurious packets can exhibit false negatives, while false positives
are not possible. Hence, a different methodology was required to evaluate this scheme. Af-
ter operating the network fault-free for a preset length of time,withpacket is intentionally
created with a certain probability and written to the buffer of a randomly chosen datapath-
segment of a random router. To gain statistical confidence, we injected 10,000 such faults,
one after the other, and repeated each simulation 10 times with different seeds. We define
detection latency as the time required to detect the error after the packet was created. If
detection latency for a specific case is more than 10,000 cycles, we flag it as a false neg-
ative. Figure 3.9 plots highest detection latency across all 10,000 faults, averaged over all
random seeds, with increasing network load. The figure also plots the average network
latency to indicate the network operational condition. Again, average detection latency
increases slowly up to a certain network load, after which there is a steep increase. We
observe that worst case average detection latency is within 1K cycles even for networks
operating at deep saturation. At this load, the average network latency is greater than
8x of the zero load network latency. For the network loads shown in the graph, no false
negatives were observed. Similarly, for the 9 PARSEC benchmark traces, a maximum de-
tection latency (across all faults and different executions) of 178 cycles was observed for
the datapath-segment-level diagnosis.
3.4 Frugal Reconfiguration with uDIREC
Once the fault locations are diagnosed at a fine granularity, it is essential to effectively
utilize the information towards a gracefully degrading reliability solution. To this end, we
propose a novel solution, called uDIREC, which, upon fault manifestations, drops over 3×
fewer nodes than existing solutions, and thus minimizes the network-induced loss of pro-
cessing capability. uDIREC builds on the findings presented in Section 3.3.1, which states
that majority of the router logic and wire faults can be localized to a single datapath seg-
ment. Further, as discussed earlier, the functionality of a datapath segment can be entirely
masked by disabling and re-routing around a single unidirectional router-link. Our fine-
resolution diagnosis scheme (Section 3.3) provides the opportunity for graceful degradation
by allowing us to disable only a single unidirectional link on each fault. However, existing
route-reconfiguration solutions [4, 100] fail to exploit these healthy unidirectional links, as
they can operate with bidirectional links only. Therefore, these reconfiguration schemes
unnecessarily consider a fault in one direction to be fatal for the entire bidirectional link,
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and cannot benefit from the fine-grained diagnosis information. uDIREC’s contributions
can be summarized as:
• A fine-grain fault model for NoCs that enables the frugal bypass of faulty unidirec-
tional links, without disabling other healthy link(s).
• A novel routing algorithm to maximally utilize unidirectional links in fault-ridden
irregular networks that result from the application of our fine-grain fault model to
faulty NoCs. The routing algorithm is guaranteed to discover only deadlock-free
routes without requiring additional VCs.
• Software-based reconfiguration handles in-field permanent faults in NoCs. It
places no restriction on topology, router architecture or the number and location of
faults. Internally, it utilizes uDIREC’s novel routing algorithm to discover a new set
of deadlock-free routes for the surviving topology.
• uDIREC (for unified DIagnosis and REConfiguration). The integration of the
fine-grained diagnosis and reconfiguration scheme enables a low-cost and frugally-
degrading reliability solution. Experiments on a 64-node NoC with 10-60 interconnect-
related faults show that uDIREC drops 60-75% fewer nodes and provides 14-40%
higher throughput over other state-of-the-art fault-tolerance solutions.
3.4.1 Fault Model
We call the traditional fault model, the coarse-grain fault model Coarse FM: it constrains
the residual network to have bidirectional links only. Therefore, reconfiguration solutions
based on the Coarse FM [39, 4, 100] are often inspired by irregular routing algorithms
designed for networks with bidirectional links only [25, 110]. Up*/down* routing [110] is
a classic example of such a routing algorithm. Up*/down* works by assigning directions
to all links in the network: up or down. Links towards the root node (connecting to a node
closer to the root) are tagged as up links, while links away from the root are tagged as down
links. Links between nodes equidistant to the root are tagged arbitrarily. All cyclic depen-
dencies are broken by disallowing routes traversing a down link followed by an up link.
With this solution, we propose a novel and refined fault model where all link- or router-
level faults are mapped to datapath segments, i.e., to unidirectional links. We call this fine-
grain fault model Fine FM. uDIREC leverages the additional links reported as fault-free by
the Fine FM to improve the reliability and performance of the faulty networks.
• Improved Reliability: A solution based on the Fine FM can provide better connec-
tivity than the Coarse FM, as the number of working links shrinks faster for the latter.
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Figure 3.10 Fine FM provides additional working unidirectional links. They can be utilized
to (a) connect more nodes (reliability), and (b) provide path diversity (performance).
In Figure 3.10a, R1 is isolated when using the Coarse FM. However, the Fine FM
allows deadlock-free routes between any pair of nodes by simply disabling the turn
R0→R1→R2.
• Improved Performance: The Fine FM can improve path diversity over the Coarse FM,
as working unidirectional links can be used to transmit packets. In Figure 3.10b, the
unidirectional link R1→R0 is faulty. With the Coarse FM, only one path remains
from R0 to R1, via links R0→R2 and R2→R1. However, with the Fine FM, an
additional route can be utilized from R0 to R1, via the unidirectional link R0→R1.
For the experiments, we have modeled the diagnosis scheme described in Section 3.3,
which can localize most fault manifestations to the resolution of a single datapath segment.
The same diagnosis information is provided to all evaluated route-reconfiguration schemes
(uDIREC and prior works). However, prior works such as Ariadne [4] and Immunet [100],
restricted by the Coarse FM, cannot utilize this fine-grained fault localization information
due to the limitations of their underlying routing algorithms.
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3.4.2 Routing with Unidirectional Links
The constraint that all network links are bidirectional enables a desirable property: if a
path between two nodes exists, irregular routing algorithms based on spanning tree con-
struction can enable at least one deadlock-free route between them. In contrast, finding
deadlock-free routes between any pair of nodes in a connected network is not always pos-
sible if the network has unidirectional links. Since our routing algorithm must enable only
deadlock-free routes, it is possible to have to sacrifice a few connected nodes to achieve
this goal.
Connectivity and Deadlock Freedom
We consider a network to be connected only if transmission is possible between any pair
of nodes in either direction (two-way connectivity). Additionally, we assume that VCs are
only used for separation of traffic into classes and/or avoiding deadlock in client protocols,
but we do not require them to overcome routing deadlocks [51]. Based on their connectivity
characteristics, we can divide all networks with unidirectional links into three categories:
R0 R1
R2 R3
R0 R1
R2 R3
R0 R1
R2 R3
(c) disconnected 
to avoid deadlock
(b) connected; 
deadlock-free(a) disconnected
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Figure 3.11 (a) Network disconnected. (b) Deadlock-free connectivity possible by disabling turn
R1→R0→R2. (c) Network connected but deadlock freedom not possible without sacrificing con-
nectivity.
(i) Disconnected: The network in Figure 3.11a is disconnected as traffic cannot traverse
from R2 & R3 to R0 & R1.
(ii) Connected and deadlock-free: In Figure 3.11b, a connected network has a cyclic
dependency in the anticlockwise direction. Such a cycle can cause deadlock, as packets re-
siding in routers’ buffers can be indefinitely waiting for packets in front of them to free up
buffer space. Formally, as a sufficient condition for deadlock freedom, all such dependency
cycles should be eliminated [29]. Thus, we use an approach based on disabling certain
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connections between links, called ‘turns’ in [50], so that the packets cannot form a cyclic
dependency. For example, in Figure 3.11b, the R1→R0→R2 turn is disabled to break the
anticlockwise cycle. In other words, the routing algorithm prohibits messages to go from
R1 to R2 & R3 via R0 to avoid packets from deadlocking. Connectivity is maintained even
after disabling this turn.
(iii) Disconnected to avoid deadlock: The network in Figure 3.11c is connected as mes-
sages can be exchanged between any pair of nodes. However, if the turn R1→R0→R2
is disabled to break the anticlockwise cycle, connectivity is lost. Specifically, R1 cannot
send messages to R2 & R3, as the only path connecting the concerned nodes goes through
this disabled turn. Even when disabling any other turn to break the cyclic dependency,
connectivity is jeopardized.
uDIREC’s routing algorithm is designed to maximally utilize resources in faulty net-
works that result from the application of the Fine FM. uDIREC deploys this routing
algorithm on each fault manifestation, to quickly discover reliable routes between the still-
connected nodes. The routing algorithm works by constructing two separate spanning trees
with unidirectional links: one for connections moving traffic away from the root node
(down-tree), and the other for connections moving traffic towards the root node (up-tree).
Each node is then assigned a unique identifier corresponding to each tree: identifiers in-
crease numerically with increasing distance from (to) the root in the down-tree (up-tree),
while equidistant nodes are ordered arbitrarily. This leads to a unique ordering of nodes
(lower order = closer to root) in each tree. Thereafter, the up link is defined as the uni-
directional link towards the node with the lower identifier in the up-tree and the down
link is defined as the unidirectional link towards the node with the lower identifier in the
down-tree.
Lockstep Construction
The two spanning trees, however, cannot be constructed independently of each other. Be-
cause of the use of unidirectional links, such an approach could lead to a mismatch in the
node ordering between the trees, and links could consequently receive inconsistent tags: up
or down. An example of such situation is shown in Figure 3.12, where mismatched node
orderings lead to link R1→R2 being tagged up in the up-tree and down in the down-tree.
Thus, the construction of the two trees must be in lockstep, guaranteeing matched ordering
by construction.
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Figure 3.12 Independent construction of up-tree and down-tree causes inconsistent labeling
of link R1→R2. (a) Up-tree: link is towards a node that is closer to the root; hence tagged up. (b)
Down-tree: link is between nodes at the same level; hence tagged arbitrarily as down.
Matched Ordering by Construction
uDIREC’s routing algorithm builds the two trees using a breadth-first search, but advances
the construction of the two trees in lockstep, expanding to new nodes only if a node order
matching on both trees exists. To this end, each leaf node reached in the network expands
the two trees to its descendants only when the node itself is reachable by both the up-tree
and the down-tree. Otherwise, the up-tree (down-tree) construction is halted until both
tree constructions reach that node. All nodes that are reachable by both the up-tree and
the down-tree can communicate among themselves by enabling deadlock-free routes. All
other unreachable nodes timeout after waiting for one or both tree(s) to reach them. As
shown in Figure 3.14a, starting from the root node (R0), both the up-tree and the down-tree
expand to R2 using bidirectional link R0↔R2; hence R2 can expand to its descendants. At
the same time, the down-tree expands to R1 and halts at R1 for the up-tree to catch-up. In
the next iteration, R2 expands the up-tree to R1, cancelling the halting status of R1. At this
time, both trees reach all nodes, and hence the network is connected and deadlock-free.
For deadlock-freedom, all routes traversing a down link followed by an up link (down→up
turn) are disallowed. Finally, a route search algorithm finds the minimal route(s) between
each source-destination pair.
Property 1. uDIREC’s routing algorithm provides deadlock-free connectivity among all
nodes reachable by both up-tree and down-tree.
Proof’s outline. With consistent node ordering, any deadlock causing cycle will contain at
least one up→down turn and one down→up turn [29]. Since uDIREC’s routing algorithm
guarantees consistent tagging of links, all dependency cycles are broken by disallowing just
down→up turns. Additionally, all the nodes connected by the spanning trees can commu-
nicate deadlock-free, as any node can reach all other nodes by going to the root node first,
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ROOT = pick root()
newly reached = up-tree = down-tree = ROOT;
/*Begin up-tree and down-tree construction*/
do:
| for(NODE in newly reached):
| | up-tree += nodes with link to(NODE)
| | down-tree += nodes with link from(NODE)
| newly reached = new overlap(up-tree,down-tree)
while(newly reached != NULL)
disable unreached nodes()
order = order nodes reachable by both trees()
apply down up turn restrictions(order)
find minimal routes with turn restrictions()
Figure 3.13 uDIREC’s deadlock-free routing algorithm to determine deadlock-free routes in
networks with unidirectional links. To guarantee a matched node ordering, nodes expand the
trees to their neighbors only if both up-tree and down-tree have reached them. The resulting
matched-ordering governs the turn restrictions, and the evaluated minimal routes adhere to these
turn restrictions.
thus following up links first and down links afterwards. In any such routing path, there will
be no disabled down→up turn.
Property 2. Routing configurations produced by uDIREC’s routing algorithm perform at
least as well as configurations generated by up*/down*, in any fault scenario.
Proof’s outline. In the worst case, to provide consistent marking of links, both up-tree and
down-tree can be build only via bidirectionally working links, as in up*/down*. Therefore,
uDIREC’s routing algorithm is always able to connect at least as many nodes as up*/down*
and is able to provide at least as many deadlock-free routes as up*/down*.
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Figure 3.14 Growing the up-tree and down-tree in lockstep. The choice of root affects con-
nectivity. (a) Success with root R0: both up-tree and down-tree connect all nodes with consistent
labeling. (b) Failure with root R1: up-tree (down-tree) halted at R0(R2).
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Root Node Selection
The structure of both trees greatly depends on the root node selection. However, as shown
in Figure 3.14, this aspect may also affect the connectivity characteristics of the network.
In this example, if instead of R0 (Figure 3.14a), R1 (Figure 3.14b) is chosen as root, uDI-
REC’s routing algorithm is unable to find deadlock-free routes to any other node in the
network. With R1 as root in Figure 3.14b, the up-tree uses the link R0→R1 to expand to R0
and the down-tree takes the link R1→R2 to expand to R2. Both trees halt at their frontier
nodes (R0 for up-tree; R2 for down-tree) waiting for their counterpart trees. The algorithm
terminates with R1 connected to no other node, as the down-tree (up-tree) never reaches R0
(R2) in this configuration. Therefore, optimal root selection can improve the connectivity
characteristics of the network when using uDIREC’s routing algorithm.
3.4.3 Reconfiguration
uDIREC designates any one node in the multi-core system as the “supervisor”, which
implements the reconfiguration algorithm in software. uDIREC takes advantage of the
fact that our fault diagnosis scheme already stores the topology information in a software-
maintained scoreboard at any one node. For simplicity of implementation, uDIREC des-
ignates the same node as the “supervisor”. With this setup, only the supervisor node is
entitled to make diagnostic decisions on the health of the NoC, and hence information
about fault locations and the surviving topology is already present at the supervisor. In this
manner, uDIREC avoids hardware overhead incurred by software-based reconfiguration so-
lutions [110, 84] to reliably collect the topology information at a central node. Upon a new
fault detection, the supervisor node transmits a reserved message to all routers/nodes in the
system, informing them about recovery initiation. On receiving this message, all routers
suspend their current operation and wait for routing function updates from the supervisor,
while the nodes stop new packet injections. In the meantime, the supervisor computes
deadlock-free routes for the surviving topology, using the routing algorithm described in
the previous section. The computed tables are finally conveyed back to each router/node,
which then resume normal operation.
As described in Section 3.4.2, network connectivity depends strongly on the choice
of the root node. To this end, uDIREC’s reconfiguration algorithm discovers the largest
connected topology via an exhaustive search of the root node that maximizes network con-
nectivity. Each node, in turn, is appointed as the temporary root node and the number of
nodes it connects is calculated. The optimal root-selection is finalized when one of the
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/* Root Selection by connectivity evaluation */
ROOTwin = -1; max connectivity = 0
for(ROOT in all nodes):
| connectivity = eval uDIREC connectivity(ROOT)
| if(connectivity == num nodes):
| | ROOTwin = ROOT; break;
| if(connectivity > max connectivity):
| | ROOTwin = ROOT;
| | max connectivity = connectivity
/* Route Construction for winner root */
apply uDIREC routing algo(ROOTwin)
Figure 3.15 uDIREC’s reconfiguration algorithm. All nodes are tried as root, and the root that
provides maximum connectivity, is chosen to build the new network. Within each root trial, uDI-
REC’s novel unidirectional routing algorithm is leveraged to determine deadlock-free routes and
determine connectivity.
following two conditions occur: (i) a root node that provides deadlock-free connectivity
among all nodes is found; or (ii) all nodes have been considered as root node. At the end of
the selection, a winner-root is determined, i.e., the node that could connect the maximum
number of nodes when chosen as root.
Reconfiguration duration. Considering all nodes as root is inefficient, and algorithmic
optimizations are possible, but uDIREC trades reconfiguration time for simplicity of the
algorithm. This is because permanent faults (even when up to tens or hundreds) are not
frequent enough for reconfiguration duration to affect overall performance. Tree-based
routing algorithms can be efficiently implemented in software, and typically take only hun-
dreds of milliseconds to complete (∼170ms [110]). Even though uDIREC requires multiple
iterations of the tree-based routing algorithm, we expect the reconfiguration overhead to be
within a few seconds at worst. Assuming an aggressive life-span of 2 years for high-end
servers and consumer electronics, and 150 NoC faults in the worst case, an NoC would
suffer 1 fault every 5 days. Therefore, an overhead of few seconds per fault manifestation
is negligible.
Reconfiguration-induced deadlock. Reconfiguration can cause routing deadlocks even
if both the initial (before fault manifestation) and final (after reconfiguration) routing
functions are independently deadlock-free [76, 97]. uDIREC avoids such deadlocks by
identifying the packets that request a turn that is illegal according to the updated routing
function. These packets are then ejected to the network interface of the router, in which they
are buffered during reconfiguration. After reconfiguration, these packets are re-injected
into the network upon buffer availability. Other state-of-the-art reconfiguration techniques
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[4, 100] utilize a similar technique to overcome reconfiguration-induced deadlocks.
Early diagnosis. Our diagnosis scheme pinpoints the fault locations in the router datap-
ath before the faults grow to fatal proportions. The first few faults in the router datapath
are corrected by the end-to-end ECC in the process of obtaining diagnostic information
about fault locations. This presents the opportunity to keep using the network (for some-
time) even after the fault has been diagnosed, as the initial few faults in the router datapath
are within the correction capacity of the ECC. The pre-emptive diagnosis enables the sal-
vaging of the processor and memory state of the about-to-be-disconnected nodes while the
network is still connected. Traditionally, computer architects have relied on check-pointing
support [99] for this purpose, while a recent research proposal [32] adds emergency links
to this end. Using this technique, it is possible to greatly simplify this additional reliability-
specific hardware. uDIREC, however, does not guarantee the integrity of packets that are
traversing the network after fault manifestation and before fault detection, and relies on
orthogonal recovery schemes [85, 5, 90] for that. However, the property of early diagnosis
can greatly reduce the likelihood of fatal data corruptions and reduce the reliance on such
recovery schemes.
Optimal root and tree. The choice of root node also affects the network latency and
throughput characteristics [105]. In addition, the performance of tree-based routing algo-
rithms is sensitive to the way trees are grown (breadth-first vs. depth-first), and the order in
which nodes are numbered [105]. Further, the surviving set of on-chip functionalities may
also differ with different root selection and tree growth schemes. However, the correspond-
ing analysis is beyond the scope of this project and we do not consider these metrics in the
root selection or tree-building process. uDIREC chooses the optimal node solely on the
basis of number of connected nodes, breaking ties by comparing statically assigned node
IDs, while the trees are build in a breadth-first fashion.
3.4.4 Implementation
In a typical software-based reconfiguration scheme, such as the ones used for off-chip net-
works [110, 106], the surviving nodes first collaborate to choose the root node, following
which, the surviving topology information is communicated to this root node. Finally, the
newly computed routing tables are delivered to all the surviving nodes. Dedicated hardware
resources are required to reliably communicate this information to and from the root node.
Fortunately, uDIREC completely eliminates the need of collecting the NoC health status at
a central node on each failure. The tight integration of the diagnosis and reconfiguration
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scheme in uDIREC makes it possible to utilize the topology information already available
with the supervisor node.
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Figure 3.16 Distribution of the routing tables from the supervisor. One control and one data
wire, organized in a unidirectional ring, are used to transfer routing tables to each NoC router in a
serial fashion. Distributed controllers, one per router, snoop on the bit-stream broadcasted on the
control wire and decode it to identify the data bit-stream relevant to the current router. The flagged
bit-stream is then assembled and written into the routing table. As permanent faults are rare, this
serial distribution poses insignificant performance overhead.
The overhead of routing table distribution can be drastically reduced by noting that
permanent faults are rare occurrences and all reconfiguration-specific transmissions can be
done serially over a single wire. To this end, uDIREC utilizes a combination of one control
wire and one data wire, that are managed by distributed controllers (at each NoC router)
organized in a ring topology. The control wire is utilized to notify all NoC routers of re-
covery initiation, and to set up the data communication between the supervisor and any
particular router. Once the communication is set up, the data wire is used to transmit the
routing table for that specific router, bit-by-bit. The process is repeated for all routers in the
NoC: upon completion, an end-of-reconfiguration signal is broadcasted again via the same
control wire. Specifically, a decode unit is included within each controller that snoops on
the bit-stream broadcasted on the control wire and identifies data bit-streams relevant to
the current router. Once a relevant data bit-stream is identified, the assemble unit gathers
the information transmitted on the data wire and writes it to the routing table. Note that
for a 64-node mesh NoC, the routing table at each node is 64 (destination nodes)×4 (di-
rections) bits. Thus, the routing information for the entire NoC is 2KB only, which should
take insignificant time to transmit when compared to the 100s of milliseconds required
for software-based route evaluation. The hardware implementation of the scheme just de-
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scribed is shown in Figure 3.16. The 2-bit wide links are used only during reconfiguration,
and are otherwise disabled with power-gating, greatly reducing both the risk of wearout
faults and the power overhead. Further, due to their small area footprint, simple resilience
schemes to protect them (TMR or ECC), do not add significant overall overhead.
We synthesized the baseline 64-bit channel mesh router using Synopsys DC [121], tar-
geting the Artisan 45nm library. We also estimated the link wire area for the same using
Orion2.0 [63] considering dimensions from an industrial chip [56]. The baseline router has
a total area of 0.138mm2 (logic=0.08mm2,wire=0.06mm2). In comparison, the distributed
controller logic required to implement the routing table distribution scheme is trivial, and
the two additional distribution wires (unidirectional ring) lead to an area overhead of only
0.34% compared to this baseline NoC. For this study, we assume that the router wires and
the two distribution wires are of the same length, and a unidirectional ring has 1/4th the
number of channels compared to a mesh.
3.4.5 Experimental Results
We evaluated uDIREC by modeling an NoC system in a cycle-accurate C++ simulator
based on [28]. The baseline system is an 8x8 mesh network with a generic 4-stage pipeline
with 2-message classes, 1-VC per message class routers. Each input channel is 64-bits
wide and each VC buffer is 8-entry deep. For comparison, we also implemented Ariadne
[4], which outperformed all previous on-chip reconfiguration solutions, i.e., Vicis [39] and
Immunet [100]. Ariadne [4] reports 40% latency improvement over Immunet, which falls
back to a high-latency ring to provide connectivity, and 140% improvement over Vicis,
which occasionally deadlocks. Since both Ariadne and Immunet guarantee connectivity
if routes (using only bidirectional links) between pairs of nodes survive, they show iden-
tical packet delivery rates. They also deliver a higher fraction of packets compared to
Vicis, especially at high number of faults when Vicis tends to deadlock. uDIREC achieves
substantial improvements over Ariadne, and thus uDIREC’s improvements over Vicis and
Immunet are expected to be even more impressive. Note that Ariadne assumed a perfect di-
agnosis mechanism, so for a fair comparison, we have paired it with our diagnosis scheme,
discussed in Section 3.3.
The uDIREC framework is analyzed with two types of workloads (Table 3.1a): syn-
thetic uniform random traffic, as well as applications from the PARSEC suite [14]. PAR-
SEC traces are obtained from Wisconsin Multifacet GEMS simulator [78] modeling a
fault-free network and configured as detailed in Table 3.1b. After fault injections, we ig-
nore messages originating from and destined to the disconnected nodes, and this could
78
lead to some evaluation inaccuracies for parallel collaborating benchmarks running on a
partitioned multi-core. However, the traces are intended to subject the faulty NoC to the
realistic burstiness of application traffic, and provide a simple and intuitive comparison.
The metrics provide valuable insights considering that a particular fault manifestation in
uDIREC and prior work(s) could lead to vastly different configurations in terms of num-
ber/location/functionality of working cores/IPs.
(a)
traffic uniformPARSEC
packet 1flit (control)5flits (data)
simulation 1M cycles
warm-up 10K cycles
(b)
processor in-order SPARC
coherence MOESI
L1 cache Private: 32KB/node
ways:2 latency:3
L2 cache Shared: 1MB/node
ways:16 latency:15
Table 3.1 (a) Simulation inputs. (b) GEMS configuration.
Fault injection. Our architectural-level fault injection technique randomly injects gate-
level faults in network components with a uniform spatial distribution over their silicon
area. Each fault location is then analyzed to map it to dysfunctional link(s), modeling
our fault diagnosis scheme (Section 3.3). The links that are marked as dysfunctional are
bypassed using the evaluated route-reconfiguration schemes. We injected a varying num-
ber of permanent faults (0-60 transistor failures) into the NoC infrastructure, and analyzed
uDIREC’s reliability and performance impact. For each number of transistor failures, the
experiment was repeated 1,000 times with different fault spatial locations, selected based
on a uniformly random function.
Scope of experiments. We restricted the scope of our experiments by injecting faults only
in the NoC infrastructure because the system-level performance and reliability depends
on the vast number of unrelated factors: fault location, fault timing, memory organiza-
tion, programming model, processor and memory reliability schemes, and architecture
specific characteristics. As a result, the surviving system functionality might not be di-
rectly comparable. Hence, we have provided a generalized evaluation across a wide range
of faults, consisting of insightful performance (latency, throughput) and reliability (number
of dropped nodes, packet delivery rate) metrics for fault-tolerant NoCs.
Reliability Evaluation
As faults accumulate, networks may become disconnected. Performance of parallel work-
loads running on a multi-core chip, with a faulty network, directly depends on the number
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Figure 3.17 Average number of dropped nodes. Compared to Ariadne, uDIREC drops 3×
fewer nodes and approximately doubles the number of faults tolerated before the same number of
nodes are dropped.
of connected processing elements (PEs) and other on-chip functionality, e.g., memory con-
trollers, caches. Thus, the ability of an algorithm to maximize the connectivity of a faulty
network is critical. In this section, we study: a) average number of dropped nodes, i.e.,
nodes not part of the largest connected sub-network, and b) the packet delivery rate for
uniform traffic, as faults accumulate in the NoC.
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Figure 3.18 Packet delivery rate. Higher network partitioning in Ariadne causes steep decrease
in delivery rate beyond 10 faults. In contrast, uDIREC degrade gracefully.
It can be noted in Figure 3.17 that Ariadne consistently drops over 3×more nodes than
uDIREC. Even with just a few faults (5-20), uDIREC shows substantial improvement over
Ariadne, dropping 1 node against Ariadne’s 3 at 20 faults, as shown in the zoomed section
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of Figure 3.17. Further, Figure 3.18 reports the number of packet delivered as a percentage
of packets generated in the network. As packets, with source and destination in discon-
nected subnetworks, cannot be delivered, this metric is an indication of partitioning in the
NoC. From the figure, both uDIREC and Ariadne deliver the majority (or all) of packets up
to 10 faults. Beyond 15 faults, Ariadne starts partitioning into multiple sub-networks, and
hence its delivery rate drops substantially below that of uDIREC. At 25 faults, uDIREC
delivers 7% more packets than Ariadne, and the gain goes up to ∼ 3× at 60 faults. uDI-
REC’s ability to deliver a large fraction of packets even at a high number of faults makes it
an excellent solution for fault-ridden NoCs.
Performance Evaluation
After reconfiguration, the NoC should keep functioning adequately with only a graceful
performance degradation. In our evaluation, we report two performance metrics: average
network latency and saturation throughput, after the network is affected by transistor faults.
Latency and throughput measures are reported for the largest connected sub-network, as-
suming nodes disconnected from each other cannot work collaboratively. First, we report
the average zero-load network latency, that is, the steady-state latency of a lightly loaded
network (0.03 flits injected per cycle per node).
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Figure 3.19 Zero load latency. Initially, latency degrades more gracefully for uDIREC as it pro-
vides path diversity. Beyond 40 faults, Ariadne becomes highly partitioned and hence latency drops
steeply. Packet delivery rate is much lower for Ariadne, confirming its excessive partitioning.
Analyzing Figure 3.19, both uDIREC and Ariadne initially show an increase in la-
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tency because the number of paths affected increases with increasing faults, while very few
nodes are disconnected from the network. uDIREC, however, degrades more gracefully
and at 30 faults, uDIREC on average has 7% lower latency than Ariadne. Beyond that
point, Ariadne’s latency starts falling. This effect is easily understood by analyzing Figure
3.17 beyond the 30-faults mark: a substantial number of nodes are dropped by Ariadne.
As a result, packets now travel shorter routes to their destinations, and thus the average
network latency is reduced. The crossover between the two latency graphs is at ∼40 faults,
and as noted from the packet delivery rate chart copied over in Figure 3.19, the differ-
ence between the delivery rate of the two techniques is large (35% more in uDIREC) and
grows rapidly beyond that point. We observed similar latency trends in simulations using
PARSEC benchmark traces.
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Figure 3.20 Saturation throughput. uDIREC consistently delivers more packets per cycle as it
uses additional unidirectional links to connect more nodes and enable more routes.
In addition to latency, we also measured saturation throughput of the largest surviving
sub-network. Figure 3.20 plots the packet throughput delivered by the network. uDIREC
consistently delivers more packets per cycle as it uses additional unidirectional links to con-
nect more nodes and enables more routes. uDIREC delivers 25% more packets per cycle
than Ariadne at 15 faults. This advantage further increases to 39% at 60 faults.
Performance, energy and fault-tolerance (PEF) metric [68]. Traditional NoC metrics,
such as energy-delay product (EDP), do not capture the importance of reliability and its
relation to both performance and power. To this end, [68] proposed a composite metric
which unifies all three components: latency, energy, and fault-tolerance. They defined PEF
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Figure 3.21 Performance-energy-fault tolerance (PEF) metric [68]. uDIREC monotonically
improves with increasing faults. uDIREC (uDIREC nv) shows 2× (1.6×) improvement at 60 faults.
as in Equation 3.1. In a fault-free network, Packet Delivery Rate=1; thus, PEF becomes
equal to EDP. We assume total network energy to be proportional to the number of active
routers in the network, as we use identical routers in our setup. Therefore, we estimate
per packet energy to be proportional to the fraction of number of active routers by packet
throughput, as shown in Equation 3.2. Figure 3.21 shows PEF values for uDIREC variants
normalized against PEF values for Ariadne. Note that a lower value of PEF is better. The
relative difference in the PEF values between uDIREC variants and Ariadne monotonically
increases with the increasing number of faults. At 15 faults, uDIREC (uDIREC nv) has
24% (17%) lower PEF than Ariadne, while showing more than 2× (1.6×) improvement at
60 faults. The reported PEF values confirm the benefits of using uDIREC across a wide
range of fault rates. At few faults, the additional paths provided by uDIREC lead to reduced
latency, while at higher number of faults, uDIREC delivers a greater fraction of the packets
to their intended destinations.
PEF =
(Average Latency)× (Energy per Packet)
Packet Delivery Rate (3.1)
Energy Per Packet ∝ Number o f Active Routers
Packet T hroughput (3.2)
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3.5 Minimal-Impact Reconfiguration with BLINC
Current solutions for permanent fault circumvention, including the one described in the
Section 3.4, often require suspending the normal network activity while executing a cen-
tralized and global-impact reconfiguration algorithm. Network activity is suspended during
reconfiguration because new routes may conflict with old routes, possibly triggering a dead-
lock situation. In addition, the change in routes can lead to loss of data. These techniques
are based on the assumption that fault occurrences are rare events, and orthogonal data re-
covery mechanisms can be leveraged without much impact on correctness or performance.
Thus, they only strive to provide optimal or quasi-optimal post-fault routing configurations,
at a high reconfiguration latency cost. For instance, reconfiguration takes between a 1K and
10K clock cycles for an 8×8 mesh with dedicated hardware [127, 4]. When reconfiguration
is conducted in software, it takes substantially longer [42]. Overall, these solutions fail to
provide non-stop operation with no data loss under faults; something that a digital system
expects from its communication infrastructure.
To this end, we propose a Brisk and Limited-Impact NoC routing re-Configuration
(BLINC) algorithm. BLINC deploys a topology-agnostic routing algorithm, which pro-
vides maximal connectivity and deadlock-freedom. The algorithm leverages a novel
representation of the network topology, which allows to quickly perform reconfiguration
locally, affecting very few routers. The representation consists of routing metadata stored
at each router in a distributed fashion and updated upon each reconfiguration event through
neighbor-to-neighbor updates. The metadata is used to compute alternative (emergency)
routes, which affect only a few routers in most cases and can be quickly deployed upon
a failure. BLINC maintains the deadlock-free network connectivity at all times, if at all
possible.
We use the BLINC algorithm to develop a transparent reliability solution for NoCs,
based on aggressive online testing and failure prevention. In this framework, individual
datapath segments (Section 3.3.1) are taken offline and tested to evaluate if they are close
to failing, in which case they are disabled. BLINC allows the quick movement of datapath
segments offline and back online, and it provides a first-response routing solution when
a failure is deemed imminent. These capabilities allow this framework to operate uninter-
rupted and without data loss through testing and fault reconfiguration. Experimental results
show an 80% reduction in the average number of routers affected by a reconfiguration
event, when compared to state-of-the-art techniques. BLINC enables negligible perfor-
mance degradation in the non-stop detection and reconfiguration solution, while solutions
based on current techniques suffer a 17-fold latency increase.
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Figure 3.22 Route computation. BLINC deploys two route computation components: routing
table (white) and reconfiguration module (gray). On fault occurrence, invalid routes are immedi-
ately replaced by emergency routes, while a procedure running in the background figures out an
optimized routing configuration. The optimized configuration for the new topology is updated after
the background procedure completes.
3.5.1 Methodology
In distributed routing, forwarding directions are selected locally at each router. Thus,
rerouting entails recomputing the routing tables for all routers in the network [100, 39, 4].
We observe that the re-computation effort can be limited by utilizing pre-computed routing
metadata, so to quickly pinpoint the affected routes. The immediate rerouting response
from BLINC is fast and deadlock-free, but not necessarily minimal. However, a new min-
imal routing configuration is computed in background in software to reflect the topology
change. Once this process is complete, the minimal routing tables are transferred to the
nodes, replacing the temporary emergency routes.
Figure 3.22 shows the components required for the BLINC algorithm. The components
shown with the white-background are part of baseline routers: routing tables are gener-
ated offline and ready when the network becomes operative. Upon a topology change, the
gray-background reconfiguration module quickly calculates valid alternative routes, so that
packets affected by the change can be safely sent through alternative (emergency) routes.
Note that the majority of packets still utilize the original optimal routes.
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Figure 3.23 Network segmentation example. a) The segmentation process identifies a segment
that starts and ends at the root node (nodes 0-root, 1, 4, and 5). Additional segments stem from nodes
already a part of other segments (nodes 2 and 6). b) The corresponding segment-to-segment tree
structure reflects this construction from root to leaves. c) Nodes within each segment are organized
in an intra-segment tree. Note how each segment includes two connections to a parent segment.
Network Segmentation
It is possible to design alternative routes based on local information if a few constructs of
segment-based routing [84] are leveraged. In segment-based routing, the entire network is
partitioned into segments. The segmentation process starts by selecting a root node, and
then identifying a segment as a sequence of nodes that start and end at the root node. Each
subsequent segment is identified by building a sequence of nodes that start and end at nodes
already included in the segmented portion of the network. Figure 3.23a shows an example
of segmentation. Note that the definition of segments in segment-based routing corresponds
to topology segments, rather than datapath segments as defined in Section 3.3.1. To avoid
confusion, we will predominantly use the term link instead of datapath segment.
BLINC’s off-line routing solution augments segment-based routing with an additional
high-level tree structure, showing the connectivity between segments. The higher-level tree
(Figure 3.23b) is built by traversing the network following adjacency, segment-by-segment
starting from the root segment. Any two adjacent segments have a parent-child relation-
ship if the segment under consideration (child segment) has links connecting to one or more
segments already in the tree (parent segments). For example, once segment A and B have
been considered, segment C is found to be a child of both. Nodes in the tree are ordered
from root to leaves based on the order in which they are included in the tree (to improve
readability, Figure 3.23b shows the segment order by using letters instead of numerals).
Moreover, BLINC also introduce an ordering of the nodes within each segment by building
“intra-segment trees” (see Figure 3.23c). Once all nodes are ordered, deadlock-free rout-
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Figure 3.24 Routing metadata. a) Port types are assigned based on the network segmentation
process. b) Each port in a node has an associated children set through child and intra-segment ports.
c) Preference direction lists associated with each node are optional.
ing can be enforced by forbidding the turns around the highest order node. Note how the
forbidden turns indicated in Figure 3.23a follow the approach just described: in segment
E, the highest order node is 11 according to Figure 3.23c, and hence turns 10-11-7 and
7-11-10 are disabled.
To gather an intuitive understanding of our approach, notice that each segment is con-
nected to segments closer to the root through two links. Thus, upon a link failure within
a segment, it is possible to use the two links to reach the two disconnected portions of the
segment. The tree structure remains unchanged, and it is sufficient to find a different route
through one or more segments. As an example, in Figure 3.23a, assume that packets going
from node 4 to node 13 traverse nodes 8 and 9. If the link 8-9 fails, it is possible to find an
alternate route via 5, 6, 10 and 9.
Routing Metadata
Routing metadata is computed during network segmentation and is embedded at each
router. It includes three types of information:
• Port type: A router port can be connected to a lower-order node (parent port), or to a
higher-order node in the same segment (intra-segment port), or to higher-order node
in a different segment (child port). Figure 3.24a indicates the type of all ports for a
example network.
• Children set: the set of reachable nodes along downward routes for each port. Figure
3.24b shows the children sets for node 9.
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• Preference list (optional): An ordered list indicating the preferred output directions.
If available, this list is used to improve the quality of the emergency routes generated.
Figure 3.24c shows an example of a preference list.
The following storage is required to store the routing metadata at each router: 2 bits to
encode the port type, a bit array to indicate the children set for each port, and 6 bits per
destination to encode the preference list (at most 3 directions, 2 bits to encode each direc-
tion). Thus, for an 8x8 mesh, at least 264 bits per router are required (384 additional bits if
the preference list is provided).
3.5.2 Reconfiguration Algorithm
Upon a link failure, BLINC leverages the metadata described above to quickly generate
alternative routes for the affected packets. Figure 3.25 illustrates the process with a high
level schematic: each segment can be represented as a chain of nodes, and thus the segment
affected by the failure will find itself disconnected. The localized reconfiguration process
will re-establish connectivity for all the nodes by exploiting the additional routing paths
that had earlier been disabled to avoid deadlock. Indeed, each segment contains exactly
one disabled turn, which at this point will be re-enabled. Then all the children sets within
the segment must be updated, so that each node is reachable from the segment boundary.
This entails adding some children to some nodes and removing children from other nodes.
In the example of Figure 3.25, Y was originally reachable via X only, but after the failure,
it becomes reachable via Z instead. Finally, the additions and subtractions to the children
sets are propagated outside the segment, until a common ancestor is reached. The reason
for keeping the children sets updated is that, during a topology change, packets whose
routing is affected by the change will use the children sets to determine their new paths.
Note that a new optimal routing configuration is generated in the background in software;
once computed, it overwrites all emergency routes. A reconfiguration example, showing
all algorithm steps (described below), is presented in Figure 3.26.
X
Y
a) before b) after
-X,Y,T
+X
+X,Y
T
Z
X
Y
T
Z
+X,Y
Figure 3.25 Children set update on reconfiguration.
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Step 1. Disabling the link: Nodes stop sending packets through the faulty link.
Step 2. Re-enabling the turn: Before the fault, the node with the disabled turn (T in Fig-
ure 3.25) was the leaf in the intra-segment tree. After the fault, the portion of the segment
between the turn-disabled node and the faulty link becomes isolated (portion between X
and T in Figure 3.25). To reconnect that portion, i) the turn at T must be re-enabled, ii) the
port types between the ends of each link of the isolated portion must be swapped (as shown
in Figure 3.26.2 and then iii) an “added-children set” must be computed for each port in
the isolated portion, which includes all the nodes downstream towards X.
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Figure 3.26 Reconfiguration example. The turn restriction in the segment with a fault is elimi-
nated and the node next to the faulty link (node 9) is the new intra-segment leaf. An added-children
set is created to indicate the new routes to reach the downward nodes after the fault, and it is prop-
agated towards the root node. Once this step completes, acknowledgment messages are propagated
back down. A similar process is followed to propagate removed-children sets starting from the other
end of the fault (node 8). Finally, invalid routes are disabled.
Step 3. Enabling alternative routes: Once the added-children set for the turn-restricted
node (T in Figure 3.25) is computed, the set is propagated toward the root node, across
segment boundaries, to instruct every node of the new route to reach the destination next
to the faulty link. For each node towards the root, the current children set of that node is
compared against the incoming added-children set, and then the latter is reduced to include
89
only the nodes that are not already present in the children sets of the node under considera-
tion. The process stops when the added-children set becomes empty. In Figure 3.26.3, the
added-children set is propagated from node 10 all the way to the root node and node 4.
Step 4. Waiting for ack: The last recipients of the added-children set generate an ac-
knowledgment message that is propagated all the way back to the node adjacent to the link
failure.
Step 5. Disabling invalid routes: Finally, the other portion of the segment (the one con-
nected to the parent port side of the faulty link) generates a “removed-children set” to
indicate that it cannot reach the other end of the link. The removed-children set is prop-
agated towards the root in a similar fashion to the added-children set: the only difference
is that nodes are eliminated from the removed-children set when they already exist in the
union of the children sets of all router’s ports other than the port receiving the remove-
children message.
3.5.3 Experimental Evaluation
BLINC was evaluated with a cycle-accurate NoC simulator [28]. The baseline network
design uses wormhole, 3-stage pipelined routers with buffers for eight 64-bit flits per input
port, connected in a mesh topology. Packets are 10 flits long, injected using random traffic
at a 0.05 flits/cycle/router rate. Finally, the fault model is similar to the uDIREC scheme
(Section 3.4.5). We evaluate three fault rates: 1%, 5% and 10% links were made faulty. 10
distinct faulty topologies were constructed out of a baseline mesh for each fault rate, and
one more failure was added on top of the baseline at 10 different sites. In total, each fault
rate is evaluated with 100 fault situations (10 baseline topologies x 10 failure locations).
Number of affected routers. The left part of Table 3.2 reports the average number of
routers affected by a reconfiguration event over a range of fault densities and network sizes.
The affected number of routers increases slowly with network size, showing that BLINC
localizes the fault manifestation to a small region. Compared to existing methods [4, 118],
BLINC achieves more than 80% reduction in the number of affected routers, across a wide
range of fault densities.
Reconfiguration latency. Reconfiguration latency was computed assuming each node
takes 5 cycles to process an add/remove children-set message and 1 cycle to propagate
the acknowledgement messages. The reconfiguration latency is reported on the right part
of Table 3.2. While reconfiguration latency is minimally sensitive to network size, it does
show a steady increase with growing fault density. We believe this is due to the natu-
rally occurring longer segments in faulty networks, which in turn, impose more hops in
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the transmission of reconfiguration messages. Overall, BLINC’s reconfiguration latency is
98% shorter than previous hardware-based techniques [4].
method % # affected routers reconf. latency (cycles)faults 6×6 8×8 10×10 6×6 8×8 10×10
BLINC
0% 7.0 9.0 9.9 21.0 26.0 30.1
1% 6.8 9.3 10.3 21.0 28.1 31.1
5% 7.1 9.1 10.0 23.9 28.7 30.6
10% 6.6 8.9 10.0 24.9 30.0 34.4
ARIADNE [4] - all routers 1.3K 4.1K 10K
OSR-Lite [118] - all routers - ∼569* -
Wachter et al.[127] - all routers - - ∼0.2K-208K
Table 3.2 Average number of affected routers and reconfiguration latency
3.6 Uninterrupted Availability with BLINC
To showcase the value of BLINC’s approach, we evaluated its deployment in a fault detec-
tion and reconfiguration solution that provides uninterrupted availability. The methodology
tests network resources aggressively to detect early signs of an upcoming fault. Each link
(or datapath-segment), in turn, is taken offline for testing, which is performed through
transmission of testing packets generated by a test pattern generator, such as the one in
[52]. This approach can detect a majority of router faults [39]. For this methodology to
be valuable, i) the network should be available and connected while a link is being tested
and ii) the testing approach should be capable of detecting early signs of link failure (e.g.:
increased delay, etc.), so that the network can reconfigure around the upcoming fault with
no loss of packets. The first requirement can be accommodated by the BLINC algorithm:
as shown in the previous section, it can provide emergency routes with minimal overhead.
The latter requirement has been solved in the context of microprocessor designs [114, 132]
but, to date, no solution of this kind has been developed for NoCs. BLINC can simply
reconfigure the NoC to avoid the target link before the testing phase, and then reactivate
the original routing after the test completes. If a link is found at risk of experiencing fail-
ure, emergency routing is maintained until a new segment-based routing solution can be
computed in the background.
The testing flow is characterized by two parameters: the length of the test duration
for each link (L) and the network testing rate ( f ), as illustrated in Figure 3.27. One com-
plete testing cycle entails testing each link in turn. Note that the network should remain
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Figure 3.27 Online testing flow. The network should remain completely available even during
testing, so that an aggressive testing frequency does not degrade network performance.
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Figure 3.28 Average packet latency under online testing. BLINC reconfigures routing quickly,
supporting online testing with only negligible performance degradation.
Figure 3.28 reports our findings: it plots average packet latency under a range of testing
rates and test durations. Viable testing rates and durations were derived from [72, 52, 132].
For instance, the rightmost data point in the plot corresponds to one complete test period
every 112,000 cycles. We compare these measurements against a routing solution (called
Stall) that does not benefit from the BLINC solution. In Stall, packets are simply stalled
in their buffers whenever they are trying to use a link undergoing testing. We only com-
pared against Stall, because other solutions [100, 39, 4, 127] have reconfiguration latencies
longer than the test durations employed. Analyzing Figure 3.28, average packet latency
is minimally affected (6% in the worst case) by the ongoing testing and reconfiguration
process when using BLINC, regardless of test durations. Moreover, Stall cannot provide
uninterrupted availability beyond a test duration of 500 cycles, even at very low testing
rates (the latency increase is 17-fold for L = 1,000 and f = 1%).
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3.7 Related Work
Ensuring reliability in NoCs has been the subject of much previous research, focusing on
a variety of aspects. Works such as [94, 85] focus on NoC protection against soft faults.
Other methods enhance NoC reliability against permanent faults by enabling one or a com-
bination of the following features: i) detection of erroneous behavior [85, 48], ii) diagnosis
of fault site [48, 39, 101, 27, 69], iii) recovery from erroneous state [85], iv) system recon-
figuration to bypass the permanent faults [100, 39, 4, 70, 21] or v) architectural protection
for router logic [26, 39, 68].
Protection against soft-errors. The most common reliability techniques augment NoC
packets with ECC information that can be checked on an end-to-end or a switch-to-switch
basis [85, 35]. ECC codes can also correct a few bit errors, beyond which the system relies
on costly data retransmission using a backup copy. Retransmission schemes cannot tackle
all erroneous scenarios, especially the ones arising from control logic malfunction, e.g.,
deadlock. [5] proposed to retransmit clean copies of data directly from the memory sub-
system, alleviating the need of large backup buffers. However, the required changes to the
cache coherence protocol present a design and verification challenge. Further, their solu-
tion also cannot recover from deadlock scenarios. A technique to recover from soft-errors
in both the router’s data-path and control logic was presented in [94]. It uses switch-
to-switch ECC and retransmission for data-path errors, while the router control logic is
protected with hardware checkers. Deadlocks due to soft-errors are broken by using ad-
ditional buffers at each router port. However, this approach leads to a prohibitive area
overhead (as was discussed in Section 2.5), especially for networks with large data packets.
In contrast, ForEVeR++ does not require backup data storage for soft-error recovery, and
it can also overcome forward progress errors such as deadlock. Additionally, ForEVeR++
also protects both the router data-path and control logic against soft-errors, at low design
complexity.
Detection and diagnosis of permanent-faults. Forward Error Control (FEC) methods use
ECC in order to detect and correct data faults during transmission by adding data redun-
dancy to the packets [35]. However, these methods quickly lose their efficiency in presence
of permanent faults, since the correction strength of ECC is quickly exhausted due to the
recurring nature of errors arising from permanent faults.
Addressing both data and control faults, authors of [26] demonstrated a reliable router
using N-Modular Redundancy (NMR). However, NMR imposes a prohibitively high area
overhead with low returns on reliability. A diagnosis method was introduced in [39] where
the authors proposed embedding Built-In-Self-Test (BIST) hardware for fault diagnosis and
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a rerouting mechanism to bypass the defective parts. Their results indicate that each router
incurs a 43% area overhead, with BIST contributing to the majority. Moreover, this method
entails periodic intervals of dedicated NoC testing. Our scheme provides fine-grained fault
diagnosis information covering both datapath and control-path faults. Additionally, it in-
curs low area overhead, and ensures no performance degradation or network operation
interruption in the absence of errors.
Reconfiguration around permanent-faults. Our route-reconfiguration scheme, uDIREC,
is orthogonal to architectural approaches that extend the lifetime of NoC links (ECC [85],
reversible transmission [6], partially-faulty links [88]) or components ([26, 68]). When the
number of faults affecting a link/component are beyond repair using such approaches, the
corresponding link/component can be switched off, and traffic re-routed around it using
uDIREC. With uDIREC, we specifically investigate fine-resolution diagnosis and route-
reconfiguration to cope with permanent faults.
During route-reconfiguration, a new set of deadlock-free routes are generated to replace
the current ones, whenever a new fault is detected. The unpredictable number and location
of fault occurrences cause reconfiguration solutions, which are designed for a bounded
number [49, 51] or constrained pattern [22, 46, 41] of faults, to be unfit for NoCs. There-
fore, we compare uDIREC only against solutions that do not put constraints on number
and location of faults. Table 3.3 presents a qualitative comparison of the algorithms in this
domain. All previous reconfiguration algorithms, either off-chip [110, 84, 106] or on-chip
[100, 39, 4, 21], are limited to the granularity of a bidirectional link, if not any coarser.
Therefore, they are limited by the shortcomings of the Coarse FM, failing to capitalize on
performance and reliability benefits of using the Fine FM. This is confirmed by the fact that
uDIREC drops less than 1/3rd of the nodes when compared to the best performing prior-art
[4].
Except for Vicis [39], which uses a costly BIST (10% overhead [33]) unit for diagnosis,
no other previous solution presented a unified approach to diagnosis and reconfiguration.
Typically, standalone route-reconfiguration schemes assume an ideal accuracy diagnosis
scheme, which either localizes a fault to an entire link/router [110, 84, 106, 100], or to a
datapath segment pair [4].
uDIREC uses simple hardware additions to assist its software-based reconfiguration,
incurring the lowest area cost among the route-reconfiguration schemes. Implementing
off-chip reconfiguration schemes requires dedicated reliable resources for the collection of
the surviving topology and the distribution of routing tables, to and from a central node,
respectively. Ariadne [4] reports that the software-managed reconfiguration algorithms
for off-chip networks, lead to 23.2% area overhead, if implemented on-chip without any
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solution diagnosis support resolution node-drop rate reconf area(%)diagnosis reconf
off-chip NO – bi-link high, >3× 23
Immunet NO – bi-link high, >3× 6
Vicis YES sgmt-pair bi-link high,dlock 1.5
Ariadne NO – bi-link high, >3× 2
uDIREC YES segment u-link low, 1× <1
Table 3.3 uDIREC’s comparison with other route-reconfiguration solutions. uDirec provides
unified fault diagnosis and reconfiguration at fine granularity, resulting in better reliability charac-
teristics. Moreover, the hardware structures required for uDIREC, are small and simple. The area
numbers for schemes other than uDIREC are as reported in prior-work [4].
modifications. Immunet [100], on the other hand, ensures reliable deadlock-free routes
by reserving an escape virtual network with large buffers, which, in the worst case, re-
configures to form a unidirectional ring of surviving nodes. Vicis [39] leverages a bulky
BIST unit at each router. In addition, the routing algorithm that Vicis implements is not
deadlock-free, and it often deadlocks at high number of faults.
Quick and minimalistic reconfiguration. Global reconfiguration solutions [100, 39, 4,
127] can tolerate an arbitrary number of faults before the network gets segmented, but suffer
from high reconfiguration overhead. In contrast, local reconfiguration solutions [133, 36]
leverage bypass rules to quickly reroute around faults using local connectivity information.
However, due to the localized nature of these solutions, they can only sustain a few faults
without causing livelock or deadlock.
Quick routing reconfiguration has been investigated mostly for off-chip interconnection
networks, such as local area networks (LANs). [20] and [111] propose dynamic, progres-
sive reconfiguration procedures to this end. However, they only discuss reconfiguration
principles without investigating the details and hardware required to support the recon-
figuration procedure. In the on-chip networks domain, OSR-Lite [119] proposes a fast
reconfiguration solution utilizing resources to support two routing-computation logic sets
based on [102], with only one of them active at a time. Upon a fault occurrence, a central
manager calculates the new replacement routes, while the old ones are still in use, then
the two are swapped. While OSR-Lite is reported to be faster than hardware solutions,
the dedicated central manager is a single-point of failure. [123] improves [119] with a
disconnection-rescuing algorithm, but it still misses potential connections due to its limited
routing capability. [44] proposes a time/space-efficient reconfigurable routing algorithm,
but it does not show its applicability to fault tolerance. In Table 3.4, we present a com-
parison of relevant routing reconfiguration techniques. Our proposed solution, BLINC, is
quick and provides high tolerance against a wide range of faults.
95
method context computation impact speed faulttolerance
BLINC (our solution) on-chip hardware local very fast high
ARIADNE [4] on-chip hardware global fast high
MD [36] on-chip hardware local very fast low
Sem-Jacobsen et al. [111] off-chip software local slow high
OSR-Lite [119, 123] on-chip software global moderate moderate
Table 3.4 BLINC’s comparison with other route-reconfiguration techniques
3.8 Summary
This chapter described solutions to protect an NoC against both soft-errors and perma-
nent faults. Protection against soft-errors requires detection capabilities, followed by a
recovery procedure. For permanent faults, however, diagnosis of the fault site is essential,
in addition to fault detection. Once a faulty component is identified, the reconfiguration
procedure either replaces the malfunctioning component with a healthy substitute, or it dis-
ables the faulty component permanently, while leveraging the redundancy in the system to
still continue operation, although at a lower performance level.
We first presented ForEVeR++ that leverages the ForEVeR infrastructure (Chapter 2)
for protecting the NoC against soft-errors. ForEVeR++ protects the NoC against soft-errors
affecting all component types (control, datapath and links). To this end, ForEVeR++ lever-
ages the ForEVeR monitoring hardware to detect soft-error manifestations, in addition to
design errors. Recovery of the soft-error affected packets is guaranteed by building re-
siliency features into our checker network. ForEVeR incurs a minimal performance penalty
up to a flit error rate of 0.01% in lightly loaded networks, while incurring an area cost of
only 6% over the baseline ForEVeR design.
We then introduced a novel method to comprehensively detect and diagnose perma-
nent faults in on-chip networks. We present a novel representation of the router micro-
architecture, partitioning it into datapath-segments for the purpose of fine-grained diagno-
sis. The high-resolution diagnosis information is then utilized by our route-reconfiguration
solution (uDIREC) to replace the defective components sparingly. Our diagnosis method
imposes no performance overhead during error-free network operation. Additionally, the
system suffers no down time on error-detection, while our diagnosis scheme is passive,
introducing no dedicated test traffic into the network. Our solution is able to achieve 98%
diagnosis accuracy by monitoring only 15 erroneous transmissions. In addition, the area
overhead is kept as low as 2.7%.
We then presented uDIREC, a solution for reliable operation of NoCs providing grace-
ful performance degradation, even in presence of a large number of faults. uDIREC
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leverages a novel deadlock-free routing algorithm to maximally utilize all the working
links in the NoC. Moreover, uDIREC incorporates a software-based fault diagnosis and
reconfiguration algorithm that places no restriction on topology, router architecture or the
number and location of faults. Experimental analysis shows that, for a 64-node NoC at 15
faults, uDIREC drops 68% fewer nodes and provides 25% higher bandwidth over state-of-
the-art reliability solutions. A combined performance, energy and fault-tolerance metric
that integrates energy-delay product with packet delivery rate, reports a 24% improvement
at 15 faults, which more than doubles beyond 50 faults, showing that uDIREC is beneficial
over a wide range of fault rates.
Finally we presented BLINC, a brisk and local-impact NoC routing reconfiguration
algorithm. BLINC utilizes a combination of online route computation procedures for im-
mediate response, paired with an optimal offline solution for long term routing. To achieve
its goal, BLINC employs compact and easy-to-manipulate routing metadata. Our evalua-
tion shows more than 80% reduction in the number of routers affected by reconfiguration,
and 98% reduction in reconfiguration latency, compared to state-of-the-art solutions. We
also discussed how BLINC enables uninterrupted availability for networks-on-chip, by al-
lowing individual network links to be taken offline for testing at high frequency. BLINC
maintains stable network performance with only a 6% increase in latency during testing, in
contrast with a 17-fold latency increase for a baseline approach that stalls one link segment
at a time.
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Chapter 4
Addressing Excessive Power Dissipation
Recent studies have shown that power-efficient performance improvements can be achieved
by designing application-specific hardware components that accelerate certain types of
computations. Research in this area has focused on integrating and utilizing several cores
implementing a diverse set of solution points in the performance, application specificity
and power dissipation space into heterogeneous Systems-on-Chip (SoCs). As the diver-
sity and quantity of heterogeneous components that make it into future CMPs and SoCs
increase, the interconnect that binds them together must also evolve to accommodate this
shift in the design paradigm. Specifically, the interconnect should be able to deliver reason-
able performance under a power budget across a diverse set of workloads. It should also
be able to monitor its own health by keeping the power consumption under check: possi-
bly by turning off unused components. A few approaches to designing Networks-on-Chip
(NoCs) for heterogeneous platforms have recently been proposed in literature, focusing on
tunable design and synthesis processes that optimize architectural parameters for a target
set of applications. This chapter proposes a new design framework that enables the NoCs
to be reconfigured at runtime, based on changing application and hardware configurations.
This design methodology allows heterogeneous system designers to quickly deploy on-
chip interconnects providing near-optimal communication in a wide range of architectures
running a variety of workloads. This differs greatly from previous approaches that require
the application’s characteristics to be known at design time and remain static throughout its
execution.
From the perspective of NoCs’ runtime health, this chapter focuses on avoiding exces-
sive power dissipation. The NoC architectures presented in this chapter reconfigure their
topology and routing dynamically to save power, optimizing based on the applications’
communication characteristics. During reconfiguration, unused or under-utilized datapath-
segments (remember the definition of datapath segment from Section 3.3.1) or even entire
routers within the NoC are switched off, and routing is re-configured to better manage ac-
tive paths. The reconfiguration mechanism is implemented in a low-overhead distributed
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hardware that allows for quick reconfigurations without affecting network performance.
All the heuristics/implementations presented guarantee that the network never enters an
erroneous state, such as deadlock or disconnection. Using such a framework, designers
will be able to provide fine-grained optimization mechanisms for pushing power-conscious
operation to the limit.
4.1 Power-Aware NoC with Panthre
NoCs are scalable and flexible, however, they are crippled by excessive power consumption
[56, 130]. Particularly problematic for NoC structures is leakage power, which is dissipated
regardless of communication activity or lack thereof. At high network utilization, static
power may comprise more than 74% of the total NoC power at a 22nm technology node
[120], and this figure is expected to increase in future technology generations. At low net-
work utilization, leakage power is an even higher fraction of the total power budget for the
NoC. With growing system integration, larger and larger portions of the NoC will be only
lightly used at any point in time, with the lightly used set varying with each application and
even within a single application over time.
Power-gating [57] is a promising solution to minimize the dissipation of leakage power.
However, conventional power-gating schemes [57] that opportunistically put components
to sleep during periods of no activity are ineffective for distributed and shared resources,
like an NoC. The problem is two-fold: i) even when lightly utilized, NoC components of-
ten do not observe long idle-periods, failing even to compensate for the energy spent in
the power-gating event itself, and ii) packets that encounter sleeping components in their
paths accrue latencies due to wake-up delays. Power-gating at a finer granularity than entire
routers [81] provides more sleeping opportunities. However, it further worsens the prob-
lem of accumulated wakeup latencies, as it puts components to sleep more aggressively.
Early wakeup with lookahead routing was proposed to compensate for wakeup latency
[80]. However, for a typical 2-stage pipeline router, lookahead can only hide a small
fraction of the wakeup latency, which is typically many cycles. In our evaluations with
multi-programmed workloads, we have identified that such conventional schemes often
lead to significant application slowdown and net energy loss.
A workload stressing only a portion of the network creates opportunities for power-
gating the remaining, lightly-used portions of the network. However, deterministic routing
algorithms provide fixed routes among source-destination pairs, and in practice do not al-
low for isolation of any network component. A possible solution is to use an adaptive
99
routing algorithm and deflect packets toward active units when they encounter a sleeping
component on their regular path. However, this approach requires additional resources to
maintain deadlock freedom, which must be kept active at all times. Moreover, accruing
multiple deflections leads to increased packet latency.
Our solution, called Panthre (for Power-aware NoC through Routing and Topology
Reconfiguration), overcomes these issues by modifying routing paths periodically so to ex-
clude lightly used portions of the topology. When Panthre’s decision engine determines
that the set of power-gated components must be updated, Panthre executes a route recon-
figuration procedure that avoids the new set of power-gated components, while providing
deadlock-free routes for all packets. This step eliminates deflections and the need for ded-
icated resources to support deadlock-freedom. Panthre leverages the rich set of alternate
paths that are available in NoC fabrics to keep traffic away from sleeping components. In
addition, it pro-actively adapts to application’s demands by power-gating only those net-
work components that are under-utilized. Similar to any route-reconfiguration approach,
the smallest granularity of route manipulation with Panthre is a datapath segment, i.e., a
collection of components within an NoC router as defined in Section 3.3.1. Therefore,
Panthre applies power-gating at the granularity of one datapath segment. This approach
presents great saving potential for leakage power, as the five constituent datapath segments
of a mesh router account for 99% of the router’s static power (Section 4.2.1).
Naturally, Panthre leads to an increase in traffic on the links kept active by channel-
ing traffic away from sleeping components. Therefore, it is essential for Panthre that
substantial low-usage links exist in the NoC. To this end, we conducted a study, whose
findings are plotted in Figure 4.1. The plot shows the contribution of network links to to-
tal network activity. Our testbed consisted of an 8x8 mesh CMP running a network-light
multiprogrammed mix of applications from the SPEC CPU2006 suite. Links are sorted by
increasing utilization during the execution, and the plot on the right indicates what fraction
of network traffic (Y axis) was carried out by a given fraction of sorted links. The plot on
the left is an enlargement of the contribution by the bottom 30% of active links: more than
20% of the links share only 5% of the traffic load on average, and only 10% of the traf-
fic travels through the bottom 30% of used links. Beyond the 30 percentile of utilization,
this disparity is no longer obvious, thus Panthre’s goal is to identify and leverage the 30%
least used links, so to maximize power savings without a significant load increase on active
links.
Panthre deploys a simple and distributed framework for traffic activity collection and
subsequent exclusion of low-usage components. Even though frequent decisions to power-
gate components are made locally at each router, Panthre’s novel reconfiguration solution
100
020
40
60
80
100
0 25 50 75 100 %
 t
ra
ff
ic
 lo
a
d
 s
h
a
re
d
0
5
10
15
0 10 20 30%
 t
ra
ff
ic
 lo
a
d
 s
h
a
re
d
>20%
>30%region of interest
fraction of links (X%) – low to high usage
Figure 4.1 Fraction of traffic load shared by the least utilized links. The fraction of traf-
fic transferred by the bottom 30% of used links is very small, thus Panthre targets this pool for
power-gating without burdening other links with high load.
ensures uninterrupted operation with guaranteed connectivity and deadlock-freedom for the
NoC topology globally. Panthre, by construction, is also free of reconfiguration-induced
routing deadlocks [76], thus eliminating the need for expensive dedicated buffering, virtual
channels (VCs), and a retransmission protocol [24, 104].
Panthre is the first solution that applies topology and routing reconfiguration in a dis-
tributed manner to maximize power savings by adapting routing decisions to changing
application communication needs. Panthre’s routing reconfiguration abilities are in stark
contrast to previous proposals, which require statistics collection, decision making, route
update and reconfiguration operation, all to be executed at a central node [104]. Such a
process requires dedicated channels to communicate with the central entity and typically
takes a long time, often requiring to suspend network operation. As a result, such cen-
tralized schemes provide little adaptivity and can only be applied at a coarse-granularity
(entire routers), and only when communication patterns are known well in advance.
In our evaluation with multiprogrammed benchmarks running on a 8x8 mesh net-
work, Panthre was able to reduce NoC power consumption by 14.5% on average for
communication-light workloads, while causing less than a 2% application slowdown. In
contrast, power-gating with lookahead [80, 81], leads to 9-11% application slowdown if
implemented at a router level, while causing as much as 20% performance loss if fine-
grained power-gating is applied. Finally, Panthre leakage power savings are 36.9% on
average when 10-16 nodes of a 64-node CMP are communication-idle.
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Figure 4.2 Overview of Panthre. Panthre consists of four components at each router: a) a usage
activity count and compare (ACC) framework to identify lightly used components, b) an ON/OFF
decision engine that determines the set of components to be power-gated, c) a Panthre-enabled route
computation unit that can execute in the background without interrupting regular NoC operation,
and d) an anomaly-based feedback algorithm that tracks application’s needs dynamically and sends
updates to the ON/OFF engine.
4.2 Panthre Design
Panthre consists of four components at each router: i) a component usage collection frame-
work (ACC), ii) a lightweight ON/OFF decision engine that determines the set of links to
power-gate based on local usage data, iii) a route compute module that updates the rout-
ing tables using broadcasts after each decision event, without interrupting normal NoC
operation, and iv) a feedback-based anomaly-detection and management unit that commu-
nicates updates to the ON/OFF decision engine so that Panthre can adapt dynamically to
changing communication patterns in the application over time. The four components of
Panthre are highlighted in Figure 4.2. These four components are implemented using fast
and lightweight distributed hardware, with minimal information communicated globally
via a few single-bit wires. The lightweight distributed hardware allows Panthre to adjust to
application’s communication needs very quickly and without ever interrupting the normal
network operation.
4.2.1 Fine-Grained Power Gating
Panthre provides fine-grained power-gating by allowing components to be excluded at the
granularity of a single unidirectional link. Upon careful examination of routers’ datapath,
we identified that powering-down a unidirectional link between two routers is equivalent
to powering down the corresponding crossbar contact and the output port at the upstream
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router, the unidirectional link itself, and the input port, input buffer and crossbar contacts
at the downstream router. We call this combined set of components, a datapath segment:
it represents the smallest granularity at which routing-based reconfiguration can be applied
for the purpose of power-gating. The concept of a datapath segment is illustrated in Figure
4.3 and was previously described in Chapter 3. Fortunately, crossbar, links and buffers
consume most of the leakage power in a router, and they can all be powered off using our
fine-grained power gating. DSENT [120] reports that 99% of the leakage power consump-
tion of the baseline mesh router synthesized at 22nm can be attributed to its 5 datapath
segments. The remaining 1% is attributed to shared units such as route computation and
allocators. Note that Panthre is unable to exclude the local datapath segment (the one con-
necting to the local core) in absence of alternate paths for them to connect to the NoC.
Therefore, in the rest of this chapter, we exclude these local datapath segments from our
computations, and assume that orthogonal power-saving schemes are being deployed for
them.
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Figure 4.3 A datapath segment. 99% of the mesh router’s leakage power is dissipated by its 5
datapath segments. Results are obtained from DSENT at 22nm node.
4.2.2 Execution Flow
Panthre’s execution is divided into fixed time windows or epochs, with power-gating de-
cisions made at the beginning of each epoch. Thus, Panthre ensures that power-gated
components are off for at least an interval of one epoch. The distributed activity counter
units (ACC, Figure 4.2) periodically collect datapath segment usage statistics by the means
of simple counters: the data is then used to guide the decision process for the next epoch.
Panthre’s decision process is simple: all datapath-segments that experience activity below
a threshold (AT H ) are put to sleep. Thereafter, a route update process updates routing tables
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to operate the network in the new configuration. However, different communication loads
require different AT H for Panthre to be effective. A fixed value could lead to an excessive
or insufficient number of power-gated segments. Therefore, we propose a threshold update
algorithm that leverages feedback from the anomaly detection unit deployed at each router.
When the number of power-gated segments is excessive, two types of anomalies may
arise: i) a large fraction of packets suffering long detours to their destinations, and ii)
congestion due to the increased load on active links. Thus, we detect these anomalies to
provide feedback to our threshold update algorithm. In addition, these anomalies are de-
tected locally at each router and broadcasted globally using single-bit wires. Each ON/OFF
decision engine is equipped with logic to update the threshold value based on this feedback
information. Note that the global anomaly broadcast ensures that AT H values are kept con-
sistent throughout the NoC. This aspect, in turn, guarantees that power-gating decisions are
fair, tackling the least used segments in the NoC.
Panthre provides the ability to systematically trade-off performance for power savings
by adjusting the criterion for the detection of these anomalies. With Panthre, stable and
power-efficient configurations are typically attained 10-15 epochs (1 epoch is 10K cycles
in our design) after a program phase change, which is quick considering that application
phases are up to 10s of millions of cycles.
4.2.3 Reconfiguration Algorithm
A hallmark of Panthre is that all power-gating decisions can be made independently at
each router, while deadlock-freedom and connectivity among all nodes is still guaranteed
throughout execution. This allows for frequent reconfigurations, in the order of one recon-
figuration event per tens of thousands of cycles. In addition, Panthre eliminates the need of
any additional hardware to recover from pathological scenarios such as deadlock. This is a
great advantage in terms of silicon cost (and power), and it also limits the impact of recon-
figuration on performance. Panthre’s reconfiguration is based on the up*/down* routing
algorithm, which breaks deadlocks by forbidding certain through-router connections be-
tween non-local links (turns). Up*/down* routing works by organizing all network nodes
on a spanning tree starting from a root node of choice. Each node receives a unique order
based on its distance from the root, and equidistant nodes are ordered arbitrarily. There-
after, all routes first leading away from the root node (down-traversal) and then towards it
(up-traversal) are marked invalid. This ensures deadlock-freedom as all dependency cycles
involve at least one ‘down→up turn’(down-traversal followed by up-traversal). A breadth-
first construction of the spanning tree rooted at node 0 is shown in Figure 4.4a. As an
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Figure 4.4 Panthre reconfiguration algorithm allows power-gating decisions to be made inde-
pendently at each router without causing disconnection or deadlock. a) Breadth-first construction
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(L-group) presents a power-gating choice between datapath-segments. b) A minimally-connected
network configuration degenerates into a spanning tree. c) A dynamically-adapted NoC where
low-usage datapath-segments are power-gated.
example, 1→4 is a down-traversal, while 4→3 is an up-traversal. Therefore, turn 1→4→3
must be marked invalid.
Note that a spanning tree, by definition, connects all the nodes in the network and it
is acyclic. In this context, Panthre’s route-reconfiguration algorithm leverages the fact that
turn restrictions are placed between two links if and only if one of them can be part of
the spanning tree. As a result, it is possible to power-gate one of the two datapath seg-
ments connected to a disabled turn and still maintain full network connectivity. Figure 4.5
illustrates the property just outlined: the left portion of the figure shows a spanning tree
construction, such that nodes 0,1 and 3 are already on the spanning tree rooted at node R,
while node 2 is being added. It can be noted that either link 0-2 or link 3-2 are sufficient to
connect to node 2. Since both are available, there will be a turn restriction 0-2-3. A similar
situation is shown on the right side of the figure, where links 1-3 and 2-3 are sufficient
to reach the to-be-added node 3, and the turn restriction is 1-2-3. The middle part of the
figure shows a more general case, where both node 2 and 3 are being added to the spanning
tree, using links 0-2 and 1-3, respectively. In this case, either the turn 0-2-3 or 1-3-2 must
be disabled to break the cycle. Depending on the turn restriction placement, this situation
degenerates into the one shown on the left or the right.
In order to organize Panthre’s reconfiguration process, we call any two links connected
by a disabled turn an L-group, as shown in Figure 4.4a. Therefore, a decision can be taken
locally at each L-group, to power-gate one of the two bi-directional datapath links, while
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the network would still be connected globally. Note that each bi-directional links comprises
two opposite unidirectional datapath segments (see Section 4.2.1). In the extreme case
when all L-groups decide to power-down two datapath segments each, the topology will
degenerate into a spanning tree, as shown in Figure 4.4b. Panthre leverages a distributed
and adaptive datapath-segment ON/OFF decision engine that determines the power-gating
decisions locally at each L-group, according to application communication characteristics.
An example network configuration produced using Panthre is shown in Figure 4.4c.
Even though many reconfiguration algorithms [4, 104] replace deadlock-free routing
paths with another set of deadlock-free routing paths after reconfiguration, packets in-
transit following the old routing paths can cause deadlocks by interacting with packets
following the new routing paths. This is because paths valid in the old routing function
might be disabled in the new routing function, or vice-versa. To circumvent this issue,
Panthre ensures that any newly developed routing configuration complies with the turn-
restrictions that were determined for an all-powered-ON NoC configuration (e.g., Figure
4.4a), eliminating the possibility of reconfiguration-induced deadlocks. Since Panthre only
disables a link if it is a part of a turn-restriction (L-group), the corresponding turn would
not be exercised, whether the corresponding link is enabled or disabled. Intuitively, if all
L-groups maximally power-gate, the network topology will degenerate into a spanning tree
(Figure 4.4b), and none of the restricted turns would be exercised. Note that Panthre’s
reconfiguration, though transparent and deadlock-free, may lead to reordering of packets
between a source-destination pair. For systems where point-to-point ordering is essen-
tial, like for certain cache coherence protocols, we suggest the use of tag matching and
reordering of packets at network interfaces, as is done in the Tilera architecture [130].
106
210
3 2
10
3 2
10
3 2
10
3
2
10
3 2
10
3 2
10
3 2
10
3
on
e 
sw
itc
he
d-
of
f 
dp
at
h-
se
g
m
en
ts
tw
o 
sw
itc
he
d-
of
f 
dp
at
h-
se
g
m
en
ts
restricted turn ON dpath-segments in L-group of node 3 other dpath-segments
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degrades into a spanning tree when maximum possible (2) datapath segments are switched-off at
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Figure 4.6 shows the eight power-gated configurations that are possible at each L-group
(around node 3 in the example). Any L-group in the network can have any of these eight
configurations (or an all-on configuration), and the network would still be connected glob-
ally. In addition, Panthre guarantees that even though the L-groups transition locally from
one configuration to the other, the network never enters a deadlock-situation. The nine con-
figurations at each L-group give Panthre great flexibility in choosing the low-usage datapath
segments to be power-gated.
Table 4.1 summarizes Panthre’s leakage power saving potential when applied to dif-
ferent topologies. The table reports the total number of non-local datapath-segments in
each topology and the number of datapath-segments required to construct the spanning tree
(#span-seg). During periods of low activity, all the non-spanning datapath-segments could
potentially be power-gated without sacrificing connectivity. We observe that Panthre has
a great potential for reducing power consumption in popular topologies, such as mesh and
tori, up to a 51% static power saving in a 8x8 torus.
topology #seg #span-seg %off topology #seg #span-seg %off
mesh-4x4 48 30 38 mesh-8x8 224 126 44
torus-4x4 64 30 53 torus-8x8 256 126 51
Table 4.1 Panthre’s leakage power saving potential for various topologies.
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4.2.4 Implementation
In this section we discuss the detailed functionality and the hardware requirements of each
of Panthre’s four components as shown in Figure 4.2. We then overview the application-
adaptive algorithm.
Activity counters and comparator (ACC). An ACC unit is associated with each datapath-
segment that belongs to an L-group. The activity counters are 10-bit counters, incremented
upon each flit traversing the corresponding datapath-segment. In addition, a 6-bit compara-
tor (compares higher order bits only) is required to compare against the AT H value provided
by the ON/OFF decision engine to determine the power-gating status of the segment in the
next epoch. An 8x8 mesh has 49 L-groups, with 4 datapath-segments each.
We monitor usage activity on an epoch-to-epoch basis. The smaller the epoch size,
the more frequently Panthre initiates reconfiguration to quickly adapt to application char-
acteristics. However, the lower-bound on epoch size is constrained by the latency of
our: i) reconfiguration (∼4K cycles), and ii) statistics collection (few thousand cycles for
capturing patterns). We determined that an epoch size of 10K cycles provides a good trade-
off between reconfiguration overhead and the amount of time Panthre takes to adapt to
changing application characteristics. We further determined that power-gating a datapath
segment that is used for more than 210 cycles within an interval of 10K cycles, is always
detrimental to performance. Therefore, our activity counters are only 10-bits wide, and all
datapath-segments with more usage than that are considered vital and always kept active.
In addition, the AT H values are incremented or decremented in quanta of at least 24, and
thus comparing the 6 higher order bits of the counters is sufficient.
The ON/OFF decision engine is deployed for each L-group and maintains and updates
the AT H value. It interfaces with the anomaly management unit to decide when the ATH
value should be incremented or decremented. To this end, a 6-bit adder/subtracter circuit
is required at each L-group. In addition, the ON/OFF decision engine instructs the route
computation unit to initiate a route-update once new power-gating decisions are made.
For simplicity of implementation, decision engines associated with all L-groups operate
in a synchronized manner. This is achieved by simply ensuring that the AT H updates,
the ON/OFF decisions and the route-updates are all applied only at epoch ends. After a
datapath-segment has been power-gated, a few packets may still require to go through old
routes to make forward progress. In this situation, the datapath-segment behaves as a con-
ventional power-gating state machine: waking up on packet arrival and sleeping again upon
its departure. Note that this scenario is extremely rare, and does not offset the benefits of
Panthre: our experiments incorporate the delays and power costs due to these situations.
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The Panthre-enabled route computation unit is shown in Figure 4.7. It consists of two
sub-components: i) a logic-based distributed routing (LBDR) implementation [40] that pro-
vides routes corresponding to an all-segments-ON configuration, and ii) a routing table that
stores the most up-to-date routes reflecting the power-gating status of the network. Having
a backup LBDR implementation has three advantages: i) upon detection of an anomaly it
allows the network to instantly switch to an all-segments-ON mode and limit performance
impact, ii) it allows the routing table to be updated bit-by-bit in the background by provid-
ing a default path if no valid option yet exists in the table, and iii) it can be implemented
cheaply. LBDR is a critical unit for Panthre as it allows uninterrupted operation even during
reconfiguration. Note that all dynamic NoC route configurations follow the minimal set of
turn restrictions, and hence packets are never stalled in router buffers due to unavailability
of valid routing paths.
Panthre is based on up*/down* routing, a naı¨ve implementation of which leads to con-
gestion at a relatively low-load compared to the popular XY routing. Therefore, we choose
less congested topology nodes as root and implement popular optimizations such as depth-
first construction of the spanning tree and load-balanced path selection [105]. Therefore,
we are able to extract at-par performance compared to XY routing, as is evident from the
results in Section 4.4. Also note that Panthre disables all its functionalities at heavy loads
because its leakage power savings are minimal at high loads. This keeps Panthre free of
any additional congestion or power dissipation at high loads.
We leverage a distributed route-update algorithm inspired by Ariadne [4] to update the
routing table on each reconfiguration event. Ariadne utilizes time-synchronized broadcasts
from all destination routers in turn, communicated to all routers through simple forwarding
operations. Each broadcast takes 64 cycles in an 8x8 mesh, and the entire reconfigura-
tion process is completed in ∼4K cycles. Figure 4.7 summarizes the features of Ariadne’s
route-update algorithm. If Ariadne-style functionality is already available in fault-tolerant
NoCs, it can be leveraged by Panthre with only minor modifications.
The anomaly management unit monitors two types of adverse behaviors that arise due to
power-gated datapath segments: i) excessive detours, and ii) network congestion. For the
purpose of detecting excessive detours, a special ‘misroute’bit is reserved in the header flit
of every packet. We set this bit if, at any router, a packet is routed through a port that takes
it further away from the destination. For a mesh topology, this is as simple as calculating
the relative X and Y coordinates of current and destination nodes: this information is al-
ready available in logic-based routing algorithms [40]. Each destination counts the fraction
of packets that suffered a detour over those that did not. If the ratio is > 1, the destination
node will broadcast a misrouting flag on a single-bit wired-OR ring (Figure 4.2). We deploy
109
packet forwarding direction
logic based 
up/down
RT update w/ 
broadcasts
default Panthre valid?
3 N
4 S
8 W
1-bit flag
1-cycle forwarding to neighbors
1-bit flag
parallel 
updates to 
routing 
table
RT update [1] features:
hardware  : 1-bit wire/port
actions       : flag broadcast
                      flag forwarding
                      RT update
one brcast : 64 cycles
#brcasts     : 64
reconf.       : 4096 cycles
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one wired-OR ring for each of 4 8x2 regions in our 8x8 mesh. These 4 rings drive a sepa-
rate wired-AND connection, and the root node is designated to monitor its anomaly status.
If the wired-AND connection is set, the root node broadcasts an anomaly code on a 1-bit
global wire that all routers can snoop. In other words, our detour detection scheme raises
a flag if at least one node in each of the 4 regions observes more than 50% misroutes. We
use a similar, but simpler scheme for congestion detection, inspired by the maximum buffer
occupancy metric of [31]. If the total buffer occupancy, at any time and at any router in
the NoC, is more than a certain threshold (29 in our implementation), the router noting the
congestion broadcasts the anomaly code on the same 1-bit global wire used for reporting
excessive detours.
Panthre’s application-adaptive algorithm is shown in Figure 4.8. At the start of execu-
tion, AT H is initialized to its maximum value, AT Hmax (= 800 in our setup). All datapath
segments with utilization above this value are never considered for power-gating. Among
the others, the ones with activity below AT H are switched-off. At the end of the execu-
tion epoch, the application-adaptive algorithm takes different actions based on whether or
not an anomaly is flagged. If an anomaly is flagged (right part of the figure), suggesting
that too many links are powered-off, then all components are instantly powered back on.
This anomaly indicates that the current AT H value is causing too aggressive power-gating.
Therefore, if anomalies are detected in the last L consecutive epochs (L=3 in our design),
AT H is lowered. Power-gating decisions are then reassessed in light of the new AT H value.
Note that decreasing AT H reduces the amount of switched-off segments and, in turn, de-
creases the likelihood of anomalies in the near future. In addition, the threshold values
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Figure 4.8 Flow-chart of Panthre’s usage-threshold update algorithm.
are lowered in two phases, with first a coarse-grain (∆AT H = 128 in our setup), and then a
fine-grained tuning (∆AT H = 16).
If an entire epoch is executed without any anomaly being flagged (left portion of the
figure), indicating that our current configuration is performance-friendly, the next epoch is
executed without updating power-gating decisions. However, if no violations are observed
in the last N consecutive epochs (N=16 in our design), suggesting that our power-gating
selection is too conservative and there is room for greater power savings, AT H is increased
and ON/OFF decisions are redone. After M (=10) successive AT H increments, we deter-
mine that the application load has considerably increased and the current AT H value is far
from optimal, thus we update AT H to AT Hmax, and re-execute the algorithm from the start.
The state machine for our algorithm is very simple and can be implemented in hardware
at low cost. It is replicated in each ON/OFF decision engine at every L-group, requiring a
6-bit adder/subtracter for AT H updates, and small counters and comparators for the other
parameters (L,M,N).
Implementation overhead. The unidirectional ring wire for anomaly broadcasts, com-
bined with wired-OR and wired-AND wires for detection of excess detours, leads to a
wiring area overhead of only 0.39% [120] in comparison to the channels of our baseline
router. We also assume that Ariadne-style route-updating functionality is already available
for fault-tolerance. All other Panthre components are extremely lightweight, with small
counters, comparators and adders added to each L-group. Therefore, compared to the deep
buffers and many virtual channels of modern routers, Panthre-specific logic is trivial both
in terms of power and area. Finally, the additional hardware is primarily for monitoring,
and thus does not add to the delay of the critical timing paths.
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4.3 Complete Router Shutdown
If some cores in a CMP system are idle, neither sending nor receiving traffic, the routers
corresponding to these cores could be completely power-gated as long as doing so does not
isolate any active node. A complete router shutdown is equivalent to shutting down 8 dat-
apath segments (4 incoming and 4 outgoing), and hence it is a very lucrative power saving
option. Panthre’s deadlock-free and connectivity-preserving reconfiguration algorithm can
be easily extended to shut down entire routers and still provide all its valuable properties.
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Figure 4.9 Complete router shutdown scheme within Panthre. Routers associated with
communication-idle cores can be put to sleep while maintaining system connectivity, as long as
they correspond to leaf nodes in the routing’s spanning tree(s). Routers that can never be considered
for shutdown are called ‘compulsory’. a) Successful shutdown of routers 7 and 13. b) Routers 11
and 14 cannot be simultaneously shutdown because this would lead to isolating an active node, i.e.,
node 15.
A router can be considered a candidate for shutdown only if it is a leaf node in at
least one of Panthre’s spanning tree constructions. The intuition behind this observation
is that a leaf node is connected to the rest of the tree only via a single link. In addition,
that link is only used for transferring packets originating or destined for that leaf router.
Therefore, if the leaf node is communication-idle, the corresponding link can be switched-
off without affecting the remaining topology. To provide an example, in Figure 4.9, the
‘compulsory’routers that can never be completely shut down are shaded in black. In the
setup of the Figure, the root is node 0 and the spanning tree was generated in a breadth-first
fashion. Note that the compulsory routers are set once a root node and a turn-restriction
configuration have been selected. Note also that in an 8x8 mesh, only 13 out of 64 routers
are compulsory. We equipped Panthre to distinguish between compulsory nodes and those
that can be shut down, and to apply shutdowns whenever possible for communication-idle
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nodes. If all compulsory routers are kept active, and if connectivity is at all possible after
shutting down all routers associated with sleeping cores, Panthre too is successfully able to
provide connectivity and deadlock-freedom.
For applications running on a multicore with 25% idle cores, our entire router shutdown
scheme can be applied successfully to more than 48% of the configurations. The integra-
tion of this scheme with Panthre is also simple: upon a group of cores notifying their idle
state, the routers associated with them (if they are not compulsory for connectivity) are put
to sleep. A route-update procedure is then executed and, if all active cores are still con-
nected to the root core (this can be easily detected by analyzing the routing table), Panthre
continues in router shutdown mode. If however, connectivity is lost, Panthre defaults back
to its baseline routing, which power-gates at the granularity of a datapath segment.
L
leaf-
link
leaf 
node
Figure 4.10 Leaf node and a leaf link. Figure shows a valid configuration with Panthre, where
all-but-one links around the leaf-node are power-gated. In this scenario, the leaf-link only carries
traffic originating or terminating at the leaf-node. Further, the leaf-link is not involved in any depen-
dency cycle. Therefore, switching-off the leaf-link, and hence switching-off the entire leaf-router,
will not affect connectivity or deadlock-freedom among the remaining nodes.
4.3.1 Connectivity with Complete Router Shutdown
Complete router shutdown can be easily implemented with Panthre and provides excellent
leakage power-saving opportunities. In this section, we provide insight into the properties
of Panthre’s reconfiguration algorithm that make complete router shutdown possible with-
out causing deadlock or disconnection. Complete router shutdown can be used to isolate a
router if that router is at the leaf node of at-least one spanning tree instance realizable with
Panthre. Panthre guarantees connectivity and deadlock-freedom for all network configura-
tions that are generated by obeying the principles outlined in Section 4.2.3. In a particular
configuration, if a router is at the leaf of the spanning tree, then by definition, it is connected
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to the rest of the network via just one bidirectional link. Let us call this bidirectional link,
a leaf link. The concept of a leaf-node and a leaf-link is shown in Figure 4.10. In such
a configuration, the leaf link is only used for communication originating or terminating at
the leaf router. In other words, the leaf link is not used for providing connectivity between
any node pair that does not contain the corresponding leaf node. Additionally, the leaf link
is not part of any cyclic dependencies. Therefore, switching-off the leaf link would not
affect the connectivity or deadlock status of the rest of the network. Since the configuration
before the link was switched-off, was deadlock-free and connected, so the configuration
after switching-off the leaf link will also be connected and deadlock-free. Notice that
powering-down the leaf link is equivalent to powering-down the entire leaf router in such a
scenario.
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Figure 4.11 Complete router shutdown for a 4x4 mesh. Every router that is a leaf node in at
least one of Panthre’s spanning tree constructions, is candidate for shutdown. The candidates for
shutdown are fixed for a particular root and turn-restriction configuration. Figure shows two span-
ning tree instances realizable with Panthre, showing all shutdown candidate routers at the leaf of the
(at least one) spanning tree. The nodes that are not at the leaf of any spanning tree are marked as
‘compulsory’.
Figure 4.11 shows two spanning tree instances, which together cover all the possible
router candidates for shutdown in the 4x4 mesh example. In other words, the two spanning
tree instances combined show all the possible leaf routers. Routers at node 0, node 1, node
2, node 4 and node 8, cannot be at the leaf node of any spanning tree that is rooted at node
0 and that follows the turn-restrictions shown in the figure. We denote such nodes as ‘com-
pulsory’, as it is necessary to keep them active if deadlock-freedom and connectivity is to
be maintained. In addition, the set of compulsory nodes is fixed for a particular choice of
root node and turn-restrictions. The location of the compulsory nodes can be hardwired to
complete router shutdown controllers at design-time.
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4.4 Experimental Results
We evaluated Panthre on a cycle-level trace-driven multi-core simulator [30], modeling a
64-core CMP system as described in Table 4.2. We used a front-end functional simulator
based on Pin [95] to collect instruction traces from applications, which are then transfered
to the trace-driven cycle-level simulator. We also integrated a detailed on-chip network
model, simulating a state-of-the-art two-stage router, described in Table 4.2b. In addition
to the baseline design with no power-gating and the Panthre design, we also implemented
router-level conventional power-gating with lookahead wakeup (PG conv) [80] and a fine-
grained port-level power-gating scheme (PG fg) [81] for comparison. For both PG conv
and PG fg, we used an idle-detection time of 4 cycles of inactivity [80]. The Panthre
design parameters described in Section 4.2.4 (e.g., ATHmax) are calibrated after detailed
design space exploration to provide a suitable trade-off between performance and power:
the values we used in our evaluation are reported in Figure 4.8.
(a) Processor @2GHz
Cores 2-wide fetch/commit64-entry ROB
coherence 4-hop MESI, 64B block
L1 cache Private: 32KB/node
ways:4 latency:2
L2 cache Shared: 256KB/node
ways:16 latency:6
Memory Distributed: 1GB/bankbanks:4 latency:160
(b) Network @2GHz
Topology 8x8 mesh, 128 bit links
Pipeline 2-stage VC flow ctrl
VCs 4 VCs/port, 8 flits/VC
Routing XY for baseline
up*/down* for Panthre
Workload synthetic: uniform
multi-prog: SPEC CPU06
Simulation synthetic: 5M
(cycles) multi-prog: 10M
Table 4.2 Experimental CMP: configuration of processor and network.
We analyzed our framework with two types of workloads: synthetic uniform ran-
dom traffic, as well as 35 applications from the SPEC CPU2006 and commercial
(sap, t pcw,s jbb,s jas) benchmark suites. We experimented across 40 randomly generated
multi-programmed workload mixes, with each mix containing 10 copies each of 6 ap-
plications randomly picked from our suite of 35 applications. For brevity of results, we
categorize the 40 workload mixes into four categories of 10 workloads each based on the
amount of cache misses per kilo instructions (MPKI). Most network transactions originate
because of misses in the caches, and hence MPKI correlates well with application commu-
nication load. The light category has benchmarks within MPKI of 200, while light-med
spans the MPKI range 200-500. The med group includes relatively network heavy bench-
marks, with MPKI between 500-1500, while the heavy category covers the MPKI range
1500-2500.
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A considerable amount of energy is spent in putting components to sleep and bringing
them back up. The amount of sleeping time required to compensate for this energy loss is
called the ‘breakeven time’. In our evaluation, we assume a breakeven time of 10 cycles and
a wakeup delay of 4ns in agreement with previous research [24, 80]. The effective sleeping
time after accounting for breakeven energy is called compensated sleep cycles (CSC) [80].
The CSC over total execution is a direct measure of leakage power savings. In our results,
we report CSC values, in addition to latency increase and application slowdown. Finally,
we use DSENT [120] to estimate total network power, accounting for both dynamic and
static power at the 22nm technology node. For dynamic energy, DSENT is used to re-
port energy spent per event (for e.g., buffer write), which is then tracked accurately in our
cycle-level simulator.
4.4.1 Synthetic Traffic
We first compare Panthre with other power-gating schemes using synthetic random traf-
fic. Random traffic is the worst case scenario for Panthre as it distributes traffic uniformly
across the network, reducing the number of low-usage links. Panthre’s primary goal is to
extract maximum power-savings by only turning-off low value datapath-segments, while
keeping latency degradation in check. Figure 4.12a plots the average packet latency for
each of the solutions evaluated. It is clear from the figure that PG conv and PG fg both
lead to a high latency increase (>2x at low load). This is due to the fact that, at low load,
network components observe packet traversals infrequently, and spend most of their time
sleeping. Therefore, packets accumulate wakeup latency at each hop. At this injection
rate, both the conventional power-gating schemes spend more than 75% of the time asleep.
However, this level of latency degradation leads to unacceptable (>10%) application slow-
down, as we will note in Section 4.4.2. Note that the latency and CSC for PG conv, both
decrease with increasing network load. However, we observe that at the injection rate
where the latency degradation becomes acceptable for PG conv (0.16 flits/cycle/node), the
CSC value drops down to only 2.7%.
In contrast, Panthre’s latency degradation is only 16.5% on average for the range of in-
jection rates shown in the graph. At an injection rate beyond 0.16 flits/cycle/node, Panthre
leads to negligible latency degradation as it keeps all links active at such high load. Natu-
rally, the power-savings are also little at that point as almost all components are considered
vital and not switched off. At low traffic loads, however, Panthre can lead to more than
20% leakage power savings (CSC) as can be noted from Figure 4.12b. With increasing
load, CSC values decrease, but Panthre still saves 10.3% leakage power on average for the
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(b) Compensated sleep cycles (CSC) obtained with
Panthre. Panthre’s leakage power savings decrease
with increasing load, the average ranges between
9.8% and 20.8% for injection rates varying from 0.01
to 0.16.
Figure 4.12 Panthre’s network latency and CSC under uniform random traffic.
range shown in the graph.
4.4.2 Multiprogrammed Workloads
Panthre is designed to save leakage power only when it is possible without degrading per-
formance. Figure 4.13a shows the speedup values for all power-gating schemes, normalized
to the baseline CMP with no power-gating capability. The average slowdown with Panthre
is only 1.9% across all four benchmark categories. In contrast, PG conv and PG fg lead
to 9.8% and 15.7% slowdown averaged over all benchmark categories, respectively. Slow-
ing down the application by such an amount is detrimental to system energy consumption.
Therefore, these conventional power-gating schemes cannot be deployed in modern CMPs.
In Figure 4.13b, we show that Panthre saves 15.6% leakage power for communication-light
workloads on average, while 9.8% leakage power is saved on average across all benchmark
categories. The total network power is reduced by 14.5%, 9.3%, 6.1% and 5.1% for light,
light-med, med and heavy workloads, respectively. With substantial power savings at very
little performance degradation, Panthre provides a good design trade-off for power-aware
systems. In addition, if designers are willing to sacrifice more performance, the Panthre
algorithm can be easily tuned for more aggressive power-gating.
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(b) Compensated sleep cycles (CSC) saved by Pan-
thre. For light workloads, the average leakage power
savings are 15.6%, while Panthre saves less for
heavy workloads (6.7%).
Figure 4.13 Panthre’s network latency and CSC with multi-programmed workloads.
4.4.3 Complete Router Shutdown
As discussed in Section 4.3, Panthre can completely shutdown a significant number of
routers associated with idle cores, and still ensure connectivity and deadlock-freedom
among the active cores. This property is useful in scenarios where certain cores are
communication-idle for substantial periods of time. We experimentally assessed Panthre’s
potential at successfully connecting all active cores after shutting down all routers associ-
ated with idle cores. To this end, we power-gated all routers associated with idle cores,
varying the number of idle cores and selecting the pool randomly (among the non- com-
pulsory ones). For each number of idle cores, we generated 1,000 distinct configurations
and reconfigured using Panthre; we finally tested the NoC to determine if any active node
was disconnected. Table 4.3 presents the results of this study for 6 different amounts of idle
cores. It can be seen that with its simple scheme, Panthre can isolate up to 25% (16 routers)
of the routers in most cases without causing any disconnection. The gains are reflected in
the power-savings achieved by Panthre with complete-router-shutdown (Panthre RS) under
low injection rate (0.01 flits/cycle/node) and uniform traffic, as shown in Figure 4.14b. It
can be noted that 36.9% of leakage power can be saved on average for 10-16 idle cores.
Note that, if Panthre RS is unsuccessful at maintaining connectivity for active cores af-
ter complete router shutdown, it reverts to its baseline approach of isolating only datapath
segments. As shown in Figure 4.14a, Panthre RS keeps latency increase under 30% on
average, providing both better power saving and latency profile than our baseline Panthre
solution.
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(b) Percentage compensated sleep cycles (CSC)
for Panthre RS is 37% for 10-16 idle cores. Pan-
thre RS improves power savings further over Pan-
thre.
Figure 4.14 Panthre’s latency and CSC when complete router shutdown is enabled at a low
injection rate and for uniform random traffic.
#idle-nodes 1 3 7 10 13 16
%connected after router shutdown 100 99 96 86 70 48
Table 4.3 Percentage of complete router shutdown configurations that provide connectivity
among active nodes. More than 48% configurations are connected with 16 or less shutdown idle
cores.
4.4.4 Adapting to Application Phase
In this section we present a case study to show Panthre’s adaptivity to changing applica-
tions’ communication characteristics. In this experiment, the network is operated at low
load (injection @ 0.01 flits/cycle/node) for 1,000 epochs, and then the network load is sud-
denly increased to 0.10 flits/cycle/node. After 1,000 epochs at high load, the network traffic
is again decreased to low load. This case-study is synonymous to typical application behav-
ior, where major phase changes are rare and in spans of millions of cycles (1,000 epochs =
10M cycles). In addition, this case study tests Panthre’s adaptivity to both increasing and
decreasing network load. Figure 4.15 plots the updates to the AT H values over the timeline
of execution. At the start of execution, AT H is initialized to AT Hmax. Since the network is
observing little traffic, activity of almost all datapath segments is below the AT Hmax value,
and Panthre’s ON/OFF decision engines switch-off datapath-segments maximally at each
L-group. Consequently, during the first epoch execution, Panthre’s anomaly management
units broadcast a flag indicating excess detours due to the many powered-down links. On
reception of this flag at any L-group, all its datapath-segments will be instantly powered-
up. At the same time, the AT H is decreased by ∆AT H . Note that, Panthre first goes through
coarse-grain adaptation (∆AT H = 128) and quickly settles around the stable value at around
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15 epochs. Thereafter, the AT H value stays around the stable value, with periodic and
fine-grained adjustments using ∆AT H equal to 16.
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Figure 4.15 Panthre quickly adapts to low-to-high and high-to-low load transitions in appli-
cations’ traffic.
Just before the transition from low-to-high load, the AT H value is stable at a low value,
and hence none of the links are powered-down when traffic suddenly increases. Thus,
Panthre operates with very few powered-down datapath segments for the next few epochs,
without observing an anomaly. The AT H value starts incrementing in small steps after
N (=16, Figure 4.8) such epochs, in absence of an anomaly. Eventually, the AT H value
is increased (after M = 10 such epochs of small AT H increments, Figure 4.8) to AT Hmax.
Thereafter, the AT H value stays around this stable mark for the duration between 1,000-
2,000 epochs. Finally, during the high-to-low traffic load transition at 2,000th epoch, the
AT H value again reduces to a stable value, in a pattern similar to the one observed at the
start of execution. This case study shows that Panthre can effectively handle both low-to-
high and high-to-low load transitions in an application phase. Similarly, Panthre was able
to adapt to both low-to-medium (0.01-0.05 flits/cycle/node) and medium-to-low (0.05-0.01
flits/cycle/node) load transitions in application phase. As can be seen from Figure 4.16, the
value of AT H stays around the optimal mark during medium traffic load, with only a few
exceptions when AT H increases to AT Hmax. However, Panthre’s anomaly detection units
quickly detect excess power-gating in such cases and reduce the value of AT H .
Figure 4.17 shows the adaptation of AT H when the network is stimulated with uniform
random traffic at a stable injection rate of 0.01 flits/cycle/node. The figure also shows the
number of datapath segments that are put to sleep in each epoch. As can be seen from
the figure, both AT H and number of power-gated datapath segments start at high values.
Therefore, Panthre detects excess detours and reduces the AT H value. A stable AT H value
is reached within 10-15 epochs, leading to 47 power-gated datapath segments on aver-
age. In addition, Panthre quickly adjusts the number of power-gated datapath segments, if
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Figure 4.16 Panthre quickly adapts to low-to-medium and medium-to-low load transitions
in applications’ traffic.
power-gating decisions become too aggressive or too conservative.
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Figure 4.17 Variation in ATH and the number of power-gated datapath segments across 1000
epochs of low-load uniform random traffic. Panthre updates ATH to maintain a suitable level of
power-gating.
4.5 Related Work
A number of power-gating schemes have been been proposed for NoC components, op-
erating at different levels of granularity: routers [80], ports [81], VCs [82], buffers [66].
However, all such schemes suffer from accumulated wakeup times and excess energy
spent in each power-gating event. NoRD [24] elongates periods of router sleep by steer-
ing light, sleep-interrupting traffic to a low-power ring network that is always kept active.
However, NoRD requires additional VC resources both in the ring and primary network
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to break deadlocks that may arise due to route-reconfiguration. In addition, NoRD re-
quires substantial dedicated hardware design and verification effort. Router Parking [104]
proposes to completely switch off routers associated with idle cores by leveraging route-
reconfiguration at a central node. Note that this schemes suffers from all the drawbacks of
centralized software-based reconfiguration algorithms. Additionally, Router Parking pro-
vides no power benefits when all cores are active, while Panthre saves up to 15% network
power even in a fully-active CMP. Catnap [31] proposes the use of multiple lightweight
networks in CMPs, while applying power-gating at the network granularity to keep the per-
formance overhead low. However, Catnap is only applicable to CMPs with high-bandwidth
requirements, and unlike Panthre, it cannot be utilized for fine-grained power-gating. Cer-
tain other route-reconfiguration solutions target performance improvement by dedicating
more resources to contentious paths. For example, the Abacus turn model [45] leverages
local and deadlock-free reconfigurations to divert additional routing paths towards heavy
traffic. However, it cannot isolate components and save leakage power by power-gating.
Finally, route-reconfiguration has been well studied in the literature in the context of
fault-tolerant routing. However, faults are rare occurrences; therefore, the majority of
the algorithms designed for fault tolerance are centralized and take significant time and
hardware resources. A notable exception is Ariadne [4], which describes a very quick
(4K cycles for a 64 node network) and lightweight route reconfiguration scheme (<2%
area overhead). Ariadne, however, also requires suspending the NoC operation during
reconfiguration and can lead to reconfiguration-induced deadlocks. In our context, since
we frequently reconfigure the NoC routing, network suspension would be detrimental.
In contrast, our route reconfiguration algorithm, although inspired by Ariadne, provides
deadlock-freedom throughout the reconfiguration, with no interruption of the mainstream
NoC activity.
4.6 Summary
In this chapter, we targeted NoCs’ runtime health from the perspective of runtime power
dissipation. NoCs consume a significant portion of the on-chip power budget: during pe-
riods of heavy activity NoC can consume up to 30% of the on-chip power. The leakage
phenomenon, that causes power dissipation irrespective of operational activity, contributes
a majority share to the NoC power at 22nm, and the ratio is worsening further with shrink-
ing transistor dimensions. We expect leakage power to be the limiting phenomenon for the
coming silicon generations. We identified that power-gating, though effective in drastically
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reducing leakage power when in effect, cannot be naı¨vely applied to shared resources, such
as the NoC. Packets communicated over the network seldom allow NoC components to
have long periods of sleep. In addition, packets that encounter sleeping components on
their paths, accumulate latencies required to wake-up the sleeping components.
To this end, we propose Panthre, that maximizes leakage power savings by guarantee-
ing long periods of uninterrupted power-gating for NoC components. It leverages topology
and routing reconfiguration to steer traffic away from sleeping components so to minimize
the latency impact. Panthre’s application-adaptive reconfiguration algorithm is imple-
mented in a lightweight and distributed manner, and it guarantees a globally-connected and
deadlock-free network at all times. In addition, Panthre monitors events indicating network
performance degradation, and updates its power-gating decisions to provide a more suitable
power-performance trade-off. Our experiments with light multi-programmed workloads
show that Panthre reduces total network power by 14.5% on average, with only a 1.8%
degradation in performance. Panthre’s network power savings increases to as much as
36.9% on average, if 10-16 nodes are idle in a 64-node CMP.
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Chapter 5
Conclusion
This dissertation addresses the most pressing challenges in ensuring the runtime health of
networks-on-chip, which are becoming more and more the interconnect of choice in multi-
core chips and SoCs. Communication infrastructure’s health is critical to the operation of
concurrent digital systems, where multiple computational units collaborate to complete a
same task. In these systems, a malfunctioning interconnect may constitute a single point
of failure if it disconnects one or more compute units from the rest of the system. Un-
fortunately, the complexity and size of these NoCs render them prone to design failures.
In addition, its constituent components are increasingly susceptible to transistor failures as
silicon dimensions shrink. Finally, contemporary NoCs bind together multitude of hetero-
geneous components, often forcing the common-case NoC designs to deliver sub-optimal
power-efficiency at runtime, which, in turn, might cause excessive power dissipation.
The solutions developed in this thesis mitigate threats to NoCs’ health by addressing
these problems at runtime, i.e., in a reactive manner. Consequently, they can address a wide
range of unforeseen problems. Further, we take an integrated approach to ensure NoCs’
runtime health, proposing a unified error detection and recovery framework. To this end,
we divide the execution of the NoC into small time windows (or epochs) so as to provide
quick error detection and recovery. During each epoch, our solutions monitor the execution
activity of NoCs in a localized and distributed manner using lightweight checkers. Upon
detection of critical events, we update the configuration of the routing scheme and the net-
work topology to better adapt to the runtime environment. The end result of our work is
a reliable and adaptable NoC infrastructure that is resilient to failures both in design and
silicon, and that adapts its power dissipation at runtime to the needs of the heterogeneous
designs and workloads.
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5.1 Summary of the Contributions
This thesis develops design methodologies to enhance the runtime health of NoCs of the
future. It particularly focuses on: i) guaranteeing correctness under unmanageable design
complexity, ii) providing dependable communication with an unreliable silicon substrate,
and iii) designing a power-aware and adaptable interconnect that tackles excessive power
dissipation. To this end, we developed novel monitoring and reconfiguration techniques
that exploit the unique characteristics of each failure class to provide low-cost, yet effective,
solutions.
Runtime protection against design errors. Our first contribution is runtime protection
against design errors that escape the pre-runtime verification effort. We presented SafeNoC,
a runtime end-to-end error detection and recovery technique to guarantee the functional
correctness of CMP interconnects. SafeNoC can detect and recover from a broad range of
functional design errors, while incurring a low performance impact only on bug manifes-
tation. This dissertation then described ForEVeR that improves error coverage and reduces
area overhead compared to SafeNoC. ForEVeR complements the use of formal methods
and runtime verification to ensure complete functional correctness in NoCs.
Runtime protection against transistor failures. The second contribution of this thesis is
the protection of NoCs against both soft- and permanent- faults. Protection against soft-
errors requires detection capabilities, followed by a recovery procedure. To this end, we
exploited ForEVeR’s infrastructure as soft-errors share many manifestation characteristics
with design errors. For permanent faults, however, diagnosis of the fault site is essential,
in addition to fault detection. To counter permanent faults, we first proposed a fine-grained
detection and diagnosis scheme that is highly accurate and runs in the background, in-
curring no performance overhead in absence of errors. Once the faulty component is
determined, the reconfiguration procedure either replaces the malfunctioning component
by a healthy counterpart, or it disables the faulty component permanently, while leverag-
ing the redundancy in the system. We then propose a reconfiguration solution, uDIREC,
which utilizes fine-grained diagnosis information to disable components frugally, while us-
ing the redundancy built into the NoC for graceful performance degradation with increasing
faults. We finally proposed a high-availability fault-tolerant solution, BLINC, based on a
novel quick-reconfiguration scheme that limits the effect of a fault manifestation to few
NoC components. Consequently, BLINC is able to provide uninterrupted availability for
mission-critical applications, even during fault manifestations.
Runtime solution to avoid excessive power dissipation. The final contribution of this
125
thesis consists of avoiding excessive power dissipation in NoCs by monitoring execution
and reconfiguring accordingly at runtime. NoCs consume a significant portion of the on-
chip power budget: during periods of heavy activity NoC can consume up to 30% of the
on-chip power [103, 130]. Our solution focuses on leakage power savings by power-gating
idle components. However, the typical network traffic seldom allows NoC components to
have long periods of sleep. In addition, packets that encounter sleeping components on
their paths, accumulate latencies required to wake them up. To this end, we proposed Pan-
thre, that maximizes leakage power savings by guaranteeing long periods of uninterrupted
power-gating for NoC components. It leverages topology and routing reconfiguration to
steer traffic away from sleeping components so to minimize the latency impact. In addition,
Panthre is application-adaptive, i.e., power savings are more aggressive for communication-
light workloads, while savings are less for communication-heavy workloads.
5.2 Future Directions
The distributed checking and reconfiguration framework developed in this thesis can be
extended to protect against other threats to NoCs’ runtime health. Among the threats that
we have not addressed in this dissertation, we believe that security breaches are the most
devastating; therefore, addressing them will be the most compelling future research direc-
tion. Our framework can also be leveraged for runtime optimization of more conventional
computer architecture metrics, such as performance or energy.
Secure communication. NoC is a centralized resource that is shared by all programs run-
ning on the CMP or the SoC. Therefore, applications actively sharing the NoC can cause
interference in each other’s execution. A tainted application running on an unprotected
NoC can thus extract information from critical applications sharing the same NoC. Con-
ventional wisdom to design secure NoCs has been to over provision hardware resources
to provide isolation at runtime [129]. Using the techniques developed in this thesis, we
propose a different approach to avert security breaches on NoCs. Rather than prevention,
we rely upon continuous traffic monitoring to detect anomalous behavior, and triggering a
recovery solution to avoid/thwart security breaches. Such a solution will result in a low-
cost solution that suffers from performance degradation only when a security attack is
underway.
Runtime optimization for performance. With the growing integration of application-
specific components in CMPs and SoCs, optimizing the on-chip interconnect for the various
execution scenarios is becoming increasingly difficult. This trend, combined with short-
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time-to-market targets, leads to an over-provisioned NoC that is designed for the worst
case. The schemes developed in this thesis can accurately monitor and predict applications’
communication characteristics, and optimize the NoC at runtime for better performance or
energy-efficiency. We can also employ our quick and transparent routing and topology
reconfiguration techniques to tailor the NoC hardware to application traffic at runtime.
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